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Beck's (1979) cognitive theory of depression states that 
irrational beliefs about the self, the world, and the future 
are typical characteristics of persons prone to depression. 
These beliefs are hypothesized to be latent until activated 
by a stressor, at which point they lead to depression. Prior 
research has firmly established the presence of such schemas 
in the actively depressed person. No evidence of 
depressotypic schemas, however, has been found among 
depression-prone persons who are currently asymptomatic (e.g., 
remitted depressives). The apparent absence of such schemas 
in the latter group might be due to inadequate assessment 
procedures. Since the schemas are hypothesized to be latent, 
it follows that they might only be revealed under special 
assessment conditions. 
In order to assess the presence of depressotypic schemas 
in depression-prone persons, three methodologies were used 
with the same group of 3 0 subjects. The subjects consisted 
of 10 actively depressed persons, 10 remitted depressives, and 
10 subjects with no history of depression. In Method I, 
subjects were exposed to tachistoscopic presentations of both 
rational and irrational versions of depressotypic statements 
under subliminal and supraliminal conditions. The dependent 
measures included a sensitive measure of dysphoric mood and 
agreement ratings with each stimulus. In Method II, subjects 
were administered four cards from the Thematic Apperception 
Test. Response latencies and total response times were 
recorded. Transcribed responses were also evaluated by 10 
expert clinicians blind to subject group. In Method III, 
subjects completed the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale, both 
under standard instructions, and under modified instructions 
to rate the beliefs of another person. The results of all 
three methodologies consistently found the actively depressed 
group to differ in the predicted direction from the normal 
group, with no differences between the normal and remitted 
groups. The results are consonant with those of prior 
investigations, and provide no evidence of depressotypic 
schemas in nondepressed, depression-prone persons. Although 
the present results do not rule out the possibility of 
depressotypic schemas in persons predisposed to depression, 
the most parsimonious explanation is that such schemas are 
concomitants, rather than precursors, of depression. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Depression 
Depression has afflicted humankind since antiquity, to 
the point of being known as the "common cold of 
psychopathology" (Seligman, 1973). Despite phenomenal 
advances over the past 20 years in our understanding of 
depression, it remains mysterious in many respects. There is 
no universally accepted etiological theory of the phenomenon; 
recent treatment interventions, despite their improved 
efficacy relative to older strategies, remain far from ideal. 
Even the precise symptoms that constitute the disorder are 
debated (Glazer, Clarkin, & Hunt, 1981; Greenwood, 1987). 
Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that a persistant or 
severe dysphoric mood and/or a loss of interest or pleasure 
in previously enjoyable activities are central to any 
conceptualization of the phenomenon (Jacobson, 1981; Rehm, 
1981b). For example, the American Psychiatric Association, 
in the recently revised third edition of its Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III-R, 1987), 
lists these two symptoms as the primary defining features of 
depression. That is, whereas the presence of one or both of 
these symptoms is not alone sufficient to constitute a 
depressive episode, the presence of at least one of these 
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symptoms is a necessary condition to diagnose depression. 
Other depressive symptoms include significant weight loss or 
gain, insomnia or hypersomnia, psychomotor retardation or 
agitation, fatigue or loss of energy, feelings of 
worthlessness and guilt, diminished ability to think or 
concentrate, indecisiveness, recurrent thoughts of death, and 
suicidal ideation (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) . 
The fact that only a subset of these various symptoms need be 
present in order to define a depressive episode results in 
substantial heterogeneity of symptoms across individuals 
diagnosed as depressed. 
The practical necessity for viable etiological theories 
and for effective treatment and prevention strategies for 
depression is obvious. In addition to the toll it takes in 
human suffering and decreased productivity, depression is 
associated with a dramatic risk for suicide. Linehan (1981) 
has found that one-sixth of the mortality for depressives 
occurs as the result of suicide, compared with only 1% for 
the general population of Americans. Estimates of the precise 
rate of depression differ, although it is generally agreed 
that between 8% and 12% of males and 20% to 2 6% of females 
will experience an episode of clinical depression in their 
lifetime (Boyd & Weissman, 1981). The age of onset of 
depression varies widely, ranging from early childhood 
throughout adult life. The duration and course of depressive 
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episodes are equally variable. At least half of those who 
experience a single depressive episode will experience at 
least one further episode at some point in their lifetime. 
Recurrent episodes may follow one another closely in time, or 
may be separated by several years of normal functioning. 
The multifaceted nature of depression is reflected in 
the range of proposed dimensions along which to subclassify 
depressive phenomena. The DSM-III-R divides Mood Disorders 
into two primary groups: Bipolar Disorders and Depressive 
Disorders (also known as "unipolar" depressions). Bipolar 
Disorders are characterized by the presence, either currently 
or historically, of a manic or hypomanic episode, whereas no 
such episode has occurred for Depressive Disorders. Bipolar 
Disorders are further divided into Bipolar Disorder and 
Cyclothymia, and Depressive Disorders are further divided into 
Major Depression and Dysthymia. Bipolar Disorder and Major 
Depression are characterized by very severe symptoms that tend 
to recur episodically. In contrast, the symptomatology of 
Cyclothymia and Dysthymia is less severe, but these conditions 
are by definition chronic and nonepisodic. Major Depression 
can co-occur with Cyclothymia (a condition sometimes termed 
"Bipolar II"), and with Dysthymia (termed "Double 
Depression"). Finally, the DSM-III-R includes residual 
categories for classifying cases of Bipolar or Depressive 
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Disorder that cannot be classified into one of the above 
categories. 
Other diagnostic subtypes that have been proposed include 
a neurotic-psychotic distinction (Paykel, 1979), an 
endogenous-reactive distinction (Mendels & Cochran, 1968; 
Seligman, 1975), a primary-secondary distinction (Robins & 
Guze, 1969; Robins, Munoz, Martin, & Gentry, 1972; Winokur, 
1973), a melancholic-nonmelancholic distinction (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987), and a seasonal-nonseasonal 
type (Rosenthal, Sack, Gillin, Lewy, Goodwin, Davenport, 
Mueller, Newsome, & Wehr, 1984). Of all the proposed 
dimensions, the unipolar-bipolar subtyping is by far the least 
controversial, and appears to be quite important in terms of 
symptomatology (Rehm, 1981), response to pharmacotherapy 
(Morris & Beck, 1974), etiology (Baldessarini, 1983; Becker, 
1977; Cadoret & Tanna, 1977), and degree of heritability 
(Mendlewicz, 1985). Moreover, psychological theories and 
interventions have focused almost exclusively on unipolar 
depression, whereas the study of bipolar or "manic" depression 
has been dominated by physiological theories and 
pharmacological interventions. Given this trend, the 
following discussion focuses only on unipolar depression. 
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Theories of Unipolar Depression 
Theories of unipolar depression can be divided into four 
broad groups: physiological, psychoanalytic, behavioral, and 
cognitive. Physiological theories are dominated by 
neurotransmitter models, which propose that abnormally low 
levels of brain neuroamines, particularly norepinephrine and 
serotonin, cause depression. The classic psychoanalytic view 
of depression holds that the condition is a result of 
introjected anger toward a lost love object. Ego 
psychologists emphasize the depressive's discrepancy between 
the actual and ideal state of the ego. Object relations 
theorists focus on the infant's failure to discriminate the 
self from significant objects as resulting in a predisposition 
toward depression. Several behavioral theories of depression 
have been proposed. Although they differ considerably in 
their details, they share the conceptualization of depression 
as largely an extinction phenomenon resulting from a loss of 
reinforcement. Aversive, inescapable social situations, 
sudden environmental changes, deficits in self-control 
behaviors or social skills, and maladaptive interpersonal 
environments have been highlighted by various behavioral 
theorists of depression. Finally, cognitive theories focus 
on abnormal cognitive content and processes in the etiology 
of depression. 
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A great deal of research has been conducted from each of 
the perspectives described above. Although some support has 
been obtained for the theories within each school, no single 
theory has been universally accepted. The cognitive theories 
have attracted a great deal of attention during the past 
several years, and are described in greater detail below. For 
a more thorough review of the various physiological, 
psychoanalytic, and behavioral theories of depression, the 
interested reader is referred to Appendix A. 
Cognitive Theories of Depression 
Over the course of the past decade, a growing amount of 
attention has been given to cognitive theories of depression. 
Although differing in details, these theories share the 
hypothesis that specific abnormalities in the processing of 
information produces depression. Treatment interventions 
therefore target the depressive's problematic cognitive 
processes (or verbal behavior) under the assumption that 
correcting these processes will ameliorate the individual's 
depression. Two cognitive theories have dominated the 
psychological literature in depression over the last ten 
years; these include the reformulated learned helplessness 
theory (Abramson et al., 1978) developed by Martin Seligman 
and his colleagues, and the cognitive theory developed by 
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Aaron Beck and his colleagues (Beck, 1967, 1976; Beck, 
Epstein, & Harrison, 1983; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; 
Sacco & Beck, 1985). 
The reformulated learned helplessness theory. The 
original learned helplessness theory held that noncontingency 
between behavior and environmental events (especially 
inescapable aversive stimulation) led to depression (Seligman, 
1973, 1974). The theory was developed following the 
observation by animal learning researchers that dogs given 
inescapable electrical shocks developed behavioral patterns 
topographically similar to many of the symptoms of human 
depression (Overmier & Seligman, 1967; Seligman & Maier, 
1967). A history of inescapable aversive stimulation was 
thought to lead to an expectation of uncontrollability of 
future events, which then resulted in depression (Seligman, 
1972, 1974, 1975). The original learned helplessness theory 
has been criticized on both empirical and theoretical grounds 
(e.g., Buchwald, Coyne, & Cole, 1978; Costello, 1978). For 
example, one of the major symptoms of depression, self-blame, 
is inconsistent with the theory (Abramson & Sackeim, 1977; 
Peterson, 1979; Peterson & Seligman, 1985). That is, if one 
sees him or herself as helpless to control negative events in 
the environment, why would one blame oneself for these events? 
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The theory was reformulated in 1978 to take into account 
more fully the depressive's perception of the relationship 
between his or her behavior and subsequent environmental 
outcomes. In brief, the revised theory holds that the 
evaluation of the nature of the causal relationship between 
one's behavior and apparently uncontrollable events determines 
how one will react to these events. Three attributional 
dimensions are hypothesized to be relevant: the 
internal-external dimension, the stable-unstable dimension, 
and the global-specific dimension. Depressed persons are 
thought to perceive bad events as due to something about 
themselves rather than about the situation (internal), which 
will be persistent across time rather than transient (stable), 
and which will likely affect outcomes in other situations as 
well (global). In contrast, positive outcomes are perceived 
by depressives caused by external, unstable, specific factors 
(e.g., luck rather-than ability or effort). The depressive's 
internal-stable-global "explanatory style" is held to be an 
enduring trait-like quality of the individual. This style is 
not itself sufficient to produce depression. Depression 
results when this explanatory style, in the context of 
stressful life events, affects the expectation of the 
uncontrollability of future events (Peterson & Seligman, 
1985). The reformulated learned helplessness theory limits 
itself to attributions about causality, and does not address 
the perception of other dimensions such as the perceived 
9 
consequences or moral aspects of events (Power & Champion, 
1986). Although existing cognitive and behavioral treatments 
for depression are interpretable within the reformulated 
theory (Seligman, 1981) , the theory has not led to new 
interventions for depression or to substantial modifications 
of existing treatments. 
The empirical support for the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory of depression is mixed. In general, most 
cross-sectional studies of depressives support the notion of 
a relationship between the internal-stable-global explanatory 
style and depression (see Peterson & Seligman, 1984, and 
Peterson & Villanova, 1984 for comprehensive reviews of this 
literature), although the empirical support for depressives' 
attributions of negative events to internal factors is 
stronger than the support for the global and stable dimensions 
(Willner, 1984) . Such data do not address, however, the 
critical hypothesis that such an explanatory style precedes 
the onset or persists beyond the remission of a depressive 
episode. This issue has been addressed by cross-sectional 
studies comparing currently depressed individuals to remitted 
depressives and individuals who have never been depressed, as 
well as by longitudinal studies which track depressed persons 
over time. Although a few such studies have found some 
indications of the depressive attributional style in remitted 
depressives (e.g., Cutrona, 1983; Eaves & Rush, 1984; Golin, 
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Sweeney, & Shaeffer, 1981; Metalsky, Abramson, Seligman, 
Semmel, & Peterson, 1982; O'Hara, Rehm, & Campbell, 1982), the 
results are generally only partially supportive of predictions 
made by the theory. Moreover, numerous other investigations 
have found no such abnormalities on Seligman's measures of 
explanatory style (most notably the Attributional Style 
Questionnaire, Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & von Baeyer, 1979) 
in premorbid or remitted depressives (e.g., Fennell & 
Campbell, 1984; Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Hollan, Kendall, 
& Lumry, 1986; Lewinsohn, Steinmetz, Larson, & Franklin, 1981; 
Mukherji, Abramson, & Martin, 1982). Several of these studies 
are discussed further below. 
Thus, although the reformulated learned helplessness 
theory remains a viable explanation of certain aspects of the 
phenomenon of depression, it has not escaped theoretical 
criticism (e.g., Power & Champion, 1986), and is only 
partially supported by empirical work. 
Beck's cognitive -theory of depression. By far the most 
popular and widely studied current psychological theory of 
depression is the cognitive theory developed by Aaron Beck 
over the past 20 years (Beck, 1967, 1976; Beck et al., 1979; 
Sacco & Beck, 1985). Trained as a psychoanalyst, Beck (1961, 
1963) observed characteristic, idiosyncratic themes in his 
early studies of depressed patient's dreams and free 
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associations. Careful study of the content of these themes 
led to the development of a clinically based theory of 
depression (Beck, 1967). Since the original publication of 
his theory, a great deal of effort has been put into the 
development and evaluation of a comprehensive treatment 
program based on the theory, culminating in the publication 
of a detailed treatment manual (Beck et al., 1979). 
Regardless of the validity of Beck's theory as an etiological 
model of depression, his cognitive therapy for depression has 
been shown to be quite efficacious for many depressed persons 
(e.g., Blackburn, Bishop, Glen, Whalley, & Christie, 1981; 
Rush, Beck, Kovacs, & Hollon, 1977). 
According to Beck's theory, "depression is primarily a 
result of the tendency to view the self, the future, and the 
world in an unrealistically negative manner" (Sacco & Beck, 
1985, p. 4) . This negative view of the self, future, and 
world is termed the "negative triad." The depressive sees 
him or herself as inept, deprived, and unworthy. Negative 
experiences are seen as being the result of a personal defect 
or abnormality. The future is anticipated to be bleak, as it 
is assumed that current difficulties will persist 
indefinitely. In addition, the world is seen as placing 
unrealistic demands upon him or her, and as presenting 
insurmountable obstacles to the realization of happiness. 
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The "negative triad" is maintained by certain deeply held 
beliefs or "schemas," which are thought to develop through 
early experiences in childhood. Schemas are defined as 
"stable cognitive patterns through which events are processed. 
Functioning like a template, schemas actively screen, code, 
categorize, and evaluate stimuli" (Sacco & Beck, 1985, p. 4). 
Examples of the schemas that Beck hypothesizes to be 
characteristic of depression include "If I am not loved by 
others, I am not a worthwhile person," and "I must achieve 
great things or I will be a failure in life" (Beck et al., 
1983, p. 2). As Power and Champion (1986) have noted, Beck 
uses the term schema interchangeably with such terms as 
belief, assumption, and attitude. This interchangeable usage 
is reflected in the name of the instrument developed by Beck 
and his associates to assess depressogenic schemas — The 
Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (Weissman & Beck, 1978). The 
depressive's schemas are held to be stable, global, rigid, and 
negatively toned (Hollon & Beck, 1979). 
The depressive's dysfunctional cognitive schemas are 
thought to remain dormant and relatively inactive until the 
individual is presented with a relevant environmental 
stressor. According to Sacco and Beck (1985, p. 5), 
"[i]t is important to point out that the cognitive theory 
of depression represents a diathesis-stress model of 
psychopathology although many writers and researchers 
fail to acknowledge this important feature. It proposes 
that individuals who are prone to depression have 
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acquired a psychological predisposition toward depression 
through early experiences that shape the development of 
cognitive schemas in a negative, self-referential manner. 
The depressoaenic cognitive schemas will remain latent 
until activated by stressors (precipitating factors! to 
which the individual is sensitized" (emphasis added). 
The significance of this point will become more obvious 
shortly when the research that has been designed to evaluate 
Beck's theory is reviewed. 
Once activated by a relevant environmental stressor 
(generally some kind of real or anticipated loss) , the 
depressogenic schemas begin to manifest themselves through 
distorted, "primitive," negativistic thinking" patterns 
consistent with themes of the negative triad. Such patterns 
include: 
1. Arbitrary inference, in which (generally self-deprecatory) 
conclusions are drawn in the absence of evidence; 
2. Selective abstraction, consisting of focusing exclusively 
on a negative detail of a situation; 
3. Overgeneralization, in which a general conclusion is drawn 
from one or more isolated events, then applied 
indiscriminately to both related and unrelated situations; 
4. Magnification and minimization, in which the significance 
and magnitude of negative events are overemphasized, whereas 
positive events are minimized; 
5. Personalization, consisting of relating external events 
to oneself without evidence; and 
6. Absolutistic, dichotomous thinking, in which one thinks 
in polarized black or white terms, and typically characterizes 
oneself in extremely negative terms (Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 
1979; Sacco & Beck, 1985). 
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These irrational thinking patterns are thus held to be the 
proximate causes of the affective, vegetative, and behavioral 
symptoms that constitute depression. 
Research on Beck's Theory 
The assessment of depressoaenic cognitions. Beck's 
theory has generated a great deal of research designed to 
evaluate its basic premises. Hollon and Beck (1979) reviewed 
several studies suggesting that depressives differ from 
control groups both in the content and the process of their 
cognitive activity. Depressives have been shown to differ from 
nondepressed individuals in reporting themes of personal loss 
and failure in dreams (Beck & Hurvich, 1959; Beck & Ward, 
1961; Hauri, 1976). Numerous studies reveal significant 
correlations between standard measures of depression and 
endorsement of depressotypic attitudes, such as those 
postulated by Beck, on a variety of paper-and-pencil measures 
(e.g., Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; Crandell & 
Chambless, 1981; Dobson & Breiter, 1981; Hollon & Kendall, 
1980; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1971; Minkoff, Bergman, 
Beck, & Beck, 1973; Nelson, 1977; Shahar, Zakai, & Berman, 
1982; Weissman, 1979). Beck, Epstein, and Harrison (1983) 
reviewed the various measures of depression-related 
cognitions, which range from those assessing underlying 
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assumptions or schemas, to those assessing "surface-level" 
cognitions such as "automatic thoughts." These authors note 
the strong correlations between these cognitive measures and 
measures of depression. 
In addition to the abnormal content of depressed persons' 
cognitions, Hollon and Beck (1979) reviewed several studies 
indicating that depressives differ from nondepressed controls 
in their cognitive processes. For example, Lishman (1972), 
and Lloyd and Lishman (197 5) found that depressed persons were 
more inclined to remember negative events and less inclined 
to recall positive events than were nondepressives. Along 
similar lines, Bargh and Tota (in press) present data 
suggesting that depressives are more efficient at processing 
negative self-referential data relative to nondepressives, 
relative to positive self-referential data, and relative to 
data about others. Similarly, Derry and Kuiper (1981), and 
Kuiper and MacDonald (1982) demonstrate that depressed 
subjects recalled equal amounts of positive vs. negative 
self-referential material on an incidental recall task, 
whereas nondepressed subjects recalled more positive than 
negative information about themselves. 
Several studies generated by the reformulated learned 
helplessness theory also suggest that depression is associated 
with anamolous cognitive processing. Several studies suggest 
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that depressives are more likely than nondepressed controls 
to offer lower estimates of the degree of control they have 
over outcomes in experimental tasks (e.g., Alloy & Abramson, 
1979). Similarly, as noted above, several studies support the 
notion that depressives tend to attribute failures to internal 
causes, such as lack of ability (Klein, Fencil-Morse, & 
Seligman, 1976; Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978). 
"Sadder but wiser". The consistent finding among the 
studies outlined above is that depressed persons report more 
negative evaluations of themselves or of situations relative 
to nondepressed controls. For some time it was generally 
assumed that depressives1 perceptions and conclusions were 
distorted and biased, consistent with Beck's theory. Several 
studies now suggest, however, that depressed persons actually 
view the world more accurately than do nondepressives, and 
that it is the nondepressed affective state that is actually 
associated with biased perception and cognition. For example, 
in the Alloy and Abramson (1979) study discussed above, it was 
found that depressed students were more accurate in their 
estimates of the degree of contingency between their behavior 
and its consequences in a laboratory task than were 
nondepressed students, who underestimated the degree of 
contingency for negative outcomes and overestimated it for 
positive outcomes. This finding was recently replicated using 
a somewhat different methodology by Dennard and Hokanson 
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(1986). Using another paradigm, Lewinsohn et al. (1980) found 
that depressives showed a close correspondence between their 
self-perceptions and the way in which others perceived them. 
In contrast, nondepressed control subjects saw themselves in 
a more positive light than others saw them. Depressed persons 
have also been shown to be more accurate or more realistic 
than nondepressives in their expectations of success vs. 
failure on laboratory tasks (Golin, Terrell, Weitz, & Drost, 
1979), in their recall of the frequency of negative feedback 
on such tasks (Nelson & Craighead, 1977) , in their 
attributions for positive vs. negative outcomes on such tasks 
(Kuiper, 1978? Rizley, 1978; Sackeim & Wegner, 1986), in the 
accuracy of their self-monitoring (Roth & Rehm, 1980), and in 
their ratings of ostensibly self-referential personality 
descriptors (Vestre & Caulfield, 1986) . 
It has been argued that these data are inconsistent with 
Beck's theory, since they suggest that it is the nondepressed 
person who holds a distorted view of reality (Layne, 1983). 
Indeed, to the extent that Beck's theory proposes that 
depressives' perceptions deviate more from "objective" 
standards than do those of nondepressed persons, the data are 
clearly contradictory. The important thrust of Beck's theory, 
however, does not depend upon objective indices of reality. 
Instead, it is the fact that depressed persons show 
systematic, negatively-skewed differences in their cognitive 
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activity relative to nondepressed persons. If normalcy 
therefore involves an illusory positive bias, then the 
depressive's heightened objectivity is in fact abnormal, and 
is clearly dysfunctional. Thus, although intriguing and 
provacative, the data suggesting that depressives view the 
world more accurately than nondepressives are not 
fundamentally at variance with Beck's theory. 
The causal relationship between abnormal cognition and 
depression. Thus, substantial data support Beck's claim that 
depression is associated with negativistic, anomolous 
cognitive activity. As Willner (1984, p. 812) has noted, 
"[a]s a description of depression, Beck's theory is 
uncontroversial." Implicit in this quote is the point, 
however, that the data reviewed above do not speak directly 
to the hypothesized causal relationship between these 
problematic cognitions and depression. Two experimental 
paradigms have been employed to address this issue, one 
involving the induction of dysphoric mood in depressed 
subjects, and the other involving the comparison of subjects 
at risk for depression with actively depressed subjects. 
The logic of the mood induction procedures (e.g., Velten, 
1968) is as follows. A nondepressed subject is presented with 
negatively toned statements along the lines of those 
hypothesized by Beck to cause depression. An increase in the 
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subject's dysphoric mood as a function of this procedure is 
held to support the notion that similar statements, when said 
to oneself, cause depression. Several studies have employed 
the Velten or similar mood induction procedures successfully 
to induce dysphoric mood in nonclinical subjects (Averill, 
1969; Coleman, 1975; Goodwin & Williams, 1983; Hale & 
Strickland, 1976; Isen, Shalker, Clark, & Karp, 1978; Masters, 
Barden, & Ford, 1979; Moore, Underwood, & Rosenhan, 1973; 
Natale, 1977a,b; Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Strickland, Hale, & 
Anderson, 1975)• 
The use of standard mood induction procedures, however, 
presents certain problems. First, it has been suggested that 
the mechanism by which these procedures function may not be 
via a direct cognitive manipulation, but rather through 
experimenter demand processes (Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 
1981; Polivy & Doyle, 1980) . Second, it is unclear if the 
mood changes produced by such procedures are in fact related 
to clinical depression. Although this is an important 
concern, the centrality of dysphoric mood as the sine qua non 
of depression enhances the plausibility of this dependent 
measure as a potential analogue to clinical depression. 
Moreover, ethical considerations preclude experimental 
manipulations that might produce effects that more fully 
resemble the symptoms of clinical depression. A third concern 
with mood induction procedures as a test of Beck's theory is 
20 
that such procedures presumably only affect "surface level" 
cognitive processes, and do not modify or interact with 
underlying schemas. Since most nondepressed persons would not 
be expected to hold to depressogenic schemas, Beck's theory 
would not seem to predict that the presentation of affectively 
laden stimuli would result in substantial depressive-like 
symptoms in individuals with no history of or predisposition 
toward depression. 
The second line of research designed to address the 
causal relationship between problematic cognitive processes 
and depression involves comparing persons at risk for 
depression but who are currently not depressed with 
individuals who are actively depressed. Such studies have 
been conducted longitudinally, in which subjects are tracked 
over time with repeated assessments made of both cognitive 
variables and depression, as well as cross-sectionally, in 
which a group of actively depressed persons are compared with 
other subject groups, such as remitted depressives and 
individuals who have never been depressed. 
One of the most comprehensive longitudinal studies was 
conducted by Lewinsohn et al. (1981). These authors 
administered several measures of depressotypic cognitions, as 
well as standard measures of depression, to a large community 
sample (n = 998) . Assessments were made at two different 
21 
points in time, with an average of 8.3 months between 
assessments. When a subject was assessed as being depressed 
at either of the two assessment phases he or she also tended 
to endorse depressotypic cognitions at that phase, supporting 
the hypothesized association between cognitive abnormalities 
and depression. Interestingly, however, the subjects who were 
not initially depressed, but who became depressed during the 
course of the study, did not differ on the cognitive measures 
at the initial assessment from subjects who did not become 
depressed. Similarly, subjects who were initially assessed 
as depressed, but who recovered during the course of the 
study, did not differ from the nondepressed subjects on the 
cognitive measures at the second assessment phase. Comparable 
results using longitudinal designs were obtained by Hamilton 
and Abramson (1983) , Lewinsohn, Hoberman, and Rosenbaum 
(1988), and Silverman, Silverman, and Eardley (1984). 
The same pattern of results has been obtained in several 
studies using a cross-sectional methodology in which the 
cognitions of remitted depressives are compared to those of 
actively depressed persons, as well as persons who have never 
been depressed. The logic of such studies is as follows. 
Since remitted depressives have been depressed and are at a 
high risk for future depressive episodes, they should 
demonstrate the stable depressogenic cognitive schemas 
suggested by Beck's theory. Remitted depressives would not 
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be expected to show all of the cognitive abnormalities that 
characterize actively depressed persons, since the more 
"surface-level" cognitions such as "automatic thoughts" are 
hypothesized to arise concomitantly with depression. 
Individuals who have never been depressed would not be 
expected to show abnormalities at either the level of 
automatic thoughts or at the level of underlying schemas. In 
a typical cross-sectional study, Hollon et al. (1986) 
administered the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; Weissman 
& Beck, 1978), a measure of the underlying depressogenic 
schemas postulated by Beck's theory, and the Automatic 
Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980), a 
measure of ruminations experienced by depressed persons, to 
groups of actively depressed persons, remitted depressives, 
and never-depressed controls. Consistent with the results of 
the longitudinal investigations, the actively depressed 
subjects showed abnormalities on both measures, but the 
remitted depressives did not differ from the never-depressed 
controls on either measure. Similar results were obtained by 
Fennell and Campbell (1984), and by Wilkinson and Blackburn 
(1981). 
A somewhat different pattern of results was obtained in 
a study by Eaves and Rush (1984). Using a longitudinal 
design, they administered the ATQ and DAS to a group of 
depressives when actively depressed, and then again after each 
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subject had been remitted for two to three weeks. As 
expected, both measures were elevated at the initial 
assessment. At the follow-up assessment, however, the 
remitted depressed subjects' ATQ scores were not different 
from a group of normal controls, but the DAS scores, although 
somewhat reduced, remained elevated relative to those of the 
controls. As noted by Hollon et al. (1986), however, the 
"remitted" depressed subjects continued to have relatively 
high scores on a standard depression measure, suggesting that 
the two to three week "remission" period was insufficient for 
full symptomatic recovery. 
In summary, several studies have examined the potential 
role of depressogenic cognitions as predisposing or diathesis 
conditions for depression. These investigations support the 
notion that depressed persons tend to endorse measures of 
depressotypic cognitions. The literature provides little 
support, however, for the hypothesis that individuals at risk 
for depression will report depressogenic schemas even when not 
currently experiencing a depressive episode. 
These results have posed a challenge to Beck's theory 
since it is based on the assumption that depressogenic schemas 
antedate the onset of a depressive episode and persist beyond 
its remission. A frequently overlooked but critical aspect 
of Beck's theory provides a clue to conducting more 
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appropriate evaluations of the theory. To wit, Beck proposes 
that the depressogenic schemas are latent or dormant during 
periods when the depression-prone individual is asymptomatic. 
Thus, the failure of persons at risk for depression to endorse 
depressogenic schemas on standard paper-and-pencil measures 
when not actively depressed is actually consistent with Beck's 
theory. 
The hypothesized presence of latent, inactive 
depressogenic schemas in individuals at risk for depression 
presents a challenge to the testability of Beck's theory. 
How can the presence of these schemas be confirmed in the 
asymptomatic depression-prone person if the schemas cannot be 
measured by standard instruments? A possible solution might 
involve a variation in the assessment procedure. Wilkinson 
and Blackburn (1981, p. 290), for example, raise the 
possibility that "...recovered depressed patients or 
individuals vulnerable to depression do not display these 
dysfunctions under most conditions, but only in, say, stress 
conditions or situations which may have specific cue 
properties for the individual." Along similar lines, Riskind 
and Rholes (in press) suggest that the negative thinking style 
of depression-prone individuals may be more accessible under 
conditions similar to those in which the pattern was 
originally learned (e.g., following a significant failure or 
loss). Similarly, Rush (personal communication, May 28, 1987) 
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draws an analogy between certain medical diagnostic tests and 
a potential procedure for assessing latent depressogenic 
schemas. Many disease processes are at least initially 
latent, and do not appear under normal assessment conditions. 
If the diseased individual is stressed in a relevant way, 
however, the pathology will be manifested. For example, 
coronary arrtery disease may not show up on a 
electrocardiagram until the individual is given a treadmill 
stress test. Similarly, an electroencephalogram may not 
reveal a patient's seizure disorder unless conducted under 
conditions of sleep deprivation. Analogously, assessment of 
an individual's depressogenic cognitive schemas using standard 
self-report measures may be futile under normal resting 
conditions, but when presented with a relevant stressor (e.g., 
the threat of some kind of loss) , the schemas may be revealed. 
In the following sections, three different experimental 
paradigms are discussed that, when applied to the problem of 
assessing the latent depressogenic schemas postulated by 
Beck's theory, might overcome the difficulties associated with 
standard assessment procedures. The first paradigm to be 
discussed involves tachistoscopic presentation of 
depressotypic statements such that they are below the 
subject's awareness threshold. The second methodology 
involves the use of the Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 
1943), an instrument commonly used in clinical settings for 
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the purpose of assessing organizing beliefs. Finally, the 
third paradigm involves administration of the Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale (Weissman, 1979) both under standard 
instructional conditions, and conditions in which the 
instructions are modified in hopes of decreasing potential 
demand characteristics problems. Following a discussion of 
each methodology, their potential implications for Beck's 
theory are elaborated. 
Subliminal Perception: History and Overview 
The basic idea behind 
perception1 is quite simple: 
psychologically by stimuli of 
introducing the concept, Dixon 
the notion of subliminal 
Individuals may be affected 
which they are unaware. In 
(1981, p. 1) writes that 
"...the brain's capacity to register, process, and 
transmit information is by no means synonymous with that 
for providing conscious perceptual experience. 
Manifestations of either capacity may occur without the 
other, and each may be independent of the other. 
Whereas conscious perceptual experience must presumably 
be dependent upon antecedent and underlying physiological 
events, these may well be quite different in kind from 
those responsible for the orderly transmission of 
information from input to output. By the same token, the 
capacity of the brain to process information does not 
depend upon, nor necessarily include, conscious 
representation of this information." 
Few would argue against the notion that conscious perceptual 
processes regularly occur in the absence of immediate external 
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stimulation. Indeed, the occurrence of dreams, images, 
illusions, and hallucinations is generally taken as 
self-evident. The converse — that external stimulation may 
impact behavior without the perceiver being aware or conscious 
of the stimulation — is, however, an idea that is more 
difficult for many to accept. 
In an exhaustive review and analysis of the theoretical 
and experimental work on subliminal perception up to that 
time, Dixon (1971) chronicles the history of the notion that 
people are affected by events outside of their awareness. 
According to Dixon, the first recorded references to 
subliminal perceptual phenomena are found in the writings of 
the Greek philosophers Democritus, Plato, and Aristotle. 
Aristotle, for example, was the first Western thinker to 
propose that unconscious stimuli during the waking hours may 
affect the content of subsequent dreams. Montaigne (1580, 
cited in Dixon, 1971) later used the notion of subliminal 
perception to address the problem of "Buridan's ass," an 
approach-approach conflict, in which an ass must choose 
between two ostensibly identical bales of hay. Over a century 
later, Leibniz (1698a & b, cited in Dixon, 1971) discussed 
subliminal perceptual phenomena at length, and anticipated 
several modern phenomena including the Poetzl phenomenon and 
perceptual defense; these phenomena are discussed below. 
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The credibility of subliminal perception grew with the 
advent of experimental psychology in the late nineteenth 
century, which began to provide an empirical basis for the 
phenomena. Throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, researchers using a variety of methodologies and 
investigating numerous different perceptual phenomena obtained 
results supporting the hypothesis that unconscious stimulation 
alters behavioral measures. The so-called "New Look" in 
perception theory and research, which proposed that 
motivational factors play a role in perceptual processes, 
steadily gained momentum (Bruner & Postman, 1947a & b; 
Erdelyi, 1974; McGinnies, 1949; Postman, Bruner, & McGinnies, 
1948) . 
The credibility of subliminal perception, as well as the 
research on subliminal phenomena, sharply declined during the 
late 1950's and early 1960's. Dixon (1971, 1981) argued that 
several factors conspired to damage the credibility of 
subliminal perception. First, rumors began circulating during 
the late 1950's that advertisers were using subliminal 
stimulation to promote the sale of popcorn and soft drinks at 
motion picture theatres (McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil, 1958). 
Both the public and the federal government were alarmed by 
these rumors. For their part, many psychologists renounced 
subliminal phenomena as nonexistant and therefore harmless. 
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Vigorous critiques of earlier experimental work in the area 
were undertaken at this time (Dixon, 1981). 
A second, more substantial factor, which actually 
underlies the uproar over the putative use of subliminal 
stimulation in advertising, concerns the issue of free will. 
The idea that one may be influenced by factors outside of 
one's conscious experience, precluding conscious 
countercontrol of such stimulation, directly threatens 
cherished tenents of free will. The popular exposure of 
subliminal perceptual research to the lay public as a result 
of the advertising scare dramatically increased public and 
scientific concern about this threat to free will. 
A third factor contributing to the downfall of subliminal 
perception involved changes in the mainstream academic 
Zeitgeist. In particular, subliminal effects were frequently, 
though unnecessarily, associated with psychoanalytic theory, 
which was rapidly falling out of favor during this period. 
Moreover, subliminal perceptual phenomena were associated by 
some with extrasensory perception, further damaging the 
respectibility of the area. 
A fourth and final factor contributing to the decline of 
subliminal perception was the advent of signal-detection 
theory. More specifically, the distinction between sensory 
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and response effects challenged the classical psychophysical 
notion of the perceptual threshold. Since subliminal 
perception seemed to rest upon the classical notion of the 
perceptual threshold, signal detection theory seemed to do 
away with subliminal phenomena in a single stroke. The 
current relationship between subliminal perception and signal 
detection theory is discussed in a later section. 
Presenting various elaborations of the four themes 
discussed above, several review papers published during this 
period sharply criticized the notion of subliminal perception 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The most 
significant of these included papers by Goldiamond (1958), 
Eriksen (I960), and Neisser (1967). The impact of these 
papers was profound, virtually preventing research in this 
area from impacting mainstream academic psychology for several 
years (Dixon, 1971; Erdelyi, 1974). 
But the critiques also had the positive, fortuitous 
effect of forcing researchers to examine closely and refine 
their methodologies, and forcing theorists to address the 
arguments raised against the phenomena. As is discussed 
further below, refined experimental methodologies, the 
demonstration that subliminal phenomena are completely 
compatible with signal detection theory, and advances in the 
neurosciences have led to a dramatic re-emergence of research 
31 
in the area over the past 15 to 20 years. A brief overview 
of the major criticisms that have been raised against 
subliminal perceptual phenomena, as well as counterarguments, 
is presented in a later section. 
Basic Research in Subliminal Perception 
There is a very large body of literature on the effects 
of subliminal stimulation of various sensory modalities, in 
which a number of different experimental methodologies have 
been employed. One of the earliest investigations of 
subliminal perception stemmed from the serrendipitous 
discovery of Poetzl (1917) that aspects of stimuli of which 
subjects are not aware during the presentation of the stimulus 
tend to emerge into awareness, frequently in a somewhat 
disguised form, at a later time. The so-called Poetzl 
phenomenon has been widely studied, and has found to be robust 
across different modalities of stimulation and dependent 
measures. Another area that received wide attention in the 
1950's and 1960's was perceptual defense. A large body of 
literature documents that stimulus recognition thresholds are 
not fixed, but instead vary as a function of the content of 
the stimulus, with emotionally threatening or anxiety 
provoking stimuli requiring longer presentation durations than 
less evocative stimuli. A third area of basic research in 
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subliminal perception involves the demonstration that 
subliminally presented verbal labels affect the perception of 
subsequently presented ambiguous stimuli. Cognitive 
psychologists have recently studied the phenomenon of priming, 
in which recognition of a stimulus (the target) is facilitated 
by preceding it immediately with a related stimulus (the 
prime). It has been demonstrated that such priming effects 
occur even when the prime is presented subliminally. A fifth 
experimental paradigm involves stereoscopic visual 
stimulation, in which simultaneous but inconsistent 
information is presented to the two eyes. It this paradigm, 
subjects report awareness of only the stimulus presented to 
one eye. It has been demonstrated, however, that the stimulus 
of which the subject is unaware (the nondominant stimulus) 
nevertheless affects the perception of the perceived 
(dominant) stimulus. Zajonc and his colleagues (e.g., Kunst-
Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) have presented data demonstrating that 
the mere-exposure effect, in which subjects' aesthetic 
preferences for stimuli are affected by prior exposure to 
those stimuli, occurs even when the stimuli are presented 
subliminally. Another area of subliminal perception research 
involves the use of physiological measures such as cortical 
evoked potentials. It has been shown, for example, that 
greater evoked potentials occur in response to subliminal 
presentations of meaningful stimuli relative to meaningless 
stimuli. 
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Although it is impossible to do justice to this extremely 
rich and complex literature in only a few pages, a brief 
review of each of the areas of basic research in subliminal 
perception described above, as well as others, is included in 
Appendix B. For more thorough reviews, the interested reader 
is referred to Dixon (1971, 1981) and to Erdelyi (1974). 
Virtually all of the research described above, although 
not incompatible with psychoanalytic theory, was not 
specifically designed to evaluate psychodynamic hypotheses. 
In the following section, a research program is described in 
which the methods derived from basic research in subliminal 
perception have been systematically applied to the evaluation 
of psychoanalytic propositions. 
Subliminal Psvchodvnamic Activation 
By far the most extensive application of subliminal 
methodologies to the study of clinical problems has been 
conducted by the late Dr. Lloyd Silverman at New York 
University.2 Beginning in the mid 1960*3, Silverman and his 
colleagues began using subliminal tachistoscopic stimulation 
to evaluate "dynamic propositions" (i.e., currently 
maintaining factors of personality and/or psychopathology) of 
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psychoanalytic theory (Silverman, 1983) . Since, from a 
psychodynamic perspective, stimulation presented below 
threshold is thought to activate or quell unconscious 
conflicts, the method has come to be known as "subliminal 
psychodynamic activation." 
The basic method is described by Silverman (1983, p. 70) 
as follows: 
"The method involves the observation of behaviors before 
and after 4-millisecond tachistoscopic exposures of 
experimental and control stimuli under conditions in 
which both subject and experimenter are blind to stimulus 
content. The experimental stimuli consist of verbal 
messages and/or pictures, with content designed to 
stimulate the unconscious wishes, anxieties, and 
fantasies that psychoanalysis views as central motivators 
of behavior. The control stimuli consist of neutral 
verbal and pictorial content." 
This general paradigm has been applied in three different 
contexts. First, in laboratory studies of clinical 
populations, persons with a particular form of psychopathology 
are presented with stimuli designed either to intensify 
temporarily or to reduce their symptomatology within one or 
two laboratory sessions. Secondly, laboratory studies of 
nonclinical populations are similar to the studies described 
above, except that normal subjects are employed. Finally, 
treatment adjunct studies involve repeated subliminal 
presentation of stimuli over a period of time in an effort to 
bring about lasting improvement in subjects' problems. 
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A brief discussion of each of these applications, 
including a description of a typical study from each category, 
is presented below. For more thorough reviews of this 
fascinating body of literature, the interested reader is 
referred to Silverman (1976, 1983), Silverman, Lachmann, and 
Milich (1982), and Weinberger and Silverman (1987). 
Laboratory Studies of Clinical Populations 
The typical laboratory study of a clinical sample 
involves the following procedures (Silverman, 1983; Weinberger 
& Silverman, 1987). In the first phase, subjects are 
introduced to the experimental setting, then provided with 
four flashes, each of 4 msec duration, of a neutral baseline 
stimulus. This is followed immediately by collection of 
baseline dependent measures. Next, four "critical" flashes 
of either an experimental stimulus or a control stimulus are 
presented, and dependent measures are again collected. In a 
second phase, which either takes place within the same session 
or in a subsequent session on the following day, the procedure 
outlined above is repeated with one variation. The critical 
stimulus (i.e., experimental or control) that was not shown 
in the first session is presented. Finally, a discrimination 
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task employing a signal detection methodology is presented to 
ensure the subliminality of the stimuli. 
In all psychodynamic activation studies, the procedure 
is conducted under double-blind conditions. The experimenter 
is kept blind as f.o the experimental condition by having 
another experimenter who never comes into contact with the 
subjects code the back of the tachistoscopic cards according 
to the order in which they are to be presented. The 
experimenter then inserts the cards into the tachistoscope in 
such a way that he or she does not view what is printed on 
them. The subject's "blindness,11 of course, is assured by the 
fact that the stimuli are presented well below the awareness 
threshold. Finally, any ratings or codings that are made of 
the dependent measures are made by assessors who are kept 
blind to the within-subjects experimental condition, and, in 
the case in which different subject groups are compared, to 
the subjects' group condition. 
A series of four experiments conducted by Silverman, 
Bronstein, and Mendelsohn (1976) illustrated the effectiveness 
of subliminal stimulation in affecting the pathology of 
clinical populations. Four groups of subjects were compared: 
hospitalized schizophrenic men, homosexual men, a mixed-gender 
sample of stutterers, and a group of hospitalized depressed 
women. Each group of subjects was run according to the 
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procedures outlined above. The experimental stimuli for each 
group reflected themes commonly held by psychoanalytic writers 
to be involved in the pathology of that group. The control 
stimuli reflected themes characteristic of another disorder. 
For example, the experimental stimuli (one pictorial and one 
verbal) for the schizophrenic sample were aggressive in theme, 
consisting of a drawing of an "angry man with teeth bared 
about to stab a woman," and the corresponding message DESTROY 
MOTHER. The control stimuli, reflecting the theme of incest, 
consisted of "a picture of a nude man and woman in a sexually 
suggestive pose with the accompanying verbal message FUCK 
MOMMY." Similar pathology-relevant (experimental) and 
pathology-irrelevant (control) stimuli were used for the other 
three groups. The experimental stimuli for one group 
contituted the control stimuli for another group and vice 
versa. For example, the incest stimuli described above were 
considered experimental stimuli for the homosexual sample, 
whereas the aggressive stimuli were considered the control 
stimuli. In addition to the pathology-relevant experimental 
and the pathology-irrelevant control stimuli, each subject 
was also administered a third "neutral-control" condition. 
The neutral control-stimuli for all groups consisted of "two 
men facing each other with bland looking expressions" along 
with the verbal message PEOPLE THINKING. 
38 
Each subject was run in each of the three experimental 
conditions (i.e., experimental, irrelevant-control, and 
neutral-control stimuli) in three separate sessions conducted 
on three consecutive days. The order of the three conditions 
was counterbalanced across subjects. A variety of dependent 
measures was employed, each designed to assess the relevant 
pathology for each subject group. These included ratings of 
story recall tests, carefully scored responses to projective 
tests, systematic observations by the experimenters, subject 
numerical ratings of the attractiveness of pictures, observer 
ratings of stuttering, and self-report mood measures. 
For the schizophrenic, homosexual, and stutterer samples, 
the results were clear and consistent: The pathology-relevant 
stimuli significantly increased measures of the particular 
pathology characteristic of each group, whereas the control 
stimuli had no such effect. Only for the depressed subjects 
were the results equivocal. Consistent with the results of 
the other groups, the control stimuli had no effect on the 
depressives. The experimental stimuli did significantly 
increase a secondary measure ("non-verbal pathology"), but had 
no effect upon the primary dependent measure of mood ratings. 
Thus, for three of the four subject groups, specific effects 
were found only for stimuli theoretically linked to the 
disorder in question. Importantly, the specificity of the 
results rules out the possibility that intensification of all 
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four forms of psychopathology resulted simply from the affect 
associated with the experimental stimuli. 
Numerous other studies of clinical populations have been 
conducted. Schizophrenics represent the most extensively 
studied group. In 14 of 17 investigations (reviewed in 
Weinberger & Silverman, 1987), a temporary exacerbation of 
pathological verbal behavior and/or pathological nonverbal 
behavior has been demonstrated in response to experimental 
relative to control stimuli. Moreover, studies of pathology 
reduction in schizophrenics have also been conducted. The 
most commonly used stimulus for this purpose is MOMMY AND I 
ARE ONE (for a discussion of the theoretical rationale behind 
this stimulus, see Silverman, 1983, and Silverman et al., 
1982). In 11 of 12 studies, tachistoscopic exposures of this 
stimulus have significantly reduced the pathology of 
schizophrenics relative to control stimuli. 
Despite the mixed results of the depressed sample of the 
Silverman et al. (1976) study described above, four studies 
have demonstrated an increase in dysphoric mood among 
depressives following presentation of aggressive stimuli 
relative to control stimuli (Cox, 1974; Miller, 1973; Rutstein 
& Goldberger, 1973; Varga, 1973). Only one study of 
depressives has completely failed to demonstrate any effects 
of subliminal psychodynamic stimuli (Oliver & Burkham, 1982). 
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As noted by Silverman (1985), however, the particular stimuli 
used in this study were rather poorly chosen, and would not 
be expected on theoretical grounds to intensify depressive 
pathology. In addition to the positive results for aggressive 
stimuli, Dauber (1984) reported two experiments in which 
guilt-inducing stimuli increased the dysphoric mood of mildly 
depressed female college students. 
In addition to studies of schizophrenics and depressives, 
three studies have found positive results for stutterers 
(Silverman, Klinger, Lustbader, Farrell, & Martin, 1972 [two 
experiments]; Silverman et al., 1976), and three have obtained 
positive results for male homosexuals (Silverman, Kwawer, 
Wolitzky, & Coron, 1973 [two experiments]; Silverman et al., 
1976). To the author's knowledge and consistent with. the 
recent review by Weinberger and Silverman (1987), there exist 
no disconfirming studies of homosexuals or stutterers. 
Laboratory Studies of Nonclinical Populations 
Two general types of subliminal psychodynamic activation 
studies have been employed with nonclinical populations, 
generally consisting of undergraduate college students 
fulfilling a course requirement. The first involves studies 
designed to decrease anxiety among students, using the same 
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basic research design described above. Florek (1978) found 
that subliminal presentations of the stimulus MY LOVER AND I 
ARE ONE, accompanied by a picture of a man and a woman gazing 
affectionately at each other, significantly reduced scores on 
the state form of the State-Trait Anxiety Scale. This finding 
was subsequently replicated by Silverman and Grabowski (1982) . 
This latter study revealed that the MY LOVER AND I ARE ONE 
stimulus served to decrease anxiety only for women, whereas 
the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus reduced anxiety only among 
the male subjects. 
The second type of study using nonclinical samples 
focuses on the effects of arousal of "oedipal" conflicts among 
male students on competitive performance. In a series of four 
experiments, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) 
presented the stimulus BEATING DAD IS OK, accompanied by a 
picture of an older man looking approvingly at a younger man, 
as well as the stimulus BEATING DAD IS WRONG, accompanied by 
a similar picture in which the older man is looking 
disapprovingly. Both of these stimuli, along with control 
Stimuli such as PEOPLE ARE TALKING, PEOPLE ARE SITTING, etc., 
were presented in counterbalanced order to all subjects. 
Immediately following each series of presentations of each 
stimulus, subjects engaged in a dart-throwing "tournament," 
and were told that cash prizes would be given to the three 
highest scorers. The dependent measure was the subject's 
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competitive performance, as measured by his total score for 
each series of eight dart throws. 
The results of three of the four studies were clearly 
supportive of predictions: The "OK" condition resulted in 
significantly better performance relative to the "WRONG" 
condition. The one study that failed to obtain positive 
results (the third study in the series) differed from the 
first two in that the experimental stimuli were presented 
under much greater illumination conditions. To test the 
hypothesis that this increase in lighting was responsible for 
the null results, the fourth study varied illumination as an 
independent variable, and found that the effect only occurred 
in the low illumination condition. This rather unexpected 
finding underscored the necessity of carefully controlling the 
degree of illumination of the blank and experimental stimulus 
fields, as well as the background room lighting, in 
tachistoscopic research (Silverman, 1983, 1984). 
Several attempts have been made to replicate and extend 
these findings. Among 11 such investigations reviewed by 
Silverman (1983), five represent clear replications, three 
only partially replicated the results, and three clearly 
failed to replicate. A recent replication attempt by Fisher, 
Glenwick, and Blumenthal (1986) also only partially replicated 
the original results. Similarly, Vitiello, Carlin, Becker, 
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Barris, and Dutton (1989) also failed to replicate these 
results. Several hypotheses have been proposed to account for 
these failures to replicate (Silverman, 1982, 1983), and 
further research designed to evaluate these hypotheses is 
needed. Nevertheless, effects using the dart-throwing 
paradigm do not appear to be nearly as robust, at least in 
terms of the proportion of successful replications, as either 
the research with clinical populations discussed previously 
or the research described below. 
Therapy and Educational Adjunct Studies 
In all of the studies reviewed thus far, the effects of 
subliminal stimulation have been quite brief. Given even the 
temporary ameliorative effects of certain stimuli for 
psychopathology, however, a natural extension of this work 
involves its application in therapeutic or educational 
contexts. Several such studies have been conducted. In 
contrast to the typical within-subjects design used in the 
studies discussed previously, "treatment-adjunct" studies 
typically employ a between-subjects design in which subjects 
are randomly assigned to one of two groups. Both groups 
receive the same intervention that in and of itself is 
believed to be effective for the condition in question. In 
addition, one group also receives repeated subliminal 
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exposures to an experimental stimulus that is hypothesized to 
enhance further the effectiveness of the treatment, while the 
other group is presented with a control stimulus. The stimuli 
are presented several times at the beginning and/or end of 
each treatment session. 
In a typical therapy adjunct study, Palmatier and 
Bornstein (1980) employed a "group-oriented, multicomponent 
behavior therapy package" for smoking cessation for all 
subjects. The 34 subjects were randomly divided into two 
groups. Subjects in the experimental group received four 
tachistoscopic presentations (4 msec) of the stimulus MOMMY 
AND I ARE ONE during each treatment session (no corresponding 
picture was used in this study) . Subjects in the control 
group received the stimulus PEOPLE ARE WALKING. The treatment 
groups, composed of both experimental and control subjects, 
met for 12 sessions over an 18-day period. The group 
therapists, the experimenter administering the tachistoscopic 
stimuli, and the subjects themselves were kept blind to the 
subjects' experimental condition. Smoking behavior was 
assessed at 1-month and 3-month follow-up periods, utilizing 
both the subjects' self-report and confirmation by someone 
with regular knowledge of the smoking habits. The results 
revealed a dramatic effect of the experimental stimulus: At 
the one-month follow-up, 67% of the subjects in the 
experimental group were abstinent, compared to only 12.5% in 
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the control group. At the three-month follow-up assessment, 
substantial differences in abstinence rates between the groups 
remained: 44% for the experimental group relative to 12.5% 
for the control group. 
Similar treatment studies have obtained positive results 
with a variety of subject populations, including insect 
phobics (Silverman, Frank, & Dachinger, 1974) , hospitalized 
schizophrenics (Silverman, Levinson, Mendelsohn, Ungaro, & 
Bronstein, 1975), depressed outpatients (Thornton, 1987), 
overweight women (Martin, 1975; Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & 
Mendelsohn, 1978; Ungaro, 1981), alcoholics (Schurtman, 
Palmatier, & Martin, 1982) , personality disordered adolescents 
in a residential treatment setting (Bryand-Tuckett & 
Silverman, 1984), college students in group therapy (Linehan 
& O*Toole, 1982), and persons with assertiveness problems 
(Packer, 1984). 
The subliminal psychodynamic activation method has also 
been employed in educational contexts. Ariam and Siller 
(1982), for example, presented Israeli high school students 
with two Hebrew translations of the English MOMMY AND I ARE 
ONE stimulus. The stimuli were presented four times per week 
for six weeks. Relative to subjects who received a control 
stimulus (the Hebrew translation of PEOPLE ARE WALKING IN THE 
STREET), the experimental subjects obtained significantly 
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higher grades on a mathematics exam given at the end of the 
six-week period. Similar results have been obtained in at 
least four additional studies (Hobbs, 1983; Parker, 1982; 
Qureshi, 1985; Zuckerman, 1980). 
In discussing several conclusions based on the therapy 
and educational adjunct studies reviewed above, Weinberger 
and Silverman (1987) note the importance of dosage. Effects 
are strongest when subjects are seen at least three times per 
week for at least two to six weeks.3 Moreover, in the only 
study to date in which dosage has been systematically varied, 
Packer (1984) found strong effects when the experimental 
stimulus was presented four times per week, but only marginal 
effects when it was presented only two times per week. 
Criticisms of Psvchodvnamic Activation Studies 
Two criticisms have been raised against the subliminal 
psychodynamic activation research discussed above. First, a 
great deal of this work has been conducted at New York 
University under the supervision of the late Dr. Lloyd 
Silverman. It has been suggested that some (presumably 
undeliberate) factor unique to Silverman's laboratory could 
have been largely responsible for the observed treatment 
effects (Heilbrun, 1982). Nevertheless, as of 1984, at least 
47 
20 dissertation studies conducted outside of Silverman's 
laboratory, in addition to numerous other non-dissertation 
investigations, have obtained positive results (Silverman, 
1984). Moreover, the ratio of studies conducted outside of 
Silverman's laboratory that have obtained positive results to 
those that obtained negative results is better than 3:1 (see 
Silverman, 1983, and Weinberger & Silverman, 1987, for 
listings of these studies). When the studies conducted within 
Silverman's laboratory are included, the overall ratio of 
supportive to nonsupportive studies is better than 4:1. 
The second criticism concerns the fact that many of the 
studies conducted both within Dr. Silverman's laboratory and 
elsewhere have been doctoral dissertations (Porterfield & 
Golding, 1985). Far from being a weakness, however, this fact 
renders the evidence in favor of the subliminal psychodynamic 
activation method all the more impressive. First, as noted 
by Silverman (1985, p. 642), "unlike other studies that may 
or may not be exposed to the light of day (the file-drawer 
phenomenon of Rosenthal, 1979), all dissertations are listed 
and abstracted (in Dissertation Abstracts^ so that a 
meaningful tally is possible." Thus, consideration of 
dissertation results is not hampered by the well-documented 
bias against publication of null results. The second reason 
that dissertation studies are not to be discounted is the fact 
that such studies are generally carefully planned and 
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thoroughly scrutinized by a committee of researchers before 
being conducted, and are generally directly supervised by a 
seasoned researcher. 
Having addressed criticisms of the subliminal 
psychpdynamic activation method in particular, an appraisal 
of the criticisms that have been raised against subliminal 
perceptual research in general is now presented. 
Criticisms of Subliminal Perception Research 
In this section the major criticisms that have been 
raised against subliminal perception are explored, as well as 
the degree to which research and theory to date have addressed 
these concerns. The criticisms can be divided into two broad 
categories: logical objections and methodological issues. 
Logical obiections. The primary "philosophical" 
objection to subliminal perception is that it is logically 
impossible, since one must first perceive in order not to 
perceive (as in perceptual defense). This argument has been 
proposed by Howie (1952) and Gibson (1968), and is reminiscent 
of Jean Paul Satre's famous criticism of the psychoanalytic 
notion of defense (i.e., one must first be aware of a conflict 
in order to raise defenses against it) . This objection is 
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readily addressed by noting that current theories do not 
conceptualize perception as an all-or-none process whereby 
environmental stimulation either has no impact upon the 
organism or else evokes conscious phenomenal experience. 
Rather, "perception," broadly speaking, is a complex, 
integrated series of processes, not all of which need involve 
awareness. Simply put, there is nothing illogical in the idea 
that organisms can make discriminations without necessarily 
being aware of (a) the stimuli discriminated, and (b) the fact 
that a discrimination is even being made. Moreover, the 
organism's ability to make discriminations without awareness 
does not require invoking a discriminating homunculus, as has 
sometimes been suggested. As Dixon (1981, pp. 184-185) notes, 
"...if an anthropomorphic preperceiver is necessitated 
by the phenomena of perceptual defence, then, logically, 
it must similarly be necessitated by all other systems 
of the living organism which do not rely upon phenomenal 
representation of the input. It would for example be 
obligatory to maintain that the cerebellum contains a 
homunculus able to discriminate the vestibular and 
proprioceptive inputs upon which skilled behavior 
depends." 
It is worth noting at this point that the notion of 
subliminal perception is completely compatible with current 
knowledge of the structure and functioning of the nervous 
system. Dixon (1971, 1981) has proposed a detailed 
neurophysiological model of subliminal perception, which has 
been expanded upon by Shevrin (1978). Regardless of the 
ultimate validity of these particular models, they serve to 
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illustrate the plausibility of subliminal perception from a 
neurophysiological perspective (Shevrin & Dickman, 1980). 
Moreover, contrary to popular opinion (e.g., Kihlstrom, 
1987; Shevrin, 1986; Shevrin & Dickman, 1980), the notion of 
subliminal perception is not the least bit incompatible with 
a behavioristic position. One possible behavioral analysis 
of subliminal perception is as follows.4 A very weak stimulus 
might nevertheless be strong enough to elicit certain 
emotional respondents, such as feelings of dysphoria for 
example. This relatively weak level of stimulation may be 
insufficient, however, to evoke operant behavior that might 
interfere with the emotional respondent (e.g., such as a class 
of "defending" behavior). As the level of stimulation 
increases, the operant behavior is more likely to be evoked, 
thereby obscuring the effects of the respondent. This 
corresponds to the fact that subliminal effects are frequently 
strongest at very weak stimulus levels relative to stronger 
levels. Awareness can be thought of in behavioral terms as 
the result of a second operant behavior of overtly or covertly 
verbalizing a stimulus (or more precisely, a tacting 
relationship between the stimulus and a verbal response; 
Skinner, 1957). Subliminal perception simply refers to the 
situation in which some behavior (such as the emotional 
respondent referred to above) is produced by a stimulus under 
conditions in which that same stimulus does not evoke an 
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associated verbal response. As with the neurophysiological 
models referred to above, the significance of this 
interpretation lies not in its validity per se, but is simply 
to illustrate the compatibility of subliminal perceptual 
phenomena with a behavioral analytic theoretical perspective. 
The majority of the criticisms leveled against subliminal 
perception have been methodological in nature. These 
criticisms are thoroughly reviewed by Dixon (1981) and by 
Erdelyi (1974) , and can be grouped into three main categories: 
response bias, partial cues, and experimenter demand effects. 
Response bias. The response bias argument, discussed 
previously in the context of perceptual defense, stems from 
the shortcomings of classical psychophysical methods to 
distinguish between so-called sensory and response effects. 
This argument holds that subjects would rather appear 
insensitive than hallucinated, and when in doubt tend to 
report not being aware of a stimulus (Goldiamond, 1958). In 
studies of subliminal perception in which signal detection 
methods have been applied in an effort to disconfound sensory 
and response effects, changes in sensory sensitivity (d1) have 
been found to vary substantially as a function of subliminal 
stimulus content (Broadbent & Gregory, 1967; Dorfman, 1967; 
Hardy & Legge, 1968). Moreover, the typical finding in 
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perceptual defense studies that highly emotive or taboo 
stimuli are recognized at lower thresholds than are moderately 
arousing stimuli argues against a purely response bias 
position. 
Finally, contrary to what might be deduced from a 
superficial overview of signal detection theory, the notion 
of subliminality is not at all incompatible with the theory. 
Both Dixon (1981) and Green (1964) argue that discrimination 
without awareness is in fact more compatible with signal 
detection theory than with classical psychophysics. In this 
regard, it is important to note that subliminal perception 
does not depend upon the notion of a fixed, invariant, 
all-or-nothing perceptual limen, as is sometimes claimed by 
critics (cf. Moore, 198.2) . Rather, the notion of subliminal 
perception simply entails the hypothesis that discrimination 
can occur at stimulus values below the range over which an 
individual's awareness threshold may range or vary (Dixon, 
1981). 
The partial cue hypothesis. The second methodological 
argument that has been raised against subliminal perceptual 
research is known as the partial cue hypothesis. The basic 
idea is that far from being completely unaware of the 
"subliminal" stimulus, the subject does consciously perceive 
part, if not all, of the stimulus, and makes a response on 
53 
the basis of partial information about the stimulus (Kellner, 
Butters, & Wiener, 19 64) . There is no question that much 
ongoing discrimination, especially discrimination of which one 
is aware, occurs in response to brief, supraliminal, "partial" 
stimuli. It is quite unlikely, however, that the results of 
all subliminal perception studies could be accounted for by 
supraliminal partial cues. Providing the strongest evidence 
against the partial cue hypothesis is the well-documented 
observation that many subliminal effects are greater well 
below the awareness threshold than when the threshold is 
approached (see Dixon, 1981, and Silverman, 1984 for a 
discussion of these studies). 
Moreover, several studies reveal that subliminally 
presented stimuli do not affect subsequent recognition of 
structurally similar stimuli, as would be expected according 
to the partial cue hypothesis. For example, Worthington 
(1964) and Wallace and Worthington (1970) found that the time 
taken to dark adapt in order to become aware of taboo words 
such as SHIT and CUNT was greater than the time required for 
neutral words of similar structure (SHOT and CULT) and of 
dissimilar structure (BOOK and TEST). There was no enhancing 
effect, however, of prior presentation of the taboo words on 
recognition of the structurally similar words over the 
structurally dissimilar words. This finding is consistent 
with the binocular rivalry study by Somekh and Wilding (1973) 
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discussed previously, in which subliminal presentations of the 
words HARRY and SAP did not affect the dependent measure, 
whereas under supraliminal conditions they did, having been 
misread as HAPPY and SAD. Finally, several studies have found 
that a stimulus presented subliminally will affect a behavior 
that the same stimulus, presented supraliminally, will not. 
Zuckerman (1960), for example, found that the stimuli WRITE 
MORE and DON'T WRITE, superimposed on cards from the Thematic 
Apperception Test, only affected subjects' behavior when 
presented subliminally. 
Thus, although the effects of partial cues cannot be 
ruled out completely in all subliminal perceptual studies, 
the results of several lines of research simply cannot be 
accounted for solely in terms of partial cues. 
Experimenter demand effects. An obvious issue to be 
reckoned with in subliminal perceptual research concerns the 
possibility of experimental demand effects (Orne, 1962; 
Rosenthal, 1963). Indeed, this possibility has been raised 
as a general explanation for all subliminal perceptual effects 
(e.g., Neisser, 1967). 
There are two points meriting consideration in this 
regard. First, much subliminal research (most notably all of 
the subliminal psychodynamic activation studies) has been 
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conducted under conditions in which both the subject and the 
experimenter were blind as to the subject's experimental 
condition. It should be noted that the majority of 
psychological research is not conducted under such stringent 
double-blind conditions. Interestingly, one study that 
explicitly set out to demonstrate "subliminal" effects by 
experimenter demand characteristics failed to produce any 
effects (Barber & Rushton, 1975). 
The second point relevant to the issue of experimenter 
demand effects is the degree to which the experimenter takes 
care to ensure that subjects are relaxed and at ease during 
the experiment. Dixon (1981) reviews numerous studies 
suggesting that "sensitivity to stimuli below the awareness 
threshold depends upon the subject being passive, relaxed, 
and non-selectively attentive, and that the, to use a current 
expression, 'uptight,' focally attentive, and highly aroused 
subject may, conversely, remain wholly unaffected by such 
stimuli" (p. 199) . Dixon goes on to suggest that a 
nonspecific "experimenter effect," concerning the degree to 
which the experimenter puts subjects at ease, may in fact be 
quite relevant to the likelihood of obtaining subliminal 
effects. This is not, of course, an alternative explanation 
of subliminal perceptual effects, but rather a potentially 
important contextual factor that may impact the probability 
that specific subliminal effects will occur. 
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In summary, a large body of literature employing a wide 
range of methodological paradigms suggests that stimuli of 
which one is completely unaware can affect one's behavior. 
The criticisms of this thesis have been adequately addressed 
on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Although problems 
can be identified with virtually any single study in any area 
of psychology, the empirical evidence from converging 
methodological paradigms supports the validity of subliminal 
perceptual phenomena beyond any reasonable doubt. 
The Thematic Apperception Test 
As a result of his work at the Harvard Psychological 
Clinic from 1927 to 1943, Henry Murray and his colleagues 
developed a theory of personality functioning organized around 
the notion of core conflicts (Murray, 1938). These conflicts 
were thought to result from the individual's "needs" 
confronting current environmental "presses" that facilitate 
or interfere with the satisfaction of needs. Examples of 
typical needs include achievement, affiliation, and agression, 
and examples of presses include criticism from others, being 
comforted, and exposure to physical danger. 
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Working with C. Morgan, Murray (1943) developed the 
Thematic Apperception Test in order to evaluate these needs 
and presses. The test consists of 29 black-and-white pictures 
from various sources printed on cards, and one blank white 
card, although only 10 cards are typically administered to any 
subject. Most of the pictures are drawings depicting 
ambiguous interpersonal scenes. The subject is asked to make 
up an imaginative story to each card, which includes a 
beginning, a middle that describes what the characters are 
doing, thinking, and feeling, and an ending. Murray reasoned 
that intense, long, and/or frequently occurring themes in the 
subject's stories pointed to important areas of conflict. 
Since the time of its original publication, the TAT has 
become one of the most widely used personality measures, and 
is included in most clinical test batteries in which 
personality is assessed. In addition to assessing areas of 
conflict, the test is also used to identify underlying 
organizing themes in a person's life of which the person may 
be unaware or unable to articulate. These themes have been 
referred to by various names, including "thema" (Murray, 
1938), "games" (Berne, 1964), "scripts" (Schank & Abelson, 
1977; Tomkins, 1978), "if-then sequences" (Alexander, 1987), 
and "leitmotifs" (Demorest, 1985). Despite theoretical 
differences, all of these concepts refer to general sequential 
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themes that help organize (or at least reflect) one's 
perception, cognition, and behavior. 
The notion of these organizing themes is quite similar 
to Beck's notion of schemas. Although Beck does not discuss 
the TAT directly as a method of assessing depressotypic 
schemas, the test's long history as an instrument for 
assessing such constructs makes it a potentially useful tool 
in this regard. 
Several scoring systems have been developed for the TAT 
that generate psychometrically reliable data. These systems 
are currently rarely used in either clinical or research 
settings, however, due to concerns that they compromise the 
test's validity and/or utility. Although many clinicians who 
use the TAT rely upon subjective norms developed over many 
years of using the test, much objective normative data has 
been published describing typical responses to each card 
(Atkinson, 1958; Holt, 1978; Murstein, 1963; Rapaport, Gill, 
& Schafer, 1968). These data allow the clinician or 
researcher to choose certain cards that tend to elicit 
particular themes. For example, card 3BM represents a person 
of ambiguous gender huddled next to a couch on the floor, next 
to whom is an ambiguous object that is often seen as a gun. 
This card tends to evoke themes of depression and suicidality, 
especially resulting from the loss of a loved one or the 
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failure in some important task (Holt, 1978; Rapaport et al., 
1968). Of course, depressive themes are frequently given even 
by nondepressed persons in response to this card. The 
intensity, duration, and manner in which the story is 
concluded, as well as the degree to which depressive themes 
emerge in response to other cards, are keys that are used to 
distinguish the nondepressed person from the individual whose 
schemas are marked by significant depressive ideation. 
On the basis of such normative data, it was hypothesized 
that cards that tend to pull for themes reflected in the 
depressotypic schemas proposed by Beck could be chosen for the 
present investigation. For example, a relatively small number 
of cards could be administered that tend to evoke themes of 
loss, failure in important strivings, achievement motivation 
and aspirations, intimacy, dependency, dysphoria, and suicidal 
impulses. Review of the depressotypic schemas proposed by 
Beck (1967; Sacco & Beck, 1985) reveal that such themes are 
central to these schemas. If remitted depressives do in fact 
hold depressotypic schemas, it follows that these might be 
revealed in their TAT data. More specifically, the TAT 
responses of remitted depressives and never-depressed persons 
would be expected to differ such that the remitted persons' 
data would be characterized by similar depressotypic themes 
as those found among actively depressed persons. 
60 
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS; see Appendix C) 
was developed by Weissman (1979) as a self-report paper-and-
pencil measure of the depressotypic schemas postulated by 
Beck. It consists of 40 statements reflecting general 
beliefs, that subjects rate according to their degree of 
agreement along a seven-point scale (from agree very much to 
disagree very much). The test items closely reflect Beck's 
schemas, and include issues concerning perfectionism, 
overconcern about approval from others, and over-generalizing 
from specific behaviors to global negative traits, among 
others. 
The DAS has been found to be psychometrically sound. An 
eight-week test-retest correlation of .84 was obtained by 
Weissman (1979), and subsequently replicated by Hamilton & 
Abramson (1983). The construct validity of the DAS is 
supported by several studies. Weissman (1979) reported 
correlations of .36 and .47 with measures of depression among 
students. Two additional studies of student populations found 
that mildly depressed students endorsed more dysfunctional 
attitudes than did nondepressed students (Dobson & Breiter, 
1983; Gotlib, 1984). Hamilton and Abramson (1983) found that 
depressed inpatients had higher DAS scores than nondepressed 
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psychiatric control patients. O'Hara, Rehm, and Campbell 
(1982) found a correlation of .28 between the DAS and the Beck 
Depression Inventory (a widely used measure of depressive 
symptomatology; Beck, 1978) among pregnant women. Weissman 
(1979) also reports a correlation coefficient of .52 between 
the DAS and the Cognitive Bias Questionnaire (Hammen & Krantz, 
1976; Krantz & Hammen, 1979), a measure of the tendency to 
show negatively biased reasoning that is often found among 
depressed persons. 
Despite the intent of the DAS to measure enduring 
depressotypic schemas, the measure has been found in many 
studies to covary with depressive episodes. That is, the 
measure has been found to return to the normal range following 
remission of the episode (Eaves & Rush, 1984; Hamilton & 
Abramson, 1983; Reda, Carpiniello, Secchiaroli, & Blanco, 
1985; Silverman, Silverman, & Eadley, 1984; Simons, Garfield, 
& Murphy, 1984). Although this finding is frequently seen as 
being at odds with Beck's theory (e.g., Barnett & Gotlib, 
1988), it is in fact quite consistent with the theory if one 
considers that Beck proposes that the depressotypic schemas 
again become latent upon remission of the depressive episode. 
One would therefore not expect face valid, self-report 
measures to reveal the presence of these latent schemas, even 
if they were present. 
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In an effort to overcome whatever editing processes might 
mask the presence of such schemas, the DAS might be 
administered under a different instructional set that 
decreased the pull for socially desirable responses. For 
example, nondepressed, depression-prone persons could be asked 
to rate the beliefs of others instead of themselves. Under 
such instructions, they might tend to endorse a higher level 
of depressotypic schemas relative to never-depressed persons. 
In any case, the DAS represents a valuable measure of the 
dysfunctional beliefs proposed by Beck for currently depressed 
persons. The absence of high DAS ratings among asymptomatic 
persons at risk for depression, hcvever, should not be taken 
as evidence against the presence of depressotypic schemas in 
the context of Beck's theory. 
Statement of Purpose 
The present investigation examined the role of 
depressotypic schemas in unipolar depression by means of three 
different methodologies. As discussed previously, Beck's 
cognitive theory of depression proposes that individuals prone 
to depression hold unrealistically negative beliefs about 
themselves, the world, and the future. These deep-seated 
beliefs or schemas develop relatively early in life, but 
remain dormant until the individual is presented with a 
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relevant environmental stressor. Upon presentation of such 
a stressor, the schemas are activated, beginning a series of 
processes eventually resulting in depression. Although much 
research confirms the presence of the depressotypic schemas 
postulated by Beck among actively depressed persons, there is 
as yet little support for the presence of these schemas among 
individuals at risk for depression who are currently not 
depressed. 
The failure of most studies conducted thus far to support 
this latter relationship seems to present a significant 
problem for Beck's theory. On the one hand, Beck specifically 
proposes that the schemas are latent when the individual is 
not actively depressed. Thus, studies that fail to document 
the presence of these schemas, using standard measures, in 
depression-prone persons who are not currently depressed can 
hardly be held to be inconsistent with Beck's theory. On the 
other hand, however, the presence of these latent schemas must 
somehow be identifiable in the person at risk for depression 
if the diathesis-stress aspect of Beck's theory is to be 
supported. Otherwise, the most parsimonious account of the 
current data is that "depressogenic" cognitions are simply 
symptoms or concomitants of depression. Thus, one of the most 
potentially problematic aspects of Beck's theory involves the 
difficulties associated with demonstrating that the abnormal 
cognitive processes seen among depressives are precursors of 
their depression. The observed correlation between abnormal 
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cognition and depression does not directly address this issue, 
since, as noted above, an equally plausible and more 
parsimonious explanation is that certain abnormal cognitions 
arise as symptoms or concomitants of depression. In order for 
the notion of latent depressogenic schemas to be theoretically 
and practically useful, some assessment procedure must be able 
to confirm their existence in the nondepressed, 
depression-prone person, despite their latent status. 
Thus, an identification of abnormal cognitions among 
persons known to be at risk for depression is critical if 
Beck's theory is to be viewed as anything more than a useful 
description of depression. Moreover, if such a relationship 
were to be identified, it would represent a psychological 
marker for depression, and as such could potentially be of 
extreme practical utility in identifying persons at risk for 
the disorder. Such identification might then allow for 
preventative measures to be taken in order to prevent the 
development of this devastating condition. 
Method I: Subliminal Stimulation of Depressotypic Statements 
All of the studies investigating the role of 
depressotypic schemas among depression-prone persons that have 
been conducted to date have relied upon standard 
paper^-and-pencil self-report measures administered under 
65 
normal assessment conditions. As discussed previously, 
several authors (e.g., Riskind & Rholes, in press; Rush, 
personal communication, 1987; Wilkinson & Blackburn, 1981) 
suggest that special assessment circumstances may be needed 
in order to verify the presence of abnormal schemas in the 
depression-prone person. The most commonly suggested 
variation in the assessment conditions involves the 
introduction of a significant stressor. 
Another possibility is suggested by the research in 
subliminal perception, particularly the subliminal 
psychodynamic activation method developed by Silverman. As 
discussed previously, Silverman's method (particularly as used 
with clinical populations) involves presenting brief 
tachistoscopic presentations of theoretically derived stimuli 
to various populations while monitoring measures of the 
pathology characteristic of the population under study. This 
procedure has been successfully used to demonstrate the 
association between putative unconscious conflict areas and 
corresponding forms of psychopathology, including depression. 
To this writer's knowledge, all of the studies employing 
Silverman's method thus far have used stimuli derived from 
psychoanalytic theory. There is nothing about the method, 
however, that limits its use to psychodynamic stimuli. 
66 
The present study employed a variation of Silverman's 
methodology in an attempt to identify the presence of the 
depressogenic cognitive schemas postulated by Beck's theory 
in persons at risk for depression. The study also examined 
the impact of subliminal presentations of stimuli derived from 
Beck's theory on the dysphoric mood of actively depressed 
persons, remitted depressives, as well as "normal" controls. 
Moreover, the impact of supraliminal presentations of 
depressogenic schemas was also examined. 
Three groups of subjects were solicited for the study: 
(a) actively depressed persons, (b) persons with a history of 
clinical depression but who are currently remitted, and (c) 
persons who have never experienced a significant depressive 
episode. Given the recurrent, episodic nature of depressive 
episodes, remitted depressives are known to be at significant 
risk for future depression. According to Beck's theory, this 
group should therefore hold latent depressotypic schemas.5 
Each subject was presented with a series of stimuli. 
The stimuli were divided into two groups. One group was 
composed of stimuli reflecting the irrational, self-defeating 
schemas proposed by Beck (e.g., "I have to be perfect"). The 
other group reflected rational, nondepressive alternatives to 
the depressotypic items (e.g., "I don't have to be perfect"). 
All stimuli were presented both subliminally and 
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supraliminally to each subject. Two dependent measures were 
employed. These included a sensitive measure of dysphoric 
mood, presented following each experimental condition, and a 
visual analogue rating of agreement with each individual 
stimulus item. 
On the basis of Beck's theory, as well as the literature 
on subliminal perception reviewed above, the following 
predictions were made. Neither subliminal nor supraliminal 
presentations of the irrational or rational stimuli were 
predicted to impact significantly the dysphoric mood of the 
never-depressed, "normal" subjects, since most if not all of 
these subjects were not thought to hold depressotypic beliefs. 
Moreover, the normal subjects were predicted to disagree 
consistently with the irrational stimulus items, and to 
endorse the rational items, regardless of presentation 
modality. 
In contrast, the actively depressed subjects were 
expected to show the opposite pattern of agreement ratings. 
That is, relative to the normal subjects, they were predicted 
to show higher agreement with the irrational stimuli and lower 
agreement with the rational stimuli regardless of presentation 
modality. It was less clear, however, whether the subliminal 
or supraliminal stimuli would significantly impact the 
depressed subjects' dysphoria, as their depressogenic schema 
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were already thought to be "activated." It was thought that 
the irrational stimuli might, however, result in a mild, 
temporary exacerbation of the depressives' dysphoric mood, 
with a possible mild amelioration following the rational 
stimuli, especially when the stimuli were presented 
subliminally. 
The most critical predictions concerned the remitted 
depressive group. According to Beck's theory, remitted 
depressives are expected to hold latent depressotypic beliefs. 
Prior research has examined these subjects' agreement ratings 
of irrational, depressotypic items, and has revealed no 
differences from normals. Assuming that a person truly does 
hold to such beliefs, the failure to endorse the beliefs may 
be due to either (a) the individual's lack of awareness of the 
beliefs, or (b) a deliberate attempt to present oneself as 
"normal." In either case, under proper subliminal 
stimulation, the remitted subjects were expected to endorse 
the depressotypic beliefs. Thus, relative to the normal 
subjects, the remitted group was predicted to report higher 
agreement ratings for the irrational items and lower agreement 
ratings for the rational items in the subliminal conditions. 
The remitted subjects' pattern of agreement ratings was not 
expected to differ from that of the normals in the 
supraliminal conditions. With regard to dysphoric mood, the 
subliminal presentation of the irrational stimuli was 
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predicted to increase temporarily the remitted depressives* 
dysphoric mood, whereas the rational stimuli were predicted 
to decrease dysphoric mood. Supraliminal presentations of 
either type of stimulus, however, were not predicted to impact 
dysphoric mood. Note that the remitted subjects were 
expected to respond similarly to the depressives in the 
subliminal conditions, and similarly to the normal subjects 
in the supraliminal conditions. 
The present study was similar in some respects to the 
mood induction studies described earlier. The present 
methodology, however, was designed to overcome many of the 
problems inherent in most mood induction research. Since the 
stimuli were delivered by an experimenter who was "blind" as 
to their content, potential experimenter demand effects were 
eliminated. Moreover, since clinical rather than analogue 
populations were employed, the results can be expected to be 
much more relevant to the phenomenon of clinical depression 
than are most previous mood induction studies. 
There are, of course, ethical concerns that must be 
addressed in any mood induction experiment, as well as special 
issues raised by the use of subliminal stimulation. These 
issues are considered and addressed in Appendix D. 
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Method II: The Thematic Apperception Test 
In addition to the tachistoscopic procedure described 
above, two additional methodologies were employed in the 
present investigation in an attempt to evaluate the presence 
of latent depressotypic schemas in depression-prone persons. 
These included the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) and two 
versions of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS). As 
discussed previously, the TAT is used in clinical settings to 
elucidate important organizing themes of which the indivdual 
may or may not be aware. It therefore represented a 
potentially useful tool for assessing the putatively latent 
depressotypic schemas among the remitted depressed subjects 
in the present study. It was hypothesized that if the 
remitted subjects did indeed hold latent depressotypic 
beliefs, these might be revealed in their TAT responses. 
Four TAT cards were administered to each subject 
immediately upon completion of the tachistoscopic procedure. 
These particular cards, described below, were chosen because 
they are widely believed to elicit general themes including 
achievement motivation, dysphoria and depression, intimacy, 
and suicidal ideation. Each of these themes is reflected in 
the depressotypic schemas described by Beck. 
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Subjects' TAT responses were audiotaped, then 
transcribed. The latency between presentation of each card 
and the subject's first response, as well as the total 
response time to each card, were recorded. The transcribed 
responses were evaluated by 10 clinical psychologists 
experienced in the interpretation of the TAT, who were blind 
to the subjects' diagnostic status. The psychologists were 
asked to decide on the basis of the TAT data whether or not 
each subject was depressed. 
It was predicted that the psychologists would, of course, 
diagnose a greater proportion of the actively depressed 
subjects as depressed relative to the never-depressed 
subjects. In accordance with Beck's theory, it was further 
predicted that more of the remitted subjects would be judged 
to be depressed relative to the normals. A similar pattern 
was predicted for the response latency measure. That is, the 
actively depressed and remitted subjects were predicted to 
have longer response latencies than the never-depressed 
controls. This was predicted because the TAT stimuli were 
expected to arouse particularly conflictual depressotypic 
themes in these subjects, thereby resulting in longer response 
latencies. The predictions for the total response time 
measure were less clear. The depressed subjects might be 
expected to have longer total response times relative to the 
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other two groups due to psychomotor slowness, or shorter times 
due to lack of involvement in the task. 
In summary, the TAT was used in an effort to assess the 
presence of latent depressotypic schemas in the three subject 
groups. In order to provide support for the diathesis aspect 
of Beck's theory, the TAT data of the remitted subjects would 
have to resemble at least somewhat the data of the 
depressives, and would have to differ from those of the normal 
subj ects. 
Method III: The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
The final procedure employed in the present investigation 
was the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS). Although scores 
on the DAS have been shown repeatedly to be strongly 
correlated with measures of active depression, several studies 
also have failed to find elevated DAS scores among remitted 
depressed persons. 
Prior to completing the standard, self-evaluative version 
of the DAS, subjects were asked to complete a modified version 
of the questionnaire. The modified questionnaire itself was 
identical to the original version except for a change in the 
instructions. Instead of asking the subjects to rate their 
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own degree of agreement with each belief, they were asked to 
rate the beliefs of a hypothetical other person. This shifted 
the focus from self-evaluation to making general statements 
about the belief systems of others. 
The existing literature on the DAS provided clear 
hypotheses for the standard version of the questionnaire: 
the actively depressed subjects were expected to endorse more 
dysfunctional beliefs than either of the other two groups, who 
were not expected to differ from one another. In contrast, 
it was predicted that the remitted subjects might respond more 
similarly to the actively depressed subjects on the other-
person version. It was reasoned that if the remitted subjects 
do hold latent depressotypic schemas, these might be revealed 
when making general, non-self-referential judgments about 
dysfunctional beliefs. 
The three methodologies described above are considerably 
different. What they share is the goal of bypassing the 
normal editing processes that might mask the presence of 
underlying depressotypic schemas in the nondepressed, 
depression-prone person. 
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METHOD 
METHOD I 
Participants 
Three subject groups, each consisting of 10 persons, were 
employed. The groups consisted of an actively depressed group, 
a remitted depressed group, and a "normal" group of persons 
who had never been depressed. Potential subjects were 
introduced to the general purpose and nature of the study 
during their initial contact with the experimenter, usually 
over the telephone. Interested potential participants were 
then mailed two brief questionnaires (described below), and 
asked to return these in a self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Those respondents who met the initial selection criteria were 
invited for a diagnostic interview, described below. 
Potential subjects were paid $5.00 each for their 
participation in this screening interview. Qualified, 
consenting subjects were invited to return for a second 
session to participate in the study proper, or participated 
in the study immediately following the diagnostic interview. 
Subjects who actually participated in the study were paid an 
additional $5.00 at the end of the experimental session. Both 
the screening interviews and the experimental sessions took 
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place at the UNCG Psychology Department. Due to the small 
number of male respondents, only female participants were 
employed. Only native English speakers were employed, as 
Silverman (1983, 1984) has reported that subliminally 
presented English stimuli may have little or no impact on 
persons whose native language is not English. 
Actively depressed persons. The actively depressed 
subjects were solicited primarily from various outpatient 
mental health facilities in the Greensboro, N.C. area, 
including the UNCG Psychology Clinic and private psychiatric 
and psychological practices. In addition to referrals from 
these sources, potential depressed subjects were solicited 
through community announcements and bulletins. These included 
bulletins mailed to various women's clubs, an article in the 
UNCG student newspaper, public service radio announcements, 
and a local television news interview in the context of a 
discussion of the depression research underway in the UNCG 
Psychology Department. 
Regardless of the means of solicitation, all participants 
underwent a diagnostic interview with the experimenter (see 
Appendix E for consent form), using an abbreviated version of 
the Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia — 
Life-time Version (SADS-L; Spitzer & Endicott, 1979; Appendix 
F) as a guide. The experimenter provided DSM-III-R diagnoses 
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on the basis of this interview. Of the 10 depressed subjects, 
four had a diagnosis of Major Depression, three of Dysthymia, 
and three of "Double Depression" (coexisting Major Depression 
and Dysthymia). None of the participants had readily 
identifiable Axis II diagnoses, although such diagnoses cannot 
be ruled out completely on the basis of the assessment 
procedures employed. None of the participants had a 
concomitant nonaffective Axis I diagnosis. The reliability 
of the diagnostic judgments is discussed below. 
The actively depressed subjects were required to meet 
the following subject selection criteria: (a) an Axis I 
diagnosis, according to DSM-III-R, of a unipolar major mood 
disorder; (b) a score of 16 or above on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1978; Appendix G; x = 32.40, SD = 7.40), 
indicating the presence of significant depressive 
symptomatology; (c) absence of significant suicidal risk, 
evidenced by a score of 4 or below on the SAD PERSONS scale 
(Patterson, Dohn, Bird, & Patterson, 1983, Appendix H; x = 
1.9, SD = 0.74); (d) written consent of the subject's primary 
therapist (Appendix I); and (e) an age of between 18 and 60 
years (x = 36.20, SD = 8.60). The BDI and the SAD PERSONS 
were administered by the experimenter at the time of the 
diagnostic screening interview. Each participant's individual 
baseline data are presented in Table 1 (this table and all 
subsequent tables may be found in Appendix J). 
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Remitted denressives. In addition to the community-
announcements described above, the remitted depressed group 
was obtained through two other sources. First, eight women 
who had participated in a treatment study of depression at 
UNCG approximately two years earlier were contacted, and asked 
if they might be interested in participating in the present 
research. Of the five women who agreed to undergo the 
screening process, three met the criteria as remitted 
subjects, one met the criteria as a depressed subject, and 
one did not meet the criteria for either group (i.e., she was 
very mildly depressed). The second source of remitted 
subjects was a large psychiatric practice in Greensboro, N.C. 
Dr. Victor Morcos of Guilford Psychiatric Associates kindly 
agreed to send letters to 31 of his former patients with a 
known history of depression (postage and the cost of materials 
was paid for by the experimenter) . The letters briefly 
described the study, and informed potential participants to 
contact the experimenter if they were interested in 
participating. Subjects who contacted the experimenter were 
then asked to sign a limited release of information form 
allowing the experimenter to contact Dr. Morcos, who then 
provided a brief overview of the potential subject's 
psychodiagnostic history (i.e., number, approximate dates, and 
duration of past depressive episodes and any other psychiatric 
conditions). 
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Regardless of the mode of solicitation, all potential 
remitted participants underwent a diagnostic interview with 
the experimenter based on the abbreviated SADS-L. Historical 
diagnoses were made by the experimenter through retrospective 
data provided by the potential subject during this interview. 
Only persons who unambiguously previously met the DSM-III-R 
criteria for a depressive disorder were selected to 
participate in the study. Of the 10 remitted subjects, nine 
had prior diagnoses of Major Depression and one had a prior 
diagnosis of "Double Depression." None of the 10 subjects 
reported current or historical symptoms indicative of other 
Axis I or Axis II disorders. 
The remitted depressed subjects were required to meet 
the following selection criteria: (a) a history of one or more 
significant clinical depressive episodes, resulting in a 
diagnosis of a unipolar major mood disorder; (b) no current 
major Axis I psychiatric diagnosis according to DSM-III-R; (c) 
a score of 6 or below on the BDI, indicating the absence of 
significant depressive symptomatology (x = 5.40, SD = 2.91); 
(d) not currently obtaining psychiatric or psychological 
treatment of any kind; (e) absence of significant suicidal 
risk, assessed by a score of 4 or below on the SADS PERSONS 
scale (x = 1.0, SD = 0.67); and (f) an age of between 18 and 
60 years (x = 38.0, SD = 8.12). As with the actively 
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depressed group, the experimenter administered the BDI and the 
SADS PERSONS to all potential participants in the context of 
the diagnostic screening interview. 
Non-depressives. The "never-depressed" participants were 
solicited through community announcements and by 
word-of-mouth. They were required to meet the following 
selection criteria: (a) no historical or current major 
psychiatric diagnosis according to DSM-III-R; (b) a score of 
6 or below on the BDI, reflecting no significant depressive 
symptomatology (x = 4.20, SD = 3.36); (c) not currently 
obtaining psychiatric or psychological treatment of any kind; 
and (d) the same criteria for age and absence of suicidal risk 
as the other two groups (age x = 38.75, SD = 7.30; SADPERSONS 
x = 0.44, SD = 0.53). As with participants from the other two 
groups, potential never-depressed participants underwent a 
brief diagnostic interview with the experimenter according to 
the SADS-L in order to rule out major current or historical 
psychopathology. The BDI and SAD PERSONS were also be 
administered by the experimenter. 
Additional information on participant selection. All of 
the screening interviews were audiotaped, and subsequently 
reviewed and independently assigned DSM-III-R diagnoses by a 
second diagnostician. This individual, who was blind to the 
experimenter's diagnostic judgments and the subject's 
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questionnaire data, was a doctoral candidate in clinical 
psychology at UNCG who has extensive experience in the 
psychodiagnosis of mood disorders. A randomly selected total 
of 26 of the 30 interviews (87%) were reviewed. The two 
diagnosticians achieved perfect agreement on all but two of 
the interviews (92%). They reviewed these two interviews 
together, and arrived at a consensus diagnosis for each. 
Each participant who was not currently obtaining 
psychiatric or psychological services (i.e., possibly some of 
the depressed subjects and all of the remitted depressed and 
never depressed subjects) was given a list of community mental 
health professionals upon completion of the assessment phase, 
whether or not they requested such information (Appendix K). 
Subjects were explicitly told that the experimenter's giving 
them this list was simply in keeping with the experimental 
protocol, and did not reflect a judgment that they do or do 
not need psychotherapeutic services. 
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As expected, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and 
corresponding Tukey's post hoc comparisons confirmed that the 
actively depressed subjects endorsed more depressive symptoms 
than the remitted and normal subjects, who did not differ from 
one another, on both the BDI and the MMPI-D (Tables 2 & 3). 
The same pattern was found for the SADPERSONS scale; although 
all three groups scored within the low-risk range for suicide 
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potential, the depressed subjects had significantly more risk 
factors than subjects in the other two groups, who did not 
differ from one another (Table 4). Finally, a one-way ANOVA 
revealed no significant differences in age between the three 
subject groups (Table 5). 
Experimental Design 
The present investigation employed a 3 (actively 
depressed vs. remitted depressed vs. never-depressed subjects) 
by 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal stimulus presentation) by 
2 (rational vs. irrational stimuli) mixed factorial design, 
with repeated measures on the last two factors. Thus, each 
subject was exposed to both subliminal and supraliminal 
presentations of both rational and irrational stimuli. In 
order to control for potential sequence effects, the order of 
the subliminal-supraliminal and rational-irrational 
manipulations was counterbalanced across subjects, under the 
condition that each subject received both subliminal 
conditions together and both supraliminal conditions together. 
The clustering of the subliminal and supraliminal conditions 
allowed the data to be analyzed for potential sequence effects 
with respect to this factor. The experiment was conducted 
under double blind conditions, as discussed below. 
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Stimuli and Apparatus 
Stimuli. Each subject received four subliminal 
presentations and one supraliminal presentation of each of 
five "rational" and five "irrational" stimuli by means of an 
electronically-controlled tachistoscope (described below). 
The subliminal stimuli were presented four times in order to 
ensure adequate retinal stimulation. Due to the extreme 
brevity of stimulation, repeated stimulus presentations were 
needed to ensure that small, involuntary ocular movements 
(vibratory tremors, and rapid jerks called micronystagnae) 
did not disrupt parafoveal retinal registration of the 
stimuli. The supraliminal stimulus presentations, which were 
by definition clearly visible, required only a single 
presentation. The irrational stimuli consisted of brief 
verbal messages that reflect typical depressotypic schemas 
postulated by Beck's (1967, 1979) theory of depression (see 
Beck et al., 1979, p. 246, and Weissman, 1978 for 
presentations of stimuli very similar to those presented 
here). The rational stimuli consisted of nondepressive, 
functional alternatives to the irrational stimuli. 
The irrational stimuli were as follows: 
1. I HAVE TO BE PERFECT 
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2. I HAVE TO BE LOVED BY EVERYONE 
3. MAKING MISTAKES IS TERRIBLE 
4. I MUST AGREE WITH EVERYONE 
5. I HAVE TO BE SUCCESSFUL AT EVERYTHING 
The rational alternative stimuli included: 
1. I DON'T HAVE TO BE PERFECT 
2. I DON'T HAVE TO BE LOVED BY EVERYONE 
3. MAKING MISTAKES IS OK 
4. IT'S OK TO DISAGREE 
5. I DON'T ALWAYS HAVE TO BE SUCCESSFUL 
Previous studies indicate that the frequency of 
day-to-day occurrence of words within verbal items is not 
critical to comparisons of subliminally presented stimuli as 
long as the stimuli being compared are not extremely 
discrepant (Erdelyi, 1974). Nevertheless, as an additional 
experimental control, the rational and irrational stimuli 
listed above were carefully designed to be as similar as 
possible along several dimensions, including word frequency. 
The total number of words for the irrational and rational 
stimulus sets are 28 and 29, respectively, and the 'total 
number of characters (including spaces between words) are 140 
and 133, respectively. Moreover, the sum of the frequency 
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indices (i.e., the number of times the words occur in a 
representative sample of American English as described by 
Kucera and Francis, 1967), for the irrational stimuli is 
160,126, relative to 169,321 for the rational stimuli, an 
insignificant difference in this context. 
It is important to note that past research suggests that 
the close similarity between the present stimuli would not 
preclude their resulting in differential effects. Several 
studies have found that very slight differences between 
similar subliminally presented stimuli can result in quite 
different effects (e.g., Bronstein & Rodin, 1983; Dauber, 
1984; Mendelsohn, 1981; Somekh & Wilding, 1973; Wallace & 
Worthington, 1970). 
Consistent with Silverman's (1983, 1984) methodology, 
the stimuli were printed in black letters 8 mm high on 3 inch 
by 5 inch unlined white index cards, and occupied two lines 
on the card. The stimuli were printed on an Okidata 
laserline-6 laser jet printer, driven by a DrHalo IBM-PC 
graphics program. They were then lightened through 
photocopying using a Kodak Ektaprint photo enhancer screen. 
A blank white card with a cross in its center as a fixation 
point served as a blank stimulus field. 
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Tachistoscope. All stimuli were presented through an 
electronically controlled four-field Gerbrands tachistoscope 
(model T-4A). The viewing distance was 0.864 meters (34 
inches). The illumination of the blank field, stimulus field, 
and room was carefully controlled according to the guidelines 
recommended by Silverman (1984). The illumination of the 
tachistoscopic fields and the room was set by means of a 
MacBeth model 6800 illuminometer, manufactured by Leeds & 
Northrap Company. The illuminometer was focused through the 
eyepiece of the tachistoscope when measuring the two fields, 
and each field remained constantly illuminated during 
measurement. When measuring the ambient room illumination, 
the illuminometer was focused toward the wall in the direction 
the subject would be looking when he or she was not looking 
into the tachistoscope. The room illumination was adjusted 
by means of an adjustable rheostat, and was set at 3.5 
footlamberts. 
The stimulus field illumination was set at the same level 
as the blank field illumination, at 3.5 footlamberts. The 
precise level of stimulus field illumination was dependent 
upon the darkness of the lines comprising the verbal stimuli, 
and was determined by means of an ascending threshold task, 
described by Silverman (1984). Several nonclinical pilot 
subjects viewed the experimental stimuli presented at 
progressively increasing durations, beginning at 4 msec and 
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increasing exposures at 3 msec intervals. The illumination 
of the stimulus field v/as adjusted so that no pilot subject 
reported seeing even a single line at less than 13 msec. Five 
pilot subjects met this criterion before the stimulus field 
illumination level was considered fixed. These pilot subjects 
were in the experimental room at least 10 minutes before 
beginning the ascending threshold task in order to dark-adapt 
sufficiently to the ambient lighting conditions. 
The verbal stimuli were constructed so that the 
horizontal visual angle of each stimulus was under 5.5°. The 
visual angle was calculated using the following formula (from 
Silverman, 1984): 
width of message 
Visual angle theta = arc tangent of 
viewing distance 
The visual angle of the rational stimuli ranged from 3.31° to 
5.49° (x = 4.60°, SD = 0.918). The visual angle of the 
irrational stimuli ranged from 3.25° to 5.42° (x = 4.61°, SD 
= 0.909) . 
Procedure 
The procedure is outlined in Table 6 (Appendix J). The 
experimenter who actually led the subject through the 
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experimental procedure (hereafter referred to as the 
"tachistoscope experimenter") was a different experimenter 
from the one who conducted the screening assessments (the 
"screening experimenter"), so that the former investigator 
could remain blind as to the subjects' group. The stimulus 
cards were coded on their backs as to the proper sequence of 
administration by the screening experimenter so that the 
tachistoscope experimenter could insert them into the 
tachistoscope without knowledge of their content, thereby 
remaining blind as to stimulus conditions. The cards were 
re-coded for each subject. 
Rationale and instructions. After introducing herself 
to the participant, the tachistoscope experimenter provided 
a brief oral and written overview of the rationale and 
procedure of the study (Appendix L), and informed consent was 
obtained. Subjects were informed of all aspects of the study 
at this time except for the specific content of the stimuli. 
Thus, no deception was used in this study. Every effort was 
made to put the participants at ease throughout the 
experimental session. This was important both to make 
participation in the study interesting and enjoyable for the 
subjects, as well as to maximize the probability of obtaining 
effects of the subliminal stimulation. Dixon (1981, p. 213) 
reviewed data suggesting that subliminal stimulation is more 
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likely to produce effects when subjects are relaxed than when 
they are anxious or uncomfortable. 
After informed consent was obtained (Appendix M), the 
subject was asked to read a standard eye chart to ensure 
visual acuity of at least 20/20. The participant was then 
seated in front of the tachistoscope, and presented with a 
printed copy of the following instructions. The subject was 
asked to read along as the instructions were presented on an 
audiotape. The use of the audiotape ensured that the 
instructions were identical across all participants. 
The machine in front of you is called a tachistoscope, 
or "t-scope" for short. It is made to flash words very 
quickly. As we have already discussed, several different 
statements will be flashed on the t-scope in this study. 
At times, some of the statements will be flashed so 
quickly that you probably won't be able to read them, and 
in fact you'll probably only see a quick flash of light. 
Each of these statements will be flashed four times in 
a row. At other times, some of the statements will be 
presented for several seconds, so that you will be able 
to read them. When the statements are presented slowly 
like this they'll only be presented once. In this study 
we are interested in two things. First, how much do 
people agree with different statements when they are 
flashed very quickly compared to when they are presented 
slowly? After seeing each statement look back at the 
paper in front of you. Then, for that item, make a mark 
somewhere on the line showing how much you agree or 
disagree with the statement that was just presented to 
you. Marks closer to the left end of the line show more 
disagreement with the statement, and marks closer to the 
right end of the line show more agreement with the 
statement. [Experimenter presented visual analogue 
scale, and demonstrated range of agreement ratings]. Of 
course, when the statement is flashed very quickly it 
will be hard to say exactly how much you agree with it 
since you won't be able to read it. Please just guess 
how much you'd agree with it if you could read it. Do 
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you understand what to do? [Experimenter clarified 
procedure as needed]. 
The second thing we are interested in is how the 
different statements might affect people's mood. A 
number of research studies have found that if you pay 
close attention to your feelings, you can notice changes 
in your mood from day to day, and even from hour to hour 
and minute to minute. In this study we'd like to see how 
well you notice your own feelings. You will be given a 
mood scale several times during the study, and all you 
have to do is to make a mark on the line next to each 
item to show how much you are experiencing that 
particular feeling right at that time. [Experimenter 
presents mood scale and demonstrates range of mood 
ratings] . Do you have any questions? Before we get 
started, remember that your participation is completely 
voluntary and that you can decide to quit the study at 
any time if you choose. OK, please go ahead and complete 
this form now, showing how much of each feeling you have 
right now; [this represented the baseline mood measure]. 
The measure of agreement and of mood are described further 
below. This introductory period lasted at least 10 minutes 
to allow the subjects to dark adapt sufficiently to the 
ambient room lighting. 
The participant was then instructed to look into the 
tachistoscope and to report what she saw.* The word HELLO!, 
printed in the same manner as the experimental stimuli, was 
presented for several seconds. This procedure, introduced by 
Porterfield and Golding (1985), ensured that the subject's 
visual acuity was adequate, and served as an introduction to 
the tachistoscope. 
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Presentation of stimuli. The first set of five 
experimental stimuli was then presented. In the supraliminal 
condition, each stimulus was presented continuously for four 
seconds, after which the subject was asked to make an 
agreement rating. The second stimulus in the series was then 
presented for four seconds, followed by an agreement rating 
and so on, until all five stimuli had been presented. 
Following presentation of the series, the mood measure was 
administered. The subliminal condition was conducted in the 
same manner, except that the stimuli were presented four times 
each for four msec per exposure, with inter-exposure intervals 
of three seconds. The blank stimulus field was presented 
during these three-second inter-stimulus intervals. 
Following presentation of the first series of five 
stimuli, a five-minute delay occurred, in which the subject 
was free to read one of several magazines in the room. This 
period was included to allow any effects of the previous 
stimuli to dissipate. Although the exact time required for 
the effects of supraliminal or subliminal stimuli presented 
in the manner outlined here to fade is unknown, Silverman 
(1977, p. 3) noted that subliminal laboratory effects (in 
contrast to effects produced in therapy and educational 
contexts) are "slight, without subjective discomfort, and very 
fleeting." In one study, for example, Silverman, Pettit, and 
Dunne (1971, cited in Silverman, 1977) found that certain 
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subliminally presented stimuli intensified subjects' pathology 
immediately following the stimulation. During a second 
assessment made 15 minutes to a half hour later, however, the 
measure of pathology had completely returned to its baseline 
level. 
Following the brief delay, the second set of stimuli was 
presented in the same manner as the first set. Immediately 
following presentation of each stimulus (once for four seconds 
in the supraliminal condition, and four times for four msec 
in the subliminal condition), an agreement rating was made. 
After presentation of all five stimuli in the series, another 
mood assessment was made, followed by another five-minute 
break. The third and fourth stimulus sets were presented in 
the same manner, with agreement ratings made immediately 
following each stimulus, mood ratings made immediately 
following each series of stimuli, and a five-minute break 
between stimulus conditions (see Table 6). 
Discrimination Task 
Following presentation of all four series of stimuli, a 
discrimination task was conducted to determine if subjects 
were able to distinguish the stimuli presented at the same 
illumination and exposure levels employed during the 
subliminal conditions of the study proper. This task, 
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designed by Silverman (1966), consists of a methodology in 
which subjects were asked simply to state (or guess) whether 
two consecutively presented stimuli were the same or different 
from one another. A greater than chance "hit rate" across 
subjects would indicate that the stimuli may not have been 
sufficiently weak to preclude awareness. A chance hit rate, 
however, would indicate that subjects were clearly unaware of 
the content of the stimuli. Instructions to the subjects 
similar to those used by Dauber (1984) were employed. Again, 
the subjects were provided with a printed copy of the 
instructions, and were asked to read along as the instructions 
are presented on an audiotape. 
I have two statements here and I want to see whether you 
can tell them apart when I flash them on at the same 
speed as I did during the experiment. First, I am going 
to show you four flashes of one of the statements. Then 
I will show you four other flashes. This second set of 
flashes will be either the same statement you just saw, 
or a different statement from the one you just saw. I 
will then ask you to tell me whether you think the last 
set of flashes was the same statement or a different 
statement from the one just before it. Just say "same" 
or "different" to tell me what you think. After that, 
I'll flash a statement again four times, and will ask you 
again try to tell me whether it's the same one or a 
different one from the one that came just before it. We 
will keep doing this a few times, and each time all you 
have to do is to tell me whether you think the statement 
you just saw was the same or different from the statement 
right before it. You will be comparing each set of 
flashes to the set you saw right before it. Do you 
understand what to do? [Experimenter clarified 
instructions as needed]. Okay, now please put your eyes 
up against the viewer, and we can get started. During 
this task, please keep your eyes focused into the viewer, 
and do not look up from the viewer. Here are four 
flashes of the first statement. Now I'm going to show 
you four more flashes of either the same or a different 
statement. Just say "same" or "different" to let me know 
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what you think. Now I will show another four flashes and > 
tell me if they are the same as or different than the 
statement you just saw. 
Eleven trials of four exposures at four msec per trial 
were presented, with the experimenter coding the subjects' 
responses. One of the irrational stimuli (I HAVE TO BE 
PERFECT) and one of the rational stimuli (IT'S OK TO DISAGREE) 
that were actually employed in the study served as the two 
comparison stimuli for the entire discrimination task. A 
three-second interval occurred between the four presentations 
of each stimulus, with a five second interval between 
different stimuli. The subject was prompted for her response 
during each five second interval between stimulus set 
presentations. 
Following completion of the discrimination task, 
participants were asked to complete a brief Post-Experimental 
Questionnaire (Appendix N). 
Dependent Measures 
As noted above, two dependent measures were employed. 
The first was an agreement rating on a 97 mm visual analogue 
scale, labeled "agree completely" at one end and "disagree 
completely" at the other (Appendix 0). This measure was 
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quantified simply by measuring the distance from the left 
(disagree) pole to the subject's mark (i.e., mm of agreement). 
The second dependent measure, designed to assess the 
participants' immediate dysphoric mood state, was a 
modification of the Depression Adjective Check List (DACL; 
Lubin, 1965; Appendix P) .6 The modification, introduced by 
Varga (1973) and subsequently employed by Dauber (1984), 
consists of a 50-point scale rather than a present-absent 
choice for each item, thereby increasing the measures 
sensitivity to finer variations in mood. The sum of the 
ratings of negative adjectives minus the sum for positive 
adjectives constituted the actual dependent measure. 
Five separate versions of the DACL were employed, so that 
a different version was used for each of the five assessments 
of each subject's mood (baseline, and after each set of 
stimulus presentations). In its original form, the different 
versions of the DACL have been shown to demonstrate high 
intercorrelations (alternate form reliability ranges from .82 
to .84; Lubin & Himelstein, 1976). The sequence of the five 
versions was counterbalanced across trials so that all 
versions of the modified DACL were equally represented across 
all trials and subjects (i.e., each version was used for six 
of the thirty subjects for any given trial). 
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METHOD II 
The same 30 subjects who participated in the procedure 
described above also participated in the second experimental 
procedure. Method II was conducted immediately following 
completion of Method I. This project involved administering 
four items from the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 
1943), one of the most widely employed personality assessment 
measures. The four cards chosen for presentation were Numbers 
1, 3BM, 10, & 14 (see Figures 1 through 4, Appendix Q). Card 
1 consists of a young boy contemplating a violin that sits on 
a table in front of him. Card 3BM is a person whose gender 
is ambiguous huddled on the floor next to a couch, next to 
whom is an ambiguous object (often seen as a revolver). Card 
10 is a close-up of the faces of an embracing man and woman 
of ambiguous ages. Finally, Card 14 consists of a silhouette 
of a man against a bright, open window, with the rest of the 
picture being totally black. Although only two of these cards 
(3BM and 14) are typically thought to pull specifically for 
depressive ideation, the other two cards were also chosen 
because they are known to elicit themes of achievement 
motivation, dysphoria, and intimacy, among others. These 
themes are central to the phenomenology of depression, and are 
reflected in the depressotypic cognitive schemas described by 
Beck. 
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Upon completion of Method I, subjects were read the 
following instructions by the experimenter (from Murray, 
1943) : 
This is a test of imagination, one form of intelligence. 
I am going to show you some pictures, one at a time; and 
your task will be to make up as dramatic a story as you 
can for each. Tell what has led up to the event shown 
in the picture, describe what is happening at the moment, 
what the characters are feeling and thinking; and then 
give the outcome. Speak your thoughts as they come to 
your mind. Do you understand? Here is the first 
picture. 
Consistent with standard TAT administrative guidelines, the 
experimenter refrained from making extraneous comments or 
providing unnecessary guidelines. The experimenter did prompt 
subjects, however, if they did not provide a complete response 
(i.e., if a story did not have a beginning, middle, and 
ending). The four cards were presented in the order described 
above to all subjects. 
All responses were audiotaped and transcribed. In 
addition to the subjects1 actual responses, four other 
dependent measures were obtained. These were the response 
latency between presentation of each card and the first 
response to that card, the total response time to each card, 
the total of the response latencies across the four cards for 
each subject, and the total of the response times for each 
subj ect. 
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Transcribed copies of each subject's responses were given 
to 10 doctoral level clinical psychologists employed at Beth 
Israel Medical Center in New York City. All 10 of the 
psychologists had received formal training in the 
administration and interpretation of the TAT. Nine of the 10 
rated their familiarity with interpretation of TAT data as 
"moderate," with one rating of "somewhat." The psychologists 
reported a mean of 7.55 years of clinical experience (SD = 
2.99), and reported having either administered or supervised 
the administration of an average of 7.90 TAT protocols (SD = 
5.78) during the preceding year. 
Informed consent was obtained following a brief 
introduction to the purpose of the study. Each psychologist 
was then given a complete copy of the TAT data, as well as 
the following written instructions: 
I want to express my sincere thanks for helping with 
my dissertation project. Recalling your own years as a 
graduate student, I'm sure you can appreciate how 
grateful I am for your assistance. 
On the pages that follow are TAT stories from thirty 
subjects. Each subject generated responses to the 
following cards: #1 (a young boy contemplating a violin 
that rests on a table in front of him); #3BM (a person 
sitting on the floor huddled against a couch. On the 
floor beside the person is an object) ; #10 (a young 
woman's head against a man's shoulder); and #14 (the 
silhouette of a person against a bright window. The rest 
of the picture is totally black) . The cards were 
administered under standard instructional conditions by 
a female undergraduate psychology student. 
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The purpose of this study is to assess the 
sensitivity of the TAT to detect depressotypic themes. 
Some of the subjects in the study were clinically 
depressed, whereas others were not depressed. After 
reading the responses to the four cards for each subject, 
your task is simply to make a judgment as to whether or 
not you think the subject was depressed. Please mark 
your judgments on the form on the following page. In 
clinical settings, of course, one would never diagnose 
depression on the basis of TAT data alone. Nevertheless, 
please make your best judgment on the basis of these 
limited data regarding whether or not each subject was 
depressed. 
You will be given a debriefing statement that 
describes the study in more detail upon completion of 
the task. I will also be happy to provide a list of 
which subjects were depressed and which were not if you 
would like. Once again, thank you very much for your 
help. 
The psychologists recorded their diagnostic judgments 
(i.e., depressed vs. not depressed) for each of the 30 
subjects, and returned these to the experimenter at their 
leisure. Upon receipt of these data the psychologists were 
provided with a written and oral debriefing (Appendix R), and 
a form listing the actual diagnostic status of each subject. 
METHOD III 
Upon completion of Method II, all 30 participants engaged 
in one final task. Each subject was asked to complete two 
versions of the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS, Form A; 
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Weissman & Beck, 1978; Appendix C) . The DAS is a 40 item 
self-report checklist that was designed to assess the 
dysfunctional schemas that are thought to underlie depression. 
The subject rates his or her agreement with each of 40 beliefs 
on a 1 to 7 Likert scale from "totally agree" to "totally 
disagree." 
The standard instructions were modified in the first 
version of the scale completed by subjects in the present 
study. Instead of asking subjects to rate their own degree 
of agreement with each statement, they were asked to rate how 
much they think someone else might agree with each statement. 
The following instructions were printed on the form: 
This inventory lists different attitudes or beliefs which 
people sometimes hold. Read EACH statement carefully and 
decide how much you think ANOTHER PERSON (not you) might 
reasonably agree or disagree with the statement. For 
each of the attitudes, show your answer by placing a 
checkmark (/) under the column that BEST DESCRIBES HOW 
YOU THINK SOMEONE ELSE MIGHT THINK. Be sure to choose 
only one answer for each attitude. Do not mark how you 
personally think, but rather how you believe someone else 
might think. You don't have to have any particular 
person in mind. Just estimate how much each belief might 
apply to someone else. For example, the first statement 
is "it is difficult to be happy unless one is good 
looking, intelligent, rich, and creative." If you could 
imagine that it might be reasonable for someone (anyone) 
to strongly agree with this statement, you would mark 
"agree very much." 
Upon completion of the first version of the DAS, subjects 
were provided with a second copy of the questionnaire, in 
which the standard administrative instructions were provided. 
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The two versions of the questionnaire were identical except 
for the different instructions for each. The order of 
presentation of the two versions was the same for all 
subjects. That is, version one (modified instructions) always 
preceded version two (standard instructions). 
Counterbalancing the order of presentation across subjects was 
avoided because it was felt that the remitted subjects in 
particular would be unlikely to endorse many dysfunctional 
beliefs on the "other person" version of the questionnaire if 
it followed the standard version. The instructions for the 
second version were as follows: 
Now please read each statement again, and decide how much 
YOU PERSONALLY agree or disagree with each statement. 
Place your checkmark under the appropriate column like 
before. Because people are different, there are no right 
or wrong answers. To decide whether a given attitude is 
typical of your way of looking at things, simply keep in 
mind what you are like MOST OF THE TIME. 
Upon completion of this measure, the participants were 
thoroughly debriefed both verbally and in writing (Appendix 
S), thanked for their participation, and dismissed. 
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RESULTS 
METHOD 1 
Check for Subliminalitv of Stimuli 
In order to evaluate whether or not the stimuli were in 
lfact below the subjects' recognition threshold during the 
subliminal conditions, the number of correct discriminations 
made during the discrimination task was evaluated for each 
group. Since there were ten discrimination trials, five 
correct responses would be expected by chance. The depressed 
subjects had a mean of 5.8 correct responses, compared with 
4.2 for the normals and 5.1 for the remitted subjects. A 
separate t-test was conducted for each subject group in which 
the number of correct responses was compared to the expected 
number of five. A significant t-test would indicate that the 
number of correct discriminations differed significantly from 
what would be expected on the basis of chance, thereby 
suggesting that the stimuli could at least sometimes be 
discriminated by the subjects. In contrast, a nonsignificant 
t-test would indicate chance responding on the discrimination 
task, thereby supporting the subliminality of the experimental 
stimuli. None of the three t-tests reached significance at 
p < .05 (t = -0.95, 1.81, and -0.17 for the depressed, normal, 
and remitted groups, respectively), indicating that the 
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accuracy of subjects' discriminations did not differ from what 
would be expected on the basis of chance. 
In order to evaluate the possibility of a response bias, 
additional t-tests compared the number of "same" and the 
number of "different" responses to the expected five (chance 
responding for ten trials). Again, a significant t-test would 
suggest a bias toward responding either "same" or "different," 
whereas a nonsignificant t-test would suggest that neither 
response predominated. The mean number of "same" responses 
was 4.7, 4.2, and 4.9 (t = 0.45, 1.81, and 0.32) , and the mean 
number of "different" responses was 5.3. 5.8, and 5.1 (t = -
0.45, -1.81, and -0.32) for the depressed, normal, and 
remitted subjects, respectively. None of these t-tests was 
significant, indicating that all three subject groups 
responded with a mix of "same" and "different" responses, and 
none of the groups had a bias toward either response. 
Although the above analyses are consistent with random 
responding on the discrimination task, the question remains 
as to whether the three subject groups differed from one 
another in either their accuracy or their tendency to give 
"same" vs. "different" responses. These questions were 
evaluated by means of three one-way analyses of variance 
(ANOVA's) by group on the number of correct discriminations, 
the number of "same" responses, and the number of "different" 
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responses (Table 7). None of these analyses reached 
significance at p < .05, indicating no differences across 
groups in the accuracy or the pattern of responses on the 
discrimination task. 
It should also be noted that none of the subjects 
reported seeing anything more than extremely brief flickers 
of light during the subliminal experimental phases or the 
discrimination task. Thus, the results of the discrimination 
task suggest that the experimental stimuli were in fact well 
below the subject's recognition threshold during the 
subliminal conditions. 
The Effects of the Stimuli on Mood 
Subjects completed a modified version of the Depressive 
Adjective Check List (DACL) at baseline then again after each 
of the four within-subjects experimental phases. As described 
above, the DACL consists of a series of dysphoric and euphoric 
adjectives with which the subject indicates his or her 
agreement. The present modification of the DACL consisted of 
adding a 130 mm visual analogue scale next to each adjective. 
Rather than agreeing or disagreeing completely with each 
adjective, subjects rated their degree of agreement on this 
scale. Scores on the DACL were obtained by measuring the 
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number of mm of agreement for each adjective, then subtracting 
the total agreement with the euphoric adjectives from the 
total agreement with the dysphoric adjectives. 
A one-way ANOVA by group on the baseline DACL reached 
significance at p = .0001. Tukey's post hoc comparisons (p 
< .05) revealed that the depressed subjects were more 
dysphoric than the remitted subjects, who were in turn more 
dysphoric than the normal subjects at baseline (Table 8) . 
This pattern is consistent with predictions made regarding 
the baseline mood states of the three groups insofar as the 
actively depressed subjects were expected to be more dysphoric 
than the other two groups. Although the obtained difference 
between the remitted and normal groups was not specifically 
predicted, it is quite small in magnitude and of little or no 
clinical significance. The effects of these baseline DACL 
differences on the analysis of the experimental data were 
controlled by means of gain scores (the method recommended by 
Huck & McLean, 1975). Gain scores were generated by 
partialling out each subject's baseline level of dysphoria 
from the subsequent dependent measures. This was accomplished 
by subtracting the subjects' baseline DACL score from each of 
the DACL scores collected after the four experimental phases. 
The resulting gain scores were then analyzed by means of a 
four-way ANOVA and associated post hoc comparisons, described 
below (Tables 9 & 10) . The analyses of the gain scores 
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revealed the same pattern of results as the analyses of the 
unadjusted DACL scores, described below. For this reason, 
only the results of the analyses of the unadjusted DACL data 
are reported in detail. 
The effects of the experimental manipulations on the 
unadjusted DACL were evaluated by means of a 4 
(counterbalanced orders) by 3 (depressed vs. remitted vs. 
normal subjects) by 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal stimulus 
presentation modality) by 2 (rational vs. irrational stimulus 
valence) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last two factors 
(Table 11). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
group (p = .0001), and a significant order by modality 
interaction (p = .0212). Consistent with predictions, Tukey's 
post hoc comparisons revealed that the depressed subjects were 
more dysphoric across all experimental conditions than were 
the remitted and the normal subjects, whereas these latter two 
groups did not differ from one another (Table 12) . This 
result is consistent with the baseline difference described 
above, in which the depressed subjects were more dysphoric at 
baseline relative to the other two groups. Although the 
remitted subjects were more dysphoric than the depressives at 
baseline, this difference disappeared when the data were 
averaged across the four within-subject experimental phases. 
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The significant order by modality interaction was 
evaluated not only by means of standard Tukey post hoc 
comparisons (Table 13), but also by means of a method 
described by Boik (1979; Table 14). The standard method of 
exploring a significant interaction involves conducting a 
series of a posteriori simple effect comparisons. For 
example, given a significant interaction between two factors 
A and B, each level of factor A would be compared against all 
other levels of factor A at a given level of factor B. Each 
level of factor B would in turn be compared against all other 
factor B levels at a given level of factor A. The method 
described by Boik allows more specific hypotheses to be tested 
by comparing combinations of certain levels of a factor 
against other levels of that factor. For example, if factor 
A has four levels, then a comparison could be made between 
Levels 1+3 and Levels 2 + 4 using a modified F-test. 
In the present order by modality interaction, there were 
four levels of the order factor (Orders 1 through 4) and two 
levels of the modality factor (subliminal vs. supraliminal). 
The four orders consisted of different combinations of the two 
within-subjects factors. For example, Order 1 consisted of 
the following sequence of experimental phases: (a) 
subliminal-irrational, (b) subliminal-rational, (c) 
supraliminal-irrational, (d) supraliminal-rational. The 
sequence of the remaining orders, as well as the mean DACL for 
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each combination of order and modality, is presented in Table 
15. 
A series of interaction contrasts were conducted using 
the Boik method (p < .05) in which combinations of two order 
levels were compared to combinations of two other levels 
(Table 14). These contrasts were performed separately for 
the subliminal condition and for the supraliminal condition. 
They permitted an evaluation of whether it was the stimulus 
valence, the modality of presentation, or some combination of 
the two that comprised the orders1 contribution to the 
interaction. These contrasts revealed that orders in which 
the first stimulus set presented was irrational resulted in 
more dysphoric mood than orders in which the rational stimuli 
were presented first. This effect occurred regardless of 
whether the initial stimulus set was presented subliminally 
or supraliminally. That is, subjects whose first experimental 
phase consisted of subliminal presentations of irrational 
stimuli became more dysphoric than subjects whose first phase 
was subliminal-rational. Similarly, subjects first presented 
with supraliminal-irrational stimuli became more dysphoric 
than subjects first presented with supraliminal-rational 
stimuli. 
This effect of the initial stimulus valence occurred for 
both levels of the modality factor; i.e., on the DACL measures 
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taken after both the subliminal and supraliminal phases. For 
example, a subject whose first stimulus condition was 
subliminal-irrational was more dysphoric not only in the 
initial subliminal phases, but also in the later supraliminal 
phases, relative to a subject whose first stimuli were 
subliminal-rational. Thus, the valence of the first stimulus 
condition encountered, regardless of the modality of 
presentation, determined the subjects' mood for the remainder 
of the experimental task. Although the pattern of means for 
the four orders was somewhat different across the two 
modalities, thereby yielding the significant interaction on 
the omnibus test (see Table 15), the more detailed post hoc 
comparisons revealed the same effect of order for both the 
subliminal and supraliminal conditions. 
In summary, consistent with predictions, analysis of the 
mood data revealed that the depressed subjects were more 
dysphoric than the remitted and normal subjects across all 
experimental conditions, whereas the latter two groups did 
not differ from one another. The valence of the initial 
stimulus condition presented to subjects determined the degree 
of dysphoria they reported across all of the experimental 
phases. Subjects who first encountered irrational stimuli 
became more dysphoric and remained so throughout the 
experiment than subjects who first encountered rational 
stimuli. This stimulus valence effect occurred regardless of 
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whether the stimuli were presented subliminally or 
supraliminally. This effect, however, did not occur 
differentially by subject group. 
Although this pattern of results is consistent with 
predictions in that the irrational stimuli were expected to 
result in more dysphoric mood ratings than the rational 
stimuli, at least in certain conditions, they are inconsistent 
with predictions in two important ways. First and foremost, 
there were no differences across the three subject groups in 
the pattern of effects of the stimulus valence and modality 
of presentation factors. Recall that according to predictions 
derived from Beck's theory, the remitted subjects were 
expected to differ from both the depressives and the normals 
in their response to these manipulations. Specifically, they 
were predicted to respond similarly to the depressives in the 
subliminal conditions, and similarly to the normal subjects 
in the supraliminal conditions. The second way in which the 
results are inconsistent with predictions is that the 
subjects' mood was expected to vary as a function of each of 
the four experimental phases, rather than being affected only 
by the first phase encountered. 
The Effects of the Stimuli on Agreement Ratings 
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Each of the four within-subjects experimental phases 
described above consisted of the presentation of five stimuli. 
Recall that following the presentation of each stimulus, 
subjects rated their agreement with that stimulus on a 97 mm 
visual analogue scale marked "disagree completely" at one pole 
and "agree completely" at the other. The degree of agreement 
with each stimulus was quantified by measuring the number of 
mm from the left (disagree) pole to the subject's mark. 
An index of each subject's overall agreement with the 
stimuli within an experimental condition was obtained by 
summing the five agreement scores for each stimulus within 
that condition. Collapsing across the stimuli in this manner 
made conceptual sense since the stimuli are all hypothesized 
to reflect the same theoretical construct (i.e., depressotypic 
cognitive style). In order to evaluate empirically the 
covariation among the stimuli, a correlation matrix was 
constructed consisting of the agreement ratings with each of 
the five individual stimuli as well as the total agreement 
index (Table 16) . Pearson correlations revealed that the 
agreement ratings for all stimuli were significantly 
positively correlated with the ratings for all other stimuli, 
including the total agreement index (p < .0001 for all 
comparisons). Given the high degree of positive covariation 
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among agreement ratings with the five stimuli, the total 
agreement index served as the dependent measure for the 
analyses described below. 
The effects of the experimental manipulations on 
subjects'agreement ratings were evaluated by means of a 4 
(counterbalanced orders) by 3 (depressed vs. remitted vs. 
normal subjects) by 2 (subliminal vs. supraliminal stimulus 
presentation modality) by 2 (rational vs. irrational stimulus 
valence) ANOVA, with repeated measures on the last two factors 
(Table 17).7 The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for 
valence (p = .0001). Overall, subjects agreed more with the 
rational stimuli (x = 305.35) than with the irrational stimuli 
(X = 178.60). 
A group by valence interaction also emerged (p = .0001). 
Tukey's post hoc comparisons (p < .05) revealed that whereas 
the remitted and normal subjects showed higher agreement with 
the rational relative to the irrational stimuli, there was no 
difference across valences for the depressed subjects (Table 
19) . Moreover, the three groups did not differ in their 
degree of agreement with the irrational stimuli. For the 
rational stimuli, the remitted subjects had higher agreement 
ratings relative to the depressed subjects, whereas the normal 
subjects did not differ from either of the other two groups. 
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The ANOVA also revealed a significant modality by valence 
interaction (p = .0001). Tukey's post hoc comparisons (p < 
.05) revealed that the rational stimuli elicited higher 
agreement ratings than the irrational stimuli only in the 
supraliminal conditions; there were no differences between the 
stimulus valences in the subliminal conditions (Table 20). 
Moreover, agreement ratings for the irrational stimuli were 
lower in the supraliminal conditions relative to the 
subliminal conditions. The opposite pattern occurred for 
agreement ratings with the rational stimuli: They were higher 
in the supraliminal conditions than in the subliminal 
conditions. Thus, agreement ratings in the subliminal 
conditions, regardless of stimulus valence, fell midway 
between the ratings for the supraliminal-rational stimuli on 
the one hand and the supraliminal-irrational stimuli on the 
other. 
Finally, a group by modality by valence interaction also 
reached statistical significance (p = .0001). Tukey's post 
hoc comparisons (p < .05) revealed the following results 
(Table 21) . First, there were no differences between the 
subject groups in any of the subliminal conditions. In the 
supraliminal conditions, however, the depressed subjects 
agreed more with the irrational stimuli and less with the 
rational stimuli than did the remitted and normal subjects, 
whereas these latter two groups did not differ from one 
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another. Second, subjects in all groups agreed more with the 
rational stimuli than with the irrational stimuli when they 
were presented supraliminally, but did not differ in their 
agreement with the two stimulus types when they were presented 
subliminally. Finally, the pattern of results described above 
for the modality by valence interaction only occurred for the 
remitted and normal subjects. That is, the remitted and 
normal subjects agreed more with the rational stimuli when 
presented supraliminal relative to subliminally, and less with 
the irrational stimuli when presented supraliminally relative 
to subliminally. There were no differences between the 
modality of stimulus presentation given either stimulus 
valence for the depressed subjects. 
In summary, subjects' agreement ratings to the individual 
experimental stimuli were highly positively correlated, as 
expected. The rational stimuli elicited higher agreement than 
did the irrational stimuli, but only for the remitted and the 
normal subjects, and only in the supraliminal conditions. 
There were no differences between agreement with the rational 
vs. irrational stimuli for the depressed subjects, or for any 
subjects in the subliminal conditions. Although it was 
predicted that the three groups would show this pattern of 
agreement ratings in the supraliminal conditions, the greater 
agreement with the rational stimuli by the normal and remitted 
subjects was not expected to be limited to the supraliminal 
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conditions only. Contrary to predictions, there was no 
evidence that the subliminal stimuli affected subjects' 
agreement ratings. This lack of impact of the subliminal 
stimulation on the agreement ratings stands in contrast to the 
results of the mood data, in which the rational vs. irrational 
stimuli differentially affected subjects1 mood even when 
presented subliminally. Interestingly, the difference between 
subject groups in their agreement ratings reflected a tendency 
for the remitted subjects in particular to agree more with the 
rational stimuli relative to the depressed subjects, rather 
than a difference between subjects in agreement with the 
irrational stimuli. This result was not predicted by Beck's 
theory, which emphasizes the association of a higher than 
normal degree of irrational beliefs with depression, rather 
than a lack of adequate rational beliefs. For the remitted 
and normal subjects, the agreement ratings for the 
subliminally presented stimuli, regardless of valence, fell 
midway between the ratings for the supraliminal-rational 
stimuli on the one hand, and the supraliminal-irrational 
stimuli on the other hand. No such difference emerged for 
the depressed subjects. This pattern is consistent with the 
results described above in which the stimulus valence affected 
the remitted and normal subjects only, and only in the 
supraliminal conditions. 
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METHOD 2 
Latency Measures 
As described previously, the latency between presentation 
of each TAT card and the first response to that card was 
recorded from audiotapes of subjects' TAT data. In addition, 
the total response time for each card was also recorded. 
Contrary to predictions, one-way ANOVA's by subject group 
revealed no differences across groups in either of these 
measures (Table 22). Two additional one-way ANOVA's were 
conducted on the sum of the response latencies across each 
subject's four TAT responses, and the sum of the total 
response times (Table 23). Both of these ANOVA's also failed 
to reach significance. 
Diagnostic Judgments 
The psychologists' diagnostic data consisted of 
categorical "depressed" vs. "not depressed" judgments. The 
primary dependent measure was the number of "depressed" 
diagnoses given to each of the 30 subjects. For any subject, 
this number could range from zero (when none of the ten 
psychologists diagnosed the subject as depressed) to ten (when 
all ten psychologists diagnosed the subject as depressed). 
116 
The mean number of depressed diagnoses per subject by subject 
group were 6.0 (SD = 1.70) for the depressed group, 1.9 (SD 
= 1.20) for the remitted group, and 3.5 (SD = 2.07) for the 
normal group. A one-way ANOVA by group reached significance 
at p < .05. Tukey's post hoc comparisons (p < .05) revealed 
that the depressed group was more likely than the remitted 
group to be diagnosed as depressed (Table 24). The depressed 
group did not differ from the normal group, however, nor did 
the normal and remitted groups differ. Although it did not 
reach statistical significance, there was an interesting trend 
for the remitted subjects to be less likely to be diagnosed 
as depressed relative to the normal subjects. 
In order to clarify the pattern of "correct" vs. 
"incorrect" diagnoses, a 2 by 2 matrix was constructed for 
each subject, with the subjects' actual diagnostic status 
(depressed vs. normal) forming one side of the matrix, and 
the psychologists1 diagnoses forming the other side. The 
judgments for the remitted subjects are not included in this 
matrix since their "true" diagnostic status is ambiguous; 
their data were instead summarized separately. The means and 
standard deviations of each cell of this matrix are presented 
in Table 25. Examination of this table reveals that the 
psychologists achieved a similar number of hits (6.0) and 
correct rejections (6.5) , and a similar number of misses (4.0) 
and false alarms (3.5). 
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In summary, the results of the latency and response time 
measures revealed no differences across the three subject 
groups. Although the expected direction of the difference was 
uncertain, it was predicted that the depressed and remitted 
subjects would differ from the normal subjects in these time 
measures. The psychologists correctly diagnosed more of the 
depressed subjects as depressed relative to the remitted 
subjects. The number of depressed diagnoses given to the 
normal subjects did not differ, however, from either the 
remitted or the depressed groups. This pattern is contrary 
to predictions made from Beck's theory, in which a greater 
number of depressed diagnoses was expected to be assigned to 
both the remitted and actively depressed subjects relative to 
the normals. 
METHOD 3 
Subjects' scores on each version of the Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale (DAS) were subjected to one-way ANOVA's by 
subject group. The mean scores for the "other person" version 
of the DAS were 139.89 (SD = 24.68), 142.80 (SD = 47.58), and 
147.30 (SD = 31.89) for the normal, remitted, and depressed 
subjects, respectively. A one-way ANOVA did not reach 
significance, revealing no differences across groups (Table 
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26). For the standard "self" version of the DAS, the normal 
subjects' mean score was 108.78 (SD = 16.28), the remitted 
subjects' mean score was 107.70 (SD = 22.15), and the 
depressed subjects' mean score was 152.20 (SD = 43.64). A 
one-way ANOVA reached significance at p = .0038. Tukey's post 
hoc comparisons revealed the predicted pattern: The 
depressives achieved a higher score (indicating more 
dysfunctional attitudes) relative to the normal and remitted 
subjects, who did not differ from one another (Table 27). 
The difference between the modified and the standard 
versions of the DAS was compared by obtaining a difference 
score for each subject (DAS-other minus DAS-self), which was 
subjected to a one-way ANOVA by group. The mean difference 
scores were 31.11 (SD = 28.14), 35.10 (SD = 35.69), and -4.90 
(SD = 68.04) for the normal, remitted, and depressed subjects, 
respectively. A one-way ANOVA by group on the difference 
scores failed to reach significance (Table 28). Although the 
difference scores were not significantly different across 
subject groups, examination of the means reveals a trend in 
which the depressives' scores on both versions of the DAS are 
comparable, and are similar to the normal and remitted 
subjects' scores on the "other person" version. The normal 
and remitted subjects, however, tended to endorse fewer 
dysfunctional beliefs on the "self" version relative to the 
"other" version. 
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In summary, as predicted, the depressed subjects 
demonstrated greater endorsement of dysfunctional beliefs 
relative to the normal and the remitted subjects on the 
standard, self-focused DAS, and the latter two groups did not 
differ from one another. Contrary to predictions, however, 
there were no differences between groups on a modified version 
of the DAS in which the beliefs of an abstract other person 
were rated. Recall that it was predicted that both the 
depressed and the remitted subjects would endorse more 
dysfunctional beliefs than the normals on this modified 
version of the DAS. Finally, also contrary to predictions 
derived from Beck's theory, there were no differences between 
groups in the difference between the "other" and the "self" 
versions of the DAS. 
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DISCUSSION 
The purpose of the present investigation was to examine 
the hypothesis that a depressotypic cognitive style represents 
a diathesis condition in the etiology of depression. The 
cognitive theory of depression proposed by Beck and his 
colleagues (1976) holds that certain early experiences lead 
to the development of an irrational, self-defeating view of 
the self, the world, and the future. These themes, in the 
form of cognitive schemas, are thought to be situationally and 
longitudinally stable. They are latent or relatively 
unavailable to the individual him or herself until activated 
by a significant stressor, such as a major loss. Once 
activated, the schemas color a wide range of cognitive 
processes, resulting in the depressive syndrome. As the 
depressive episode remits, the schemas once again become 
latent. 
There exists a large body of literature documenting the 
presence of depressotypic cognitions, including the core 
beliefs reflective of irrational schemas, in actively 
depressed persons (Hollon & Beck, 1979). The hypothesized 
presence of depressotypic schemas in depression-prone persons 
who are currently asymptomatic, however, has generally not 
been supported. Nevertheless, this negative finding is not 
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inconsistent with Beck's theory, since the majority of prior 
studies have not assessed for depressotypic schemas in ways 
that would be expected to expose their presence, given their 
latent status. If the diathesis aspect of Beck's theory, 
which is arguably the most critical component of the theory, 
is to be supported, these latent schemas must somehow be 
exposed. 
The present investigation represented an effort to 
evaluate whether or not such depressotypic schemas are present 
in the depression-prone person by comparing the performance 
of actively depressed, remitted, and never-depressed persons 
using three different assessment methods. Each of the methods 
was designed to go beyond standard self-report measures in an 
effort to examine the presence of underlying beliefs of which 
the subjects themselves were presumably either unaware, or 
hesitant to reveal. The three methods differed in the degree 
to which they were obviously designed to assess cognitive 
schemas. The tachistoscopic procedure was designed to bypass 
any experimenter demand, social-editing, or defensive 
processes that might obscure the presence of latent 
depressotypic schemas. Since the subjects were unaware of the 
content of the stimuli during the subliminal conditions, they 
could not intentionally edit their reactions to the 
stimulation. The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) task was 
somewhat less concealed in its purpose, presumably allowing 
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the subjects a greater degree of control over what they 
revealed about their core beliefs. The Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale (DAS) procedure was the least veiled of the 
three methods from the subjects' perspective. 
A review of the predictions for each of the experimental 
methods, followed by a discussion of the results obtained, is 
presented below. The results are then discussed in terms of 
their implications for Beck's theory. Finally, a discussion 
of how the present results interface with other psychological 
research on diathesis conditions in the etiology of 
depression, followed by a discussion of directions for future 
research, is presented. 
The Tachistoscopic Procedure 
The first of the three experimental procedures was 
essentially a type of mood induction procedure in which 
participants were presented with five irrational statements 
derived from the depressotypic schemas outlined by Beck, as 
well as five rational counterpart statements. The stimuli 
were presented both subliminally and supraliminally to all 
subjects by means of a tachistoscope. Following presentation 
of each stimulus, participants were asked to rate their degree 
of agreement with that statement along a visual analogue 
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scale. Following each set of stimuli, subjects completed a 
sensitive mood measure designed to assess subtle changes in 
mood (especially along a dysphoria-euphoria dimension) that 
resulted from the previous stimulus set. 
Mood measure. On the basis of Beck's theory and the 
results of studies employing the subliminal psychodynamic 
activation method with depressives (Cox, 1974; Dauber, 1984; 
Miller, 1973; Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973; Varga, 1973), the 
following predictions were made for the Depressive Adjective 
Check List (DACL, Lubin, 1965). These predictions can be 
summarized as a group by modality by valence interaction. 
First, it was predicted that the moods of the never-depressed 
subjects would be relatively unaffected by the stimuli, since 
they do not hold the depressotypic schemas reflected by the 
stimuli. The predictions for the actively depressed subjects 
were less clear. They might be expected to show an increase 
in dysphoric mood following the irrational stimuli, especially 
in the subliminal condition. Since their depressotypic 
schemas are presumed to have already been activated, however, 
it is not clear that an exacerbation of dysphoria would be 
expected. The most critical predictions concerned the 
remitted group. As discussed above, they are hypothesized to 
hold latent depressotypic schemas but are unable or unwilling 
to reveal such beliefs on standard self-report measures. It 
was therefore predicted that the subliminal presentation of 
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the irrational stimuli would result in an increase in 
dysphoria, with a corresponding decrease in dysphoria 
following the subliminal rational stimuli. The supraliminal 
stimuli were predicted to have little or no effect on the 
remitted subjects' mood. 
The results of the DACL revealed that the depressed 
subjects were more dysphoric across all experimental 
conditions relative to both the remitted and the never-
depressed subjects. This result is consistent with the 
baseline difference between the depressed subjects and the 
other two groups, and simply confirms the expected finding 
that the depressives were more dysphoric throughout the 
procedure. 
The predicted differential effects by subject group were 
not obtained. All three groups responded similarly on the 
DACL to the experimental manipulations. The absence of any 
differential effects by subject group is, of course, 
inconsistent with the predictions made according to Beck's 
theory. The implications of this finding for Beck's theory 
are discussed along with other results in a separate section 
below. 
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Close analysis of the data also revealed an interesting 
and unexpected effect of the stimuli. The valence of the 
first stimulus set encountered by the participants, regardless 
of whether it was presented subliminally or supraliminally, 
determined the degree of dysphoria reported throughout the 
remainder of the procedure. Subjects who were presented with 
the irrational stimuli first were more dysphoric across not 
only that initial phase but also across the three remaining 
experimental phases, relative to subjects who were presented 
with the rational stimuli first. This effect occurred for all 
three subject groups. 
This finding raises several implications. First, it 
suggests the occurrence of a kind of primacy effect. The 
first set of stimuli encountered by the participants appeared 
to set their mood, leaving it impervious to the effects of the 
stimuli that followed. Although the present procedure 
included a ten minute resting period between each experimental 
phase, it may have been that this was insufficient to allow 
the subjects' mood to return to baseline. In the only study 
to examine this issue directly, Silverman et al. (1971) found 
that the exacerbation of psychopathology that occurred 
following subliminal stimulation completely dissipated between 
15 and 30 minutes later. No similar study has examined this 
issue with depressives, however, leaving open the question of 
exactly how long a dysphoric mood induction lasts. 
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The second feature of the above finding is its 
consistency with the mood induction literature (Averill, 1969; 
Coleman, 1975; Goodwin & Williams, 1983; Hale & Strickland, 
1976; Isen et al., 1978; Masters et al., 1979; Moore et al., 
1973; Natale, 1977a, 1977b; Polivy & Doyle, 1980; Strickland 
et al., 1975). Recall that standard mood induction techniques 
(e.g., Velten, 1968) involve measuring changes in dysphoria 
following the presentation of negatively toned statements to 
nondepressed subjects. A primary criticism that has been 
raised against such procedures in the study of clinical 
depression is the possibility that the results are due to 
experimenter demand effects (Buchwald, Strack, & Coyne, 1981; 
Polivy & Doyle, 1980). The present results suggest that a 
negative mood induction is possible in depressed, remitted, 
and never-depressed persons. Thus, negative mood induction 
is possible not only in nondepressed persons, but in persons 
demonstrating a wide range of baseline dysphoria levels. 
Moreover, the fact that such induction took place even when 
the stimuli were outside of both the experimenter's and the 
subjects1 awareness mitigates against an experimenter demand 
explanation. 
A third important feature of the results of the 
tachistoscopic procedure is the finding that the valence of 
the stimuli had an impact upon the participants* mood even 
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when presented subliminally. This result supports the 
treatment integrity of the experimental procedure. Despite 
being well below the recognition threshold, the stimuli 
nevertheless had an impact on mood. This finding adds yet 
another small piece of evidence to the growing body of 
literature documenting the various effects of stimulation 
without awareness in laboratory studies (Dixon, 1981). 
Agreement ratings. The predictions for the agreement 
ratings were similar to the predictions for the mood data, 
and can also be summarized as a group by modality by valence 
interaction. Since they hold no predisposition toward 
depression, the normal subjects were predicted to agree with 
the rational statements and disagree with the irrational 
statements, regardless of modality. In contrast, the 
depressives were predicted to show lower agreement with the 
rational statements and higher agreement with the irrational 
statements relative to the normal subjects, regardless of 
modality. The remitted subjects were expected to respond 
similarly to the normals during the supraliminal conditions, 
and to the depressives during the subliminal conditions. That 
is, they were expected to show relatively higher agreement 
with the rational stimuli when they were presented 
supraliminally, and relatively higher agreement with the 
irrational stimuli when presented subliminally. 
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The results of the agreement ratings did not support the 
diathesis component of Beck's theory. Although the results 
were basically consistent with predictions for the depressed 
and normal subjects, the predictions for the remitted subjects 
were not supported. Specifically, there were no differences 
in the pattern of agreement ratings between the remitted and 
the normal subjects. Both of these groups agreed more with 
the rational stimuli than with the irrational stimuli, but 
only when the stimuli were presented supraliminally. There 
were no differences between the remitted and normal subjects' 
agreement ratings for the rational vs. irrational subliminally 
presented stimuli. Similarly, the depressed subjects did not 
differ in their agreement ratings for the rational vs. 
irrational subliminal stimuli. 
These results are consistent with the results of the mood 
data described above. Like the mood data, they reveal the 
predicted difference between the actively depressed and the 
never depressed subjects. These findings are consistent with 
the large body of literature documenting irrational beliefs 
among depressives. These findings also validated that the 
sample of depressed subjects employed in this study was 
representative of the population described in the literature 
with respect to the presence of irrational beliefs. 
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Unlike the mood data, however, the agreement ratings were 
not affected in the subliminal conditions. There are at least 
two related explanations for this discrepancy. First, it is 
possible that the more analytical reasoning processes 
underlying the agreement ratings were less susceptible to 
subliminal stimulation relative to the more impressionistic 
mood ratings (cf. Dixon, 1981). Similarly, the subjects may 
have found the agreement task during the subliminal conditions 
significantly less plausible than the mood measure. Casual 
observations of the subjects' reaction to the experimental 
instructions suggested that the notion that subliminal 
stimulation may result in slight changes in mood was easier 
to accept by most subjects than the idea that they could rate 
their agreement with statements that they could not see. This 
impression may have led the participants to constrict their 
range of ratings on the visual analogue scales more for the 
agreement measures than for the mood measures. This 
interpretation is supported by comparison of the average 
standard deviations for the two measures. Although the length 
of the visual analogue scale for each item of the mood measure 
was somewhat longer than the scale for the agreement measure 
(130 mm vs. 97 mm.), the mean standard deviation for the mood 
measure across all conditions and all groups was over three 
times as large (367.41) as the standard deviation for the 
agreement measure (117.88). 
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As noted above, like the mood data, the agreement data 
were inconsistent with the diathesis component of Beck's 
theory. This point is discussed further below. 
The Thematic Apperception Test 
The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT; Murray, 1943) is 
one of the most widely used psychological assessment 
instruments among clinical psychologists, and is included in 
most standard test batteries in which personality functioning 
is assessed (Rapaport et al., 1968). One's responses to the 
ambiguous interpersonal scenes depicted on the TAT cards are 
held to reflect basic themes around which one's behavior and 
experiences are organized. Revelation of these themes in TAT 
responses is not thought to be contingent upon the subjects' 
awareness of them. The TAT was therefore chosen as a tool for 
investigating the presence of depressotypic schemas in the 
remitted depressive. 
As described previously, there were two types of data 
extracted from the subject's TAT responses. First, time 
measures of the latency to the first response to each card, 
and the total response time for each card were recorded. It 
was predicted that the actively depressed subjects and the 
remitted subjects would have longer response latencies than 
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the normal controls. This pattern was predicted since two of 
the four card administered are known to elicit depressive 
themes (Holt, 1978; Rapaport et al., 1968), which would be 
expected to be conflictual or threatening to these 
individuals, and therefore to result in longer response 
latencies. The predictions for the total response time were 
less clear; although the depressives might be expected to have 
longer total response times relative to the other groups due 
to their characteristic psychomotor retardation, they might 
also have shorter times due to lack of interest and 
involvement in the task. 
The second class of data obtained from the TAT procedure 
was the psychologists' diagnostic judgments. It was reasoned 
that the presence of depressotypic themes among a subject's 
responses would increase the likelihood that she would be 
diagnosed as depressed. It was therefore predicted that a 
higher proportion of the subjects in the depressed and in the 
remitted groups would be diagnosed as depressed relative to 
the normal subjects. 
Both the time measures and the diagnostic data failed to 
support the predictions. Like the results of the 
tachistoscopic procedure described above, the results of the 
TAT data were not consistent with predictions made according 
to Beck's theory. There were no differences between the 
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subject groups in either of the time measures. Although the 
depressed subjects were indeed more likely to be diagnosed as 
depressed relative to the remitted subjects, there were no 
differences between the normal subjects and either of the 
other two groups. There was an interesting trend for the 
remitted subjects to be less likely to be diagnosed as 
depressed relative to the normal subjects, which is consistent 
with the fact that only the remitted subjects differed 
significantly from the depressives. This finding suggests 
that the responses of the remitted subjects actually contained 
somewhat fewer depressive themes than the responses of the 
normal subjects. It is possible that the remitted subjects 
were going out of their way to give "normal" responses free 
of any depressive themes. Although intriguing, such an 
interpretation must remain most tentative due to the 
relatively small differences in the diagnostic data between 
the remitted and normal groups. 
There are at least two potential explanations for the 
lack of predicted results. First, it could be argued that 
although the TAT is indeed sensitive to organizing schemas, 
it is not differentially sensitive to depressotypic schemas, 
even given the particular cards chosen for administration in 
the present investigation. That is, although the test may 
have elicited depressotypic themes, among others, from the 
depressed subjects, it may have elicited equally conflictual 
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nondepressotypic themes from the nondepressed subjects. This 
is consistent with the fact that not all of the four cards 
chosen for administration are typically thought to pull 
specifically for depressive themes. The similarity in the 
time measures might therefore be expected. 
The second explanation for the lack of predicted results 
concerns the purpose of the TAT in general, and the manner in 
which the present data were collected in particular. The TAT 
is generally used to assess idiosyncratic organizing themes, 
as noted above. It is rarely if ever used alone to make broad 
nosological diagnostic judgments such as depressed vs. not 
depressed. The presence of certain themes or other response 
characteristics across several cards may suggest a diagnostic 
category. It may be asking too much of the test, however, to 
yield data that can be used in isolation to make valid 
clinical diagnoses. 
Although the TAT was administered under standard 
conditions during the present investigation, there were three 
important aspects of the resulting data that may have limited 
their utility. First, due to time constraints, only four TAT 
cards were administered to each subject. In normal clinical 
settings, a minimum of 10 cards are administered, thereby 
obviously yielding more and richer data. Second, the same 
four cards were administered to all participants in this 
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study. In typical clinical settings, however, the particular 
cards chosen for administration are selected from a pool of 
30 cards according to the question at hand and to prior 
knowledge of the subject's personality style, gender, age, 
etc. Although this was done, of course, in order to avoid 
potential confounds of presenting different cards to different 
subjects, it might have reduced the sensitivity of the test. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the diagnosticians did 
not administer the test themselves, but instead made their 
judgments on the basis of typewritten transcripts of the 
subjects' responses. Most clinicians who use the TAT feel 
that subtle nuances of the subject's verbal and nonverbal 
behavior frequently yield important data. Moreover, slight 
variations in administrative style, as well as the stimulus 
value each administrator him or herself brings into the 
testing situation, were not accommodated by the present 
procedure. Inclusion of such administrative nuances was, of 
course, impossible in the context of the present procedure. 
Although potentially useful clinically, tests such as the TAT 
that rely heavily on such subtleties are inherently difficult 
to employ in controlled experimental investigations. 
As noted above, the results of the TAT data were not 
consistent with the diathesis aspect of Beck's model. This 
point is elaborated below. 
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The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale 
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS, Weissman, 1979) 
is a 40-item self-report inventory designed specifically to 
assess the depressotypic schemas proposed by Beck. The 
inventory consists of statements with which subjects rate 
their degree of agreement along a 7-point scale. 
Before the standard self-focused version of the DAS was 
administered in the present investigation, subjects were asked 
to complete a version of the DAS in which the instructions had 
been modified. Instead of asking subjects to rate their own 
degree of agreement with each statement, they were asked to 
rate how someone else might possibly respond. It was 
predicted from past research (e.g., Eaves & Rush, 1984; 
Hamilton & Abramson, 1983) that the depressives would endorse 
higher agreement with dysfunctional attitudes on the standard 
version of the DAS than both the remitted and normal subjects, 
who would not differ from one another. For the "other person" 
version of the DAS, the results for the actively depressed and 
the normal subjects were predicted to be the same as for the 
standard version. The remitted subjects, however, were 
predicted to respond similarly to the depressed subjects on 
this modified version, that is, endorsing a large number of 
dysfunctional attitudes. It was reasoned that when the 
evaluative context of the test was made less threatening so 
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that their responses were not seen as a direct reflection on 
themselves, the remitted subjects might reveal the presence 
of underlying depressotypic schemas. 
The results of the standard DAS data were consistent with 
predictions: The depressives expressed stronger agreement 
with dysfunctional beliefs than did either the remitted or 
never-depressed groups, and these latter two groups did not 
differ from one another. This result is consistent with past 
studies demonstrating higher DAS scores among actively 
depressed persons relative to control samples (Dobson & 
Breiter, 1983; Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; O'Hara, Rehm, & 
Campbell, 1982; Weissman, 1979). Like the previously 
discussed finding of higher agreement with the supraliminally 
presented irrational statements in the tachistoscopic 
procedure, this finding confirmed that the depressives in the 
present study were typical of the depressive population at 
large with respect to the presence of dysfunctional 
cognitions. 
In contrast to the results of the standard version of 
the DAS, the results of the "other person" version were not 
consistent with predictions made from Beck's theory. When 
instructed to focus on another person rather than themselves, 
subjects in all three groups endorsed similar levels of 
dysfunctional attitudes. Examination of the means for each 
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group revealed an interesting pattern. It was not the 
depressives, but rather the remitted and normal subjects, who 
were inconsistent in their responses to the two measures. 
More specifically, although the remitted and normal subjects 
endorsed less dysfunctional attitudes relative to the 
depressives on the standard self-focused version of the DAS, 
all three groups endorsed the same relatively high level of 
dysfunctional attitudes on the modified version. Thus, 
depressives saw themselves and others as sharing an equally 
pessimistic outlook. The normal and remitted subjects, in 
contrast, viewed others as holding a relatively high degree 
of dysfunctional attitudes, whereas they rated themselves more 
positively. 
This pattern of results suggests that depressed as well 
as nondepressed persons share the perception that other people 
hold a high degree of dysfunctional attitudes. Only the 
depressives, however, endorse such attitudes themselves. This 
finding, although counter to predictions for the nondepressed 
subjects, is nevertheless consistent with the "illusory self-
glow" literature discussed previously. Recall that numerous 
studies have consistently found that depressives are more 
accurate in their evaluative judgments in a wide range of both 
social and nonsocial situations than are nondepressed persons. 
For example, Lewinsohn et al. (1980) found that depressives 
showed a close correspondence between their self-perceptions 
138 
and the way they were viewed by others, whereas nondepressives 
saw themselves more positively than others saw them. The 
present results may reflect a similar process, whereby 
nondepressed persons attribute a low degree of dysfunctional 
beliefs to themselves and a high degree of such beliefs to 
other persons in order to inflate their self-perception. 
As noted above, like the results of the tachistoscopic 
procedure and the TAT procedure, the results of the DAS 
procedure were not consistent with predictions made according 
to Beck's theory. This issue is discussed next. 
Implications for Beck's Theory of Depression 
The three procedures described above were vastly 
different methodologies all converging in pursuit of the same 
construct: a depressotypic cognitive style that reflects a 
vulnerability for the development of depression. In order to 
be a true diathesis, such a cognitive style must precede the 
development of depression, and since depression is an episodic 
phenomenon, must endure beyond the remission of depression, 
at least in most individuals. The present investigation took 
advantage of the episodic nature of depression to examine the 
presence of depressotypic schemas in remitted depressives. 
Although other researchers have employed remitted depressives 
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in an effort to study depressotypic schemas, the unique 
feature of all three of the methods employed here is their 
attempt to bypass the normal editing processes that might 
otherwise obscure the presence of depressotypic cognitions in 
asymptomatic depression-prone persons. Such methods represent 
the only fair test of the diathesis component of Beck's 
theory, since he repeatedly emphasizes that the depressotypic 
schemas are latent in the asymptomatic individual (Sacco & 
Beck, 1985). 
The remitted and the never-depressed participants did 
not differ on any of the measures employed in this 
investigation, findings which do not support Beck's proposal 
of latent, depressotypic schemas in the asymptomatic 
depression-prone person. All three experimental procedures 
were consistent in revealing no differences between these two 
groups. The most parsimonious explanation of the present 
results is that depressotypic cognitions are concomitants of 
a depressed state, rather than enduring traits. As discussed 
further below, this conclusion is consistent with the 
conclusions of a recent paper reviewing this body of 
literature (Barnett & Gotlib, 1988) . 
The possibility of latent depressotypic schemas in the 
asymptomatic depression-prone person cannot, of course, be 
categorically ruled out on the basis of the present results. 
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It is possible that the procedures employed here failed to 
reveal depressotypic schemas that were in fact present in the 
remitted depressives. Although this is always a possibility 
and the null hypothesis that remitted and normal persons are 
the same can never be definitively proven, the fact that three 
different methods all designed to reveal such schemas 
consistently found no differences between the remitted and the 
normal subjects mitigates against this conclusion. Moreover, 
the ad hoc argument that the present procedures failed to tap 
latent schemas can remain plausible only if the presence of 
such schemas can somehow be revealed in the asymptomatic 
person. 
It might also be argued that the negative findings 
reflected something about the particular remitted subjects 
employed in the present study. For example, it might be 
argued that since these subjects were not assessed by the 
experimenter while they were actually depressed one cannot be 
certain that they were in fact representative of the 
population of remitted clinical depressives. Problems in 
subject selection were quite unlikely, however, for two 
reasons. First, great care was taken in the selection of the 
remitted participants for this study to ensure, as much as 
possible, that they had had at least one prior significant 
clinical depressive episode. Where possible, collateral data 
were obtained from outside sources, such as the subject's past 
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therapist, to supplement and validate the retrospective data 
provided by the subject herself. Secondly, the majority of 
the subjects employed in this study also served as 
participants in another dissertation project in which 
differences on an operant task employing behavioral measures, 
and on a social task employing physiological measures were 
found between the remitted and normal subjects (Sigmon, 1989) . 
Thus, there were no obvious characteristics of the present 
sample of remitted subjects that would seem to preclude their 
possessing depressotypic schemas. 
Thus, Beck's theory continues to represent a useful 
description of the cognitive content and processes associated 
with active depressive episodes. Moreover, his cognitive 
therapy for depression has proven quite efficacious, and is 
widely considered one of the most effective interventions for 
the disorder (Blackburn et al., 1981; Carson & Carson, 1984; 
Rush et al., 1977). The present results, as well as the bulk 
of the relevant literature, however, argued against the 
etiological significance of depressotypic cognitions. 
Psychological Diatheses for Depression 
Although Beck's theory is arguably the most well known 
current psychosocial theory of depression, it is by no means 
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the only such theory to propose a diathesis-stress model of 
the etiology of depression. In a recently published paper, 
Barnett and Gotlib (1988) presented a thorough review of the 
literature that has attempted to distinguish concomitants of 
depression from antecedents and sequelae of the disorder. 
They evaluated the results of studies examining six 
psychosocial variables: attributional style, dysfunctional 
attitudes, personality, social support, marital distress, and 
coping style. The authors concluded that, consistent with the 
present results, there is little support for a cognitive 
vulnerability for depression. 
In contrast, Barnett and Gotlib found that various 
disturbances in personality and interpersonal functioning may 
be more likely to represent psychosocial diatheses for 
depression. Specifically, they concluded that there is 
evidence that remitted depressives demonstrate higher levels 
of dependency, especially in terms of desiring approval, 
attention, and help from others, relative to controls. At 
the same time, they also seem to socialize less than never-
depressed controls. There is some evidence that depression-
prone persons, including remitted depressives, also tend to 
be less socially integrated than controls, in that they have 
fewer important relationships and participate in fewer social 
activities. Finally, there is substantial support for the 
conclusion that high levels of marital distress is both an 
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antecedent and a sequela of depression, especially among 
women. 
It should be noted that excessive dependency and other 
interpersonal disturbances highlighted by Barnett and Gotlib 
as enduring sequelae of depression are almost certainly 
related to some degree of cognitive dysfunction. For example, 
an excessively dependent person is likely to manifest 
irrational cognitions such as "if I were to make a decision 
on my own the consequences would certainly be disastrous." 
Thus, disturbances in personality and interpersonal 
functioning may partially vindicate Beck's theory by 
suggesting specific dysfunctional content areas in 
depressives' cognition. Moreover, the particular disturbances 
in interpersonal and personality functioning, and consequently 
the particular types of irrational cognitions, may differ 
across subgroups of depressives. 
The diathesis-stress model represents a useful framework 
for theories attempting to explain the development and 
pathogenesis of psychopathology, including depression. The 
importance of identifying diathesis conditions cannot be 
overstated, given their potential utility for primary 
prevention. The probability that a single, general diathesis 
for depression can be identified, however, is called into 
question by the growing appreciation of the heterogeneity of 
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depression (Craighead, 1980; Liberman, 1981; McKnight, Nelson, 
Hayes, & Jarrett, 1984). Heterogeneity of symptom 
presentation, while pointing to the possibility of multiple 
etiologies of depression, does not rule out the possibility 
of a common diathesis for most depressive disorders. For 
example, many medical conditions (e.g., Lyme's disease) are 
characterized by widely differing patterns of symptoms across 
individuals, but share a common etiology. Nevertheless, it 
is entirely possible that there are many different etiological 
pathways leading to similar outcomes that fall under the 
general rubric of depression. If so, there may not be a 
single diathesis condition that underlies all depressive 
disorders, but instead multiple classes of both diatheses and 
precipitants. 
Directions for Future Research 
As noted above, the issue of whether or not a single 
psychosocial vulnerability can be identified in depression 
remains an open question. Given the rather heterogeneous 
symptomatology of depressive disorders, however, it would seem 
wise for future researchers to give strong consideration to 
the possibility that there may exist multiple etiological 
pathways to depression. Even within Beck's theory, for 
example, the specific beliefs that predispose certain 
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individuals to depression may be idiosyncratic, corresponding 
only roughly to the core dysfunctional attitudes that Beck 
describes. 
Although the present results were inconsistent with 
Beck's proposal of a cognitive diathesis to depression, the 
issue is by no means resolved. The present investigation was, 
to the author's knowledge, the first to employ special 
assessment procedures in an attempt to measure latent 
cognitive schemas in depression-prone persons. The results 
of a single investigation, of course, cannot resolve the issue 
one way or the other. Moreover, as noted above, the null 
hypothesis that remitted and normal persons do not differ with 
respect to depressotypic schemas can never be definitively 
proven. It behooves future researchers to take seriously 
Beck's repeated assertion that the schemas he proposes are 
latent in the asymptomatic person. Even if such schemas are 
present, it cannot be assumed that they can be assessed simply 
by asking a person to rate his or her agreement with a series 
of beliefs. 
The utility of subliminal perception methods. Despite 
the lack of differential effects by subject group in the 
present study, subliminal perception paradigms continue to 
represent potentially useful tools for exploring unconscious 
processes in clinical populations, including the possibility 
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of latent depressotypic cognitions in depression. It is 
generally now accepted that under certain conditions, 
tachistoscopically presented subliminal stimulation can 
produce measurable effects on a range of dependent measures 
(Dixon, 1981). The utility of Silverman's subliminal 
psychodynamic activation method in particular, on which the 
present tachistoscopic procedure was partially based, however, 
has recently been called into question. 
In a recent critical review of the subliminal 
psychodynamic activation paradigm, Balay and Shevrin (1988) 
raise three criticisms of Silverman's method and 
interpretations of his results. First, they noted that the 
majority of the reported results are based on gain scores in 
which a measure collected immediately after an experimental 
stimulus is subtracted from a measure collected after a prior 
neutral baseline stimulus. They suggested that it is not 
possible to know if positive results were due to the effects 
of the "neutral" baseline stimulus or the critical 
experimental stimulus. Putatively neutral baseline stimuli 
(e.g., "people are talking") may evoke a temporary increase 
in anxiety or some other measure of psychopathology. A 
decrease in anxiety following the "experimental" stimulus 
(e.g., "mommy and I are one") may therefore simply reflect a 
return to the true baseline level, rather than an effect of 
the latter stimulus. This criticism is not relevant to the 
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present design since (a) the baseline mood measure was 
collected prior to the presentation of any stimulus, and (b) 
gain scores were not employed in the final analyses reported. 
Nevertheless, it does offer a more parsimonious interpretation 
of some of Silverman's more seemingly incredible results. 
The second criticism concerned Silverman's hypothesis 
that a single, universal psychodynamic conflict could be 
identified that underlies the psychopathology of a given 
diagnostic group. Balay and Shevrin argued that although this 
position may be true and the issue remains an empirical one, 
it is more likely that the specific themes or conflicts 
underlying any individual * s psychopathology are highly 
idiosyncratic. As an example of this idiographic approach, 
they point to ongoing work by Shevrin (in press) in which 
individualized conflictual themes are extracted from 
interviews and psychological test data. These themes are then 
presented, along with control stimuli, both subliminally and 
supraliminally, while brain event-related potentials are 
monitored. Greater evoked potentials result from the 
individualized stimuli than from the control stimuli, even 
when presented subliminally. This criticism is not, of 
course, unique to Silverman's method. Although Beck allows 
for somewhat more latitude in the specific dysfunctional 
beliefs held by different depressed individuals relative to 
Silverman, he does propose that the dysfunctional cognitions 
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of all depressives can be summarized by a small number of 
general statements. 
The third and final criticism of Silverman's method was 
that he and his colleagues too quickly extended the subliminal 
psychodynamic activation method to new populations and 
applications, relying on sometimes complex ad hoc explanations 
to account for variations and discrepancies in results. Balay 
and Shevrin argued for the importance of careful demonstration 
of the contextual conditions necessary for subliminal effects 
to occur before attempting such broad applications. It is 
important to note that despite their criticisms of certain 
details of Silverman's method and interpretations, Balay and 
Shevrin strongly support the use of subliminal perception 
methods to investigate unconscious processes in 
psychopathology, as reflected in Shevrin's own work described 
above. In fact, one of their major concerns with the 
subliminal psychodynamic activation paradigm was that it may 
decrease the credibility of all subliminal applications; 
"...it would be misleading if the validity of subliminal 
perception were to stand or fall on subliminal psychodynamic 
activation research because the validity of the concept has 
been so well established in other ways" (p. 172). 
Thus, subliminal perception methods remain potentially 
useful tools for investigating potential cognitive markers 
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for depression. In order for such methods to achieve their 
full potential, however, more systematic research is needed 
into the basic contextual conditions that facilitate the 
occurrence of subliminal effects. 
Other approaches to the study of depressotypic schemas. 
Despite the finding of no differences between the remitted 
and depressed subjects in the present study, and despite the 
unknown reliability of the test as it is typically used, the 
Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) remains a potentially useful 
tool for exploring depressotypic schemas. As an alternative 
to the diagnostic approach employed in the present study, 
experienced clinicians, blind to subject group, might extract 
general idiosyncratic themes from the data of actively 
depressed, remitted, and normal depressed subjects. Although 
there exists a wealth of observational data on the TAT (e.g., 
Holt, 1978; Rapaport et al., 1968; Tomkins, 1947), there are 
little controlled data on the degree to which certain themes 
are consistently reflected in the data of different diagnostic 
groups. 
In contrast, the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS) 
appears ineffective in the assessment of latent depressotypic 
schemas. Numerous studies, including the present one, have 
found no differences between remitted depressives and never-
depressed controls on the DAS. The DAS is indisputably the 
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best existing instrument for measuring the depressotypic 
schemas postulated by Beck in the actively depressed person. 
Its straightforward self-report format, however, seems to 
preclude its ability to detect beliefs that are outside of the 
subject's awareness, regardless of the mode of administration. 
In addition to the procedures employed in the present 
study, another approach to the search for latent cognitive 
antecedents and sequelae of depression would be to present 
asymptomatic depression-prone persons with a relevant 
stressor, then compare any cognitive changes to a pre-stressor 
baseline measure. For example, remitted depressives could be 
told that a confederate with whom they had just interacted 
disliked them. They could then be asked to complete something 
like the Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale. Some support could 
be claimed for the existence of latent depressotypic schemas 
among remitted depressives if they endorsed higher levels of 
dysfunctional attitudes following the feedback, relative to 
never-depressed controls. A potential problem with such a 
study is that presentation of a stressor that would be strong 
enough to represent a fair test of the theory would almost 
certainly be ethically problematic. It is not clear if a 
stressor could be identified that would activate the schemas 
only enough to measure their effects, but not enough to 
produce significant dysphoria. Furthermore, the particular 
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stressors that would elicit depressotypic schemas might be 
idiosyncratic across individuals. 
Other psychological diatheses for depression. The 
increased sensitivity to the heterogeneity of depression is 
reflected in the recent interest in the relationship between 
various personality disorders and depression (Farmer & Nelson, 
in preparation; Hirschfeld & Cross, 1987). Estimates of the 
co-occurrence of DSM-III personality disorders among 
clinically depressed outpatients range from 48% (Shea, Glass, 
Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty, 1987) to 75% (Pilkonis & Frank, 
1988). Akiskal, Hirschfeld, and Yerevanian (1983), among 
others, have suggested that a dysfunctional premorbid 
personality predisposes one to the development of depression, 
and that the symptomatology of the resulting depression will 
be colored by the nature of the particular personality style. 
Research in this area is just beginning, and much work is 
needed to examine the relationship between one's premorbid 
personality characteristics and factors that lead to 
depression. 
In line with the conclusions of the Barnett and Gotlib 
(1988) review discussed above and consistent with Sigmon's 
(1989) recent findings, further research on interpersonal 
factors that render one vulnerable to depression is clearly 
indicated. Barnett and Gotlib noted that despite the 
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tentative conclusion that interpersonal dependency places one 
at risk for depression, there have not yet been developed any 
well-validated measures of this construct. The authors also 
stressed the importance of further work on the relationship 
between marital distress and depression. 
Given the difficulty and expense of longitudinal 
research, investigators can continue to take advantage of the 
episodic nature of depression by comparing remitted 
depressives with never-depressed controls in searching for 
psychosocial predispositions to depression. Once a promising 
candidate for such a diathesis is identified, however, 
longitudinal designs are indispensable in verifying that the 
factor actually precedes depression, rather than being a 
consequence or "scar" (Zeiss & Lewinsohn, 1988) of the 
disorder. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. It has been argued that the term subliminal perception is 
oxymoronic, since perception by definition implies awareness. 
As used in the literature referred to in this discussion, 
however, the term does not require or even necessarily imply 
awareness. For the sake of simplicity and consistency with 
this literature, the effects of stimulation in the absence of 
awareness will be discussed here under the general rubric of 
"subliminal perception." 
2. Gratitude is expressed to Dr. Doris Silverman and to Dr. 
Joel Weinberger for graciously providing reprints of some of 
the late Dr. Lloyd Silverman's unpublished manuscripts. 
3. As noted by Weinberger and Silverman (1987), all 11 of 
the therapy and educational adjunct studies that have met 
these dosage criteria have produced positive results. 
4. Gratitude is expressed to Dr. Richard Shull for his 
helpful insights into this analysis. 
5. Of course, not all remitted depressives would necessarily 
be expected by Beck's theory to hold depressogenic schemas. 
It is conceivable, for example, that an intervention such as 
cognitive therapy or psychotherapy received during or 
subsequent to a person's last depressive episode may have 
effectively eliminated these schemas. The high rate of 
relapse, even among persons who have been treated for one or 
more episodes of clinical depression, however, suggests that 
the majority of remitted depressives do hold some diathesis 
condition that renders them vulnerable to future depression. 
Moreover, the hypothesis evaluated by the present study does 
not require that all remitted depressives hold depressogenic 
schemas, but only that a greater proportion of remitted 
depressives hold such schemas to a greater extent relative to 
persons who have never been depressed. 
6. I am grateful to Dr. Richard Dauber for providing me a 
copy of this measure. 
7. In order to evaluate further any potential differences 
between the five experimental stimuli, this 4-way ANOVA was 
re-run adding the stimuli as a fifth within-subjects factor 
(see Table 18) . The results of this 4 (order) by 3 (group) 
by 2 (modality) by 2 (modality) by 5 (stimulus) ANOVA revealed 
only two significant effects involving the stimulus factor: 
The valence by stimulus interaction was significant (p = 
.0069), and the modality by valence by stimulus interaction 
was significant (p = .0111). Despite the significance of the 
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valence by stimulus interaction on the omnibus test, more 
conservative post hoc comparisons (Tukey's tests with p < .05) 
revealed no differences across the five stimuli for either the 
rational or the irrational conditions. Tukey's tests on the 
modality by valence by stimulus interaction revealed that for 
all five stimuli, agreement ratings in the supraliminal 
conditions were greater than in the subliminal conditions for 
the rational stimuli, with the opposite pattern for the 
irrational stimuli. The only exception was the irrational 
version of the stimulus "I have to be successful at 
everything," in which there was no difference in agreement 
ratings between the supraliminal and subliminal modalities. 
Given the large number of comparisons made, this single minor 
result carries little weight, and does not alter the 
conclusion that there were no differential effects of any of 
the stimuli that would preclude collapsing across stimuli in 
the analyses. 
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The Amine Theory 
A large part of the etiological research that has been 
conducted on unipolar depression has focused on 
neurophysiological factors. This research centers around the 
so-called amine theory of depression (Baldessarini, 1983; 
Green & Costain, 1979). Although the specific details of the 
amine theory are controversial, the basic proposition is that 
depression is caused by a deficit in certain brain 
neurotransmitters, especially the catecholamine 
norepinephrine, and the indolamine serotonin. Although these 
amines make up only 2% to 5% of all neurotransmitters in the 
central nervous system, approximately 90% of the amine 
transmitters are found in the limbic system, which is believed 
to be involved in autonomic arousal and emotional functioning 
(Hendler, 1982). Numerous studies lend support to the 
relationship between low levels of amine neurotransmitters and 
depression (e.g., Mendels, Fiere, Fitzgerand, Ramsey, & 
Stokes, 1972) . It remains to be demonstrated, however, that 
a reduction in these substances causes depression, as opposed 
to being a consequence or a correlate of depression. 
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Current somatic interventions for depression, including 
psychotropic medications and electroconvulsive therapy, have 
been shown to be quite effective for many (though not all) 
depressed persons. The use of somatic interventions presents 
several problems, however, including contraindicating factors 
for many individuals, potentially dangerous short-term and 
long-term side effects, and the potential for chemical 
dependence in the case of antidepressant medication. 
Psychoanalytic Theories 
Virtually all modern theories of psychopathology owe an 
often-unrecognized debt to the pioneering work of Sigmund 
Freud (Sulloway, 1983), and current theories of depression are 
no exception. As early as 1895, in a letter to his friend 
Wilhelm Fliess, Freud noted three themes that continue to 
permeate thinking on depression: the theme of loss in the 
etiology of the condition, the analogy between depression and 
the process of mourning, and the frequent association of 
depression and anxiety (Freud, 1895/1950). 
Early psychoanalytic formulations of depression, first 
presented by Abraham (1911, 1916) and subsequently developed 
by Freud (1917), involve the notion of introjection of 
hostility and anger unconsciously directed toward a lost love 
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object. According to Freud (1917), the depressive harbors a 
fundamentally ambivalent attitude toward a particular (often 
abstract) love object. When the object is lost, libido is not 
divested from the object and displaced onto a new object, as 
is the normal course in mourning. Rather, the depressive 
continues to identify with the lost object. As reality 
testing proceeds, two consequences of this "narcissistic 
identification" occur. First, the gradual realization that 
the object is truly lost becomes synonymous with loss of ego, 
resulting in low self-esteem. Second, feelings of hostility 
toward the lost object, which are repressed from 
consciousness, are introjected onto the self, resulting in 
feelings of worthlessness and guilt, and tendencies toward 
self-destructiveness. 
Later Freudians, such as Rado (1928) and Gero (1936), 
expanded upon Freud's theory to incorporate his tripartite 
structure of personality functioning, and his theory of 
infantile sexuality. The ego psychologists, especially 
Bibring (1953) , emphasized the depressive's realization of the 
discrepancy between the ego * s actual state and its ideal 
state, as well as the ego's helplessness to achieve its ideal 
state. The object-relations theorists (e.g., Klein, 1948? 
Jacobson, 1971) extended Freudian concepts back into the first 
months of life, focusing on the relationship between the 
infant and significant objects in his or her world. 
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Depression (or at least a predisposition toward depression in 
later life) was held to result from problems in the formation 
of object-relations, particularly a failure to discriminate 
sufficiently the self from significant objects. 
Empirical data directly evaluating psychodynamic theories 
of depression are sparse, although recent methodological 
innovations have provided some support for certain 
psychoanalytic propositions (Silverman, 1976) . Psychoanalytic 
interventions for depression have rarely been subjected to 
systematic empirical evaluation. Despite the paucity of 
"hard" data, the insightful clinical observations and 
theoretical work of psychoanalysts continues to exert a 
powerful influence on the study of depression by theorists 
and researchers from a variety of theoretical perspectives. 
Behavioral Theories 
Several behaviorally-oriented theorists have proposed 
theories and models in an effort to account for the behavior 
of depressed persons. Common themes among the various 
behavioral approaches to depression include a loss of 
reinforcement and a reduction in the overall rate of emitted 
behavior. Skinner (1953, 1974) conceptualizes depression as 
an extinction phenomenon. A reduction in reinforcement or the 
instigation of response cost for operant behavior leads 
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directly to a reduction in the overall rate of operant 
behavior. The conceptualization of depression as an 
extinction phenomenon has been central to all behavioral 
approaches to depression (Hoberman & Lewinsohn, 1985; 
Lewinsohn, 1975). Similarly, Lazarus (1968) views depression 
as the result of a loss of reinforcement, resulting in a 
weakened behavioral repertoire. 
Ferster (1973, 1981) conceptualizes depression as a 
reduction in the rate of operant behavior, and suggests three 
general factors that might produce this reduction. First, a 
lean schedule of positive reinforcement will result in a 
decrease in operant behavior, as suggested by Skinner and 
Lazarus. Second, failure to escape from aversive social 
stimuli may result in a reduction in behavior. Third, sudden 
environmental changes may result in removal of discriminative 
stimuli for ongoing behavior, thereby resulting in a reduced 
rate of behavior. Ferster also proposes that the verbal 
behavior of depressives is controlled primarily by immediate 
states of deprivation rather than by appropriate social cues. 
Costello (1972) expands upon Ferster*s idea of the removal of 
discriminative stimuli for behavior as a possible cause for 
the reduction in the rate of the depressive's behavior. He 
suggests that depression is the result of a loss of 
reinforcement effectiveness, rather than a reduction in the 
rate or amount of reinforcement. This may occur as the result 
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of neurophysiological changes or the disruption of a 
behavioral chain. 
Seligman (1973, 1974) describes a model of depression 
known as "learned helplessness.11 Depression is viewed as the 
result of repeated exposure to inescapable aversive 
stimulation. Facing both theoretical and empirical arguments 
against the original model, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale 
(1978) proposed a revised version of the theory, essentially 
arguing that it is the perception of noncontingency between 
behavior and environmental events, in particular unattainable 
reinforcement and unavoidable punishment, that causes 
depression. This revised version of the learned-helplessness 
theory is discussed further in the next section. 
A deficit in appropriate self-control behavior 
constitutes the major theme of a model of depression proposed 
by Rehm (1977, 1981a). Depressed persons are described as 
having deficits in self-monitoring, self-evaluation, and 
self-reinforcement behavior. These deficits are considered 
relatively stable personality traits, and combine with 
stressful events in the person's life to produce a depressive 
episode. For example, in the face of a stressful event, 
depression-prone persons may only attend to negative aspects 
of the event, as well as only to the immediate consequences 
of their behavior. They may simultaneously set unrealistic 
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criteria for their behavior, then punish themselves 
excessively for not attaining their goals. It is this style 
of interaction with the environment that is hypothesized to 
lead to depression. 
Probably the best known behavioral theorist of depression 
is Peter Lewinsohn. Lewinsohn and his colleagues have proposed 
a theory of depression in which a low rate of 
response-contingent reinforcement ("reconposre") functions as 
an eliciting stimulus for the emission of some depressive 
respondents, including feelings of dysphoria, fatigue, and 
other somatic complaints (Lewinsohn, 1974, 1975; Lewinsohn, 
Weinstein, & Shaw, 1969). A low rate of response-contingent 
positive reinforcement also produces other depressive 
behaviors through the process of operant extinction. Finally, 
some depressive behaviors may be maintained by reinforcement 
from the social environment. Thus, Lewinsohn combines both 
operant and respondent processes in his theory of depression. 
Lewinsohn maintains that a low rate of 
response-contingent positive reinforcement is a function of 
three variables: (a) a small number of events that are 
potentially reinforcing for an individual (determined by 
biological and experiential factors); (b) a small amount or 
rate of reinforcement available from the environment; and (c) 
a deficit in an individual's social skills (Lewinsohn, 1975). 
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Of these factors, a deficit in appropriate social skills is 
considered especially important to the development and 
maintenance of depression (Lewinsohn, Weinstein, & Alper, 
1970; Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973) . Given a loss of or a reduction 
in socially-mediated reinforcement, the individual who does 
not posses the appropriate skills with which to regain or 
replace this reinforcement is likely to become depressed. 
Several studies support the general notion of broad 
social skills problems in depression (Haley, 1985; Herbert, 
Nelson, & Herbert, 1987; Lewinsohn, Mischel, Chaplin, & 
Barton, 1980; Weissman & Paykel, 1974; Youngren & Lewinsohn, 
1980), but the precise behaviors that are problematic remain 
largely unidentified (Coyne, 1976a; Libet & Lewinsohn, 1973; 
Winer, Bonner, Blaney, & Murray, 1981). Regardless of the 
role played by social skills in depression, several studies 
have demonstrated the efficacy of social skills training in 
the treatment of some depressives (Hersen, Bellack, & 
Himmelhoch, 1980; Lewinsohn, Weinstein, & Alper, 1970; 
McKnight, Nelson, Hayes, & Jarrett, 1984; Nelson, Herbert, 
Herbert, Sigmon, & Brannon, 1987; Wells, Hersen, Bellack, & 
Himmelhoch, 1979). 
Lewinsohn and his colleagues have recently proposed a new 
theory of the etiology and maintenance of depression (Hoberman 
& Lewinsohn, 1985; Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger, 
193 
1985) . Briefly, the theory proposes that environmental 
stressors result in the disruption of automatic, "scripted" 
behavior patterns, thereby reducing the rate of positive 
reinforcement and/or increasing the rate of aversive 
experiences in the individual's environment. This change in 
reinforcing conditions then results in a heightened state of 
self-awareness, especially for negative events. This enhanced 
self-awareness then leads to increased dysphoria and, 
ultimately, to the various other depressive symptoms. Once 
the depressive syndrome has emerged, it feeds into the 
heightened state of self-awareness to create a vicious cycle 
of symptom maintenance. Although the model is promising, it 
has not yet been directly subjected to empirical evaluation. 
Although not explicitly presented as behavioral, Coyne 
(1976b) presents a theory of depression in which the depressed 
person's ongoing interactions with his or her social 
environment serve to establish and maintain depression. The 
behavior of the depressive is hypothesized to evoke negative 
reactions in others in the social environment, causing others 
to desire to reject and to avoid the depressive. Such escape 
is impossible, however, due to potential repercusions from the 
social community at large, who might view rejection of a 
depressed person as insensitive and uncaring. Thus, the 
competing demands on significant others in the depressive's 
environment (desire to avoid vs. potential punishment for 
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rejecting the depressive) results in a disturbed pattern of 
social interaction, which further exacerbates the depression. 
Coyne's theory, like Lewinsohn's, highlights the role of 
social behavior in depression, although Lewinsohn's hypothesis 
of a social skills deficit in depression is not necessary to 
Coyne's theory. Several studies support the notion that 
others find interacting with depressives aversive (Coyne, 
1976a; Hammen & Peters, 1978; Herbert et al., 1987; Howes & 
Hokanson, 1979; Strack & Coyne, 1983), although other studies 
suggest that a tendency to elicit negative reactions in others 
is not unique to depressives (Boswell & Murray, 1981; Haley, 
1985; King & Heller, 1984) . Coyne (1984) outlines an 
intervention for depression similar to the approaches 
described by Burgess (1969) and Liberxnan (1970) , in which 
others (especially family members) are encouraged to provide 
veridical feedback to the depressed person regarding his or 
her behavior in social situations. A similar program has 
recently been proposed by Gotlib and Colby (1987). Although 
initial clinical reports from these authors appear favorable, 
further research is needed to evaluate the efficacy of this 
approach to therapy for depression. 
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Appendix B 
Review of Basic Research in Subliminal Perception 
The Poetzl Phenomenon 
One of the earliest investigations of subliminal 
perceptual phenomena resulted from the serrendipitous 
observations of a contemporary of Freud. Poetzl (1917), 
studying the neurological effects of lesions in the visual 
system, found that subjects tended to "release" into 
consciousness at a later time aspects of stimuli that they 
were unaware of at the initial time of presentation. This 
phenomenon has been extensively studied, and has come to be 
known as the Poetzl effect. In general, the effect refers to 
the subsequent emergence, usually in dreams but also in other 
modalities, of stimuli of which the subject was unaware during 
their initial presentation. Poetzl (1917) labeled the effect 
the "law of exclusion," referring to the fact that only 
aspects of a stimulus that are excluded from awareness at the 
initial presentation subsequently emerge in dreams. In one 
of Poetzl's (1917) original studies, subjects were presented 
with 10 msec exposures of a slide of the temple ruins at 
Thebes, and were asked to describe what they saw, to report 
any subsequent dreams, and to draw their dream imagery. 
Consistent with the law of exclusion, only those features of 
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the stimulus that were not reported during the initial 
presentation of the stimulus appeared in subsequent dreams. 
The Poetzl effect has received a great deal of scientific • 
attention, and has been shown to be quite robust across 
methodological variations (see Shevrin, 1986, for a recent 
review of this literature). The effect has been shown to be 
relatively independent of the mode of stimulation. The effect 
has been demonstrated with very brief stimulus exposures 
(e.g., Fisher, 1954, 1957, 1960; Fisher & Paul, 1959; Fiss, 
Goldberg, & Klein, 1963; Giddan, 1967; Haber & Erdelyi, 1967; 
Luborsky & Shevrin, 1956; Paul & Fisher, 1959; Poetzl, 1917; 
Shevrin & Luborsky, 1958; Silverman, 1965), and with prolonged 
stimulus exposures (Malamud, 1934; Malamud & Linder, 1931). 
Moreover, a wide range of dependent measures have been 
successfully employed, including dream content (Fisher, 1954; 
Shevrin & Luborsky, 1958), fantasy drawings (Giddan, 1967), 
reported imagery (Allers & Teler, 1924; Fiss, Goldberg, & 
Klein, 1963; Luborsky & Shevrin, 1956), word associations 
(Allers & Teler, 1924; Shevrin & Fisher, 1967; Shevrin & 
Fritzler, 1968) , and responses to Rorscharch cards (Silverman, 
1965; Silverman & Silverman, 1964). 
In many studies., it has been found that subsequent 
responses by subjects appear to be related symbolically, 
rather than literally, to the initial stimulus (Dixon, 1981). 
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Fisher (1954), in fact, has suggested that the content of 
normal dreams may be determined by symbolic transformation of 
prior stimulation of which the individual was unaware or to 
which he or she was not attending. Of course, the primary 
criticism of the purported demonstrations of symbolic 
transformation concerns how objectively the content of 
subjects' dreams, free associations, and the like can be 
assessed. That is, how can we be certain that the material 
obtained by subjects is really reflective of the original 
stimulus? Later replications and extensions of the Poetzl 
effect leave little doubt as to the validity of such dependent 
measurement. For example, Giddan (1967) had judges who were 
blind to experimental condition evaluate drawings made by 
subjects as to whether or not they were similar to 
experimental stimuli that had been tachistoscopically 
presented for 2.5 msec. The judges placed each drawing into 
one of three categories according to its relatedness to the 
original stimulus: "Probable," "Possible," and "None." The 
results confirmed the Poetzl effect, and the raters achieved 
an acceptably high level of inter-rater reliability. 
Perceptual Defense 
At the heart of the "New Look" movement in perception is 
the phenomenon of perceptual defense. The basic idea is that 
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recognition thresholds are not fixed, but vary as a function 
of subject characteristics and the nature of the stimulus, 
with emotionally threatening or anxiety provoking stimuli 
requiring longer durations for recognition than less arousing 
stimuli (Erdelyi, 1974) . Most of the work on perceptual 
defense uses tachistoscopic presentations of verbal or 
pictorial stimuli. The typical early paradigm involved 
subjects verbally or otherwise indicating when they recognized 
a series of stimuli that were presented for different 
durations. The results of these studies can be summarized as 
follows (Brown, 1961; Dixon, 1981): (a) an inverse U 
relationship exists between stimulus affect and recognition 
thresholds, with medium levels of emotionality producing 
higher thresholds relative to low or high levels of stimulus 
affect; (b) this same relationship holds for individual 
differences across subjects as a function of their anxiety 
concerning specific conflict areas; and (c) galvanic skin 
response (GSR) measures taken before stimulus recognition are 
higher for emotive than for neutral stimuli. 
Dixon (1958) has designed an alternative paradigm for 
studying perceptual defense. While subliminal presentations 
of high vs. low emotive stimuli are presented to one eye, 
varying intensities of a neutral stimulus — a spot of light 
— are simultaneously presented to the other eye. The subject 
is asked simply to respond when he or she sees the spot of 
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light. The emotive or neutral stimuli remain subliminal, and 
the subject is not even aware of the fact that he or she is 
being stimulated. The results of several studies using this 
methodology have demonstrated perceptual defense effects; the 
awareness threshold of the neutral stimulus in one eye varies 
as a function of the emotionality of the stimulus presented 
subliminally to the other eye (Dixon, 1958; Dixon & Haider, 
1961; Henley, 1974; Henley & Dixon, 1976). For example, 
Henley and Dixon (1976) found that stimuli hypothesized to be 
particularly disturbing to schizophrenics (i.e., words such 
as "Breast" and pictorial stimuli of mother-child 
interactions) raised the awareness threshold for a spot of 
light presented to the other eye. In contrast to normal 
controls, however, the emotional word "Cancer" lowered rather 
than raised the recognition threshold for the neutral 
stimulus. 
Using a related methodology, Hardy and Legge (1968) 
demonstrated that visual thresholds for neutral stimuli vary 
as a function of the emotionality of subliminal auditory 
stimuli. A second experiment demonstrated the same effects 
using the converse relation, in which the emotionality of 
subliminal visual stimuli affected auditory thresholds. 
Finally, Worthington (1969) asked subjects to compare the 
phenomenal brightness of pairs of verbal stimuli of varying 
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degrees of emotionality. The stimuli were presented at equal 
intensities, well below the recognition threshold, such that 
they appeared as two faint areas of light on a screen. 
Consistent with other perceptual defense demonstrations, the 
highly emotive stimuli were consistently judged as less bright 
relative to the less emotive stimuli. 
The previously discussed reappraisal of subliminal 
perceptual phenomena that took place in 1950's focused heavily 
on purported demonstrations of perceptual defense. 
Interestingly, even the critics generally acknowledged that 
the effects described above were well-established. The focus 
of concern was instead directed toward distinguishing 
perceptual from response effects. The "response-bias" 
criticism of subliminal research is discussed further in a 
later section, but given its particular relevance to the issue 
of perceptual defense, it is briefly addressed here. The 
basic idea is that "subjects recognize taboo and neutral words 
with equal facility but are reluctant to report embarrassing 
items, requiring greater certainty and therefore longer 
exposure durations" (Erdelyi, 1974, p. 8). In signal 
detection terms, the sensitivity (d1) for both types of 
stimuli are identical, but the decision criterion (B) is more 
stringent for reporting affectively-laden stimuli. 
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Although it is difficult to imagine that decision 
criteria are irrelevant to stimulus reporting, it does not 
appear that all perceptual defense effects can be accounted 
for simply in response bias terms. Consider, for example, 
studies by Ruiz and Krauss (1968) and by Zigler and Yospe 
(1960) in which perceptual defense effects were demonstrated 
even when subjects were required to respond outloud to neutral 
stimulus words with taboo words and vice versa. Studies 
employing signal detection procedures in an effort to 
distinguish stimulus sensitivity (d1) from response criterion 
(B) factors suggest that the former are most important 
(Broadbent & Gregory, 1967; Chapman & Feather, 1972; Dorfman, 
1967; Dorfman, Grossberg, & Kroeker, 1965). It is interesting 
to note that, according to Dixon (1981), both Dorfman, and 
Broadbent and Gregory initially espoused a response-bias 
position on perceptual defense, and actually anticipated 
finding the opposite results than those obtained. 
Another argument against the response-bias explanation 
concerns the typical finding of an inverse U relationship 
between emotionality and recognition thresholds, discussed 
above. Recall that the threshold for moderately emotive 
stimuli is generally higher than the threshold for low emotive 
stimuli. This finding, combined with the results of 
supportive studies in which subjects were made to respond to 
neutral items with taboo words, argues against the notion of 
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a response bias against reporting consciously perceived 
emotive stimuli. 
In conclusion, the demonstration of perceptual defense 
effects using a wide range of carefully controlled 
experimental paradigms leaves the validity of the phenomenon 
beyond any reasonable doubt. 
The Effects of Labels upon the Perception of Ambiguous Stimuli 
One of the most simple demonstrations of subliminal 
perception involves the effects of subliminally presented 
verbal stimuli upon responses given to subsequent 
supraliminally presented ambiguous stimuli (e.g., Erdley & 
D'Agostino, 1988). In a classic study, Smith, Spense, and 
Klein (1959) presented subjects tachistoscopic exposures of 
gradually increasing durations of the words "Happy" and 
"Angry," interspersed with supraliminal exposures of an 
expressionless male face. The results revealed that the face 
was judged as more pleasant when it had just been preceded by 
"Happy" than by "Angry." Moreover, this effect was no weaker 
at extremely brief levels of stimulation than at longer 
durations of exposure. This effect is not confined to the 
visual modality, as Henley (1975) found that descriptions of 
an ambiguous face were influenced by stimulation presented 
below the auditory threshold. Similarly, Groeger (1986) found 
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that subjects' responses on a sentence completion task were 
influenced by subliminally presented auditory cues. 
The results of the Smith et al. (1959) study have been 
replicated by Sackeim, Packer, and Gurr (1977), and by Somekh 
and Wilding (1973). In the Somekh and Wilding study, the 
authors presented "happy" and "sad" stimuli subliminally to 
one eye, while the neutral face was presented simultaneously 
supraliminally to the other eye. In addition to replicating 
the results of the earlier study, the Somekh and Wilding study 
included conditions in which stimuli structurally similar to 
"happy" and "sad" ("harry" and "sap") were presented under 
both sub- and supraliminal conditions. Interestingly, these 
latter stimuli were only misread in the supraliminal 
condition, having no effect upon descriptions of the neutral 
face when presented subliminally. 
Visual Priming 
Cognitive psychologists interested in semantic memory 
have extensively studied a phenomenon known as priming, in 
which recognition of a stimulus (the target) is facilitated 
by preceding it immediately with a related stimulus (the 
prime). For example, it takes subjects less time to say the 
word "chair" when it immediately follows the word "table" than 
when it follows "bread" (Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971) . 
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Of particular interest in the present context is the 
discovery by Marcel (1974, 1983) that priming effects occur 
even when the prime is presented subliminally. Marcel's 
paradigm involves two phases. In the initial phase, the prime 
stimulus (a picture or a word) is immediately followed by a 
"masking" stimulus, consisting of randomly oriented 
characters, which impairs recognition of the prime. The 
duration of the stimuli and the interval between the prime and 
mask are manipulated in an effort to find critical values 
below which the prime cannot be identified. Thus, the masking 
stimulus effectively renders the prime subliminal to the 
subject. The second phase involves a series of trials in 
which supraliminal exposures of target words are preceded 
immediately by prime-mask stimuli or nonprime-mask stimuli, 
which are presented tachistoscopically at values well below 
the predetermined critical recognition threshold. The primary 
dependent measure is the reaction time to identify the target 
stimuli. The typical results are lower reaction times for 
target stimuli preceded by primes than for targets preceded 
by nonprimes. 
Using a similar methodology, Fowler, Wolford, Slade, and 
Tassinary (1981) presented very brief (10 msec) exposures of 
prime stimuli followed by a mask. The brief stimulus exposure 
and the prime-mask interval were such that the subjects were 
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at a chance level of guessing whether any prime stimulus had 
been presented (as opposed to a blank field). Subjects were 
required simply to indicate if the target stimulus was a word 
or a nonword string of letters. Again, priming effects were 
demonstrated; reaction times were lower when the prime was 
related to the target stimulus, even though subjects reported 
being unaware of the prime. 
In both of the paradigms described above, conditions were 
also included in which the priming stimuli were presented 
supraliminally. The differences in recognition times between 
primed and nonprimed targets were the same whether the primes 
were presented sub- or supraliminally. Thus, the consistent 
finding of studies of visual priming is that comparable 
priming effects occur when subjects are unaware of the prime 
as when the prime is presented supraliminally. 
A related experiment using nonverbal stimuli was recently 
conducted by Overbeeke (1986) in The Netherlands. Brief but 
supraliminal (750 msec) exposures of a profile of a 10-year 
old boy were preceded by extremely brief (1 msec) 
tachistoscopic exposures of either a younger profile, an older 
profile, or a blank card. Following presentation of the 
supraliminal stimulus, subjects were asked to estimate the age 
of the profile. Subjects who received the younger prime 
judged the target profile as significantly younger than those 
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who received the control (blank) prime, although there were 
no significant differences between judgments of subjects in 
the older and control groups. 
Stereoscopic Visual Stimulation 
Numerous researchers have investigated the perceptual 
effects of simultaneous but inconsistent stimulation of the 
two eyes. These investigations suggest that visual 
stimulation of which a subject is apparently unaware may 
nevertheless exert an influence upon perception. In studies 
of binocular rivalry, in which only the information presented 
to one eye is perceived, changes in the stimulus field of the 
other (nondominant) eye will result in an immediate shift in 
dominance, even though the subject does not report noticing 
the stimulation that precipitated this shift. For example, 
Walker (1975, 1978) presented subjects with a red field in one 
eye and a green field in the other, and the subjects reported 
seeing only one of the two colors. An additional stimulus of 
moving black and white squares was then presented to the 
nondominant eye, which immediately caused it to assume 
dominance, even though the subjects did not report seeing the 
squares. 
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Other studies demonstrate the influence of factors such 
as personality variables and gender on perceptual dominance 
effects. For example, Wells and Bell (1960) presented a 
portrait of the subject's father to one eye and the subject's 
mother to the other eye, and found that the boys showed 
perceptual dominance for the female parent, whereas the girls 
showed dominance for the male parent. Dixon (1981) reviewd 
numerous other investigations using stereoscopic visual 
stimulation that demonstrate the interaction of the content 
of such stimulation with a range of subject variables to 
determine perceptual experience (e.g., Beloff & Beloff, 1959; 
Beloff & Coupar, 1968; Berg & Toch, 1964; Moore, 1966; 
Pettigrew, Allport, & Barnett, 1958; Purcell & Clifford, 1966? 
Reynolds & Toch, 1965; Shelley & Toch, 1962; Toch & Schulte, 
1961). Moreover, Shevrin and Dickman (1980) cited several 
studies of binocular rivalry that demonstrated that a visual 
evoked response is generated by the stimulation of both the 
dominant and the suppressed eye (e.g., Cobb, Morton, & 
Ettlinger, 1967; Harter, Seiple, & Musso, 1974; Harter, Towle, 
& Musso, 1976; Lehman & Fender, 1968; Spekreijse, Van Der 
Tweel, & Ragan, 1972). 
208 
The Mere-Exposure Effect 
The effects of repeated exposure to virtually any 
stimulus upon subjects' emotional or aesthetic judgments of 
that stimulus are well documented: Subjects prefer familiar 
stimuli over unfamiliar ones (Harrison, 1969; Matlin, 1970; 
Saegert, Swap, & Zajonc, 1973; Zajonc, 1968). Kunst-Wilson and 
Zajonc (1980) have recently demonstrated that even repeated 
subliminal exposures to stimuli increase the appeal of these 
stimuli relative to novel stimuli. This experiment consisted 
of an exposure phase followed by a test phase. During the 
exposure phase, 20 irregular octagons were divided into two 
groups. Half of thesubjects were presented with 1 msec 
exposures of stimuli from one group, whereas half were 
presented with stimuli from the other group. Pretesting with 
a prior group of subjects revealed that such brief stimulus 
exposures precluded above chance accuracy in judgments as to 
whether a stimulus or a blank field was presented. During the 
test phase, all subjects were presented with 1 second 
exposures of ten pairs of stimuli, each pair consisting of one 
stimulus from each original group. The subjects were asked 
to identify (a) the stimulus they liked best, and (b) the 
stimulus they had seen before. The results indicated that 
recognition performance was at a chance level, but a clear 
preference effect for the familiar stimuli was found. These 
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findings were recently replicated and extended by Bornstein, 
Leone, & Galley (1987) . 
Medical Conditions: Cortical Blindness and Anaesthesia 
Studies of blind or partially blind individuals whose 
periphereal visual organs are intact, but whose condition is 
caused by damage to central visual pathways are also relevant 
to the notion of perception without awareness. These studies 
reveal that cortically blind persons are able to respond to 
stimuli that they report being completely unable to see (e.g., 
Ikeda & Wright, 1974; Poppel, Held, & Frost, 1973). In one 
such study, Weiskrantz (1977) describes an extensive 
investigation of a man with blindness in both left half fields 
as the result of a lesion in his right calcarine fissure. 
When asked to guess the position of stimuli presented on a 
screen to his blind field by pointing, or to guess whether an 
0" or an "X" was presented on a screen, he proved remarkably 
accurate. He never acknowledged "seeing" these stimuli, 
however, although he readily acknowledged seeing even a faint 
stimulus that was presented to his good field. 
Another medical condition that is relevant to the present 
discussion concerns surgical patients under deep anaesthesia. 
McKean (1985) discussed the recent work of Bennett on the 
effects of auditory stimulation under anaesthesia on 
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subsequent waking behavior. In one study, anaesthesized 
subjects undergoing surgery were instructed to signal that 
they heard the message by pulling their ear during a 
postoperative interview. Almost all of the experimental 
subjects pulled at their ear during the interview, although 
none recalled having been instructed to do so, whereas less 
han half of a control group of subjects pulled at their ear. 
Other Basic Research Programs 
In addition to the investigations described above, 
several other research areas demonstrate that stimuli of which 
one is unaware can affect behavioral and physiological 
measures. Several studies demonstrated that visual stimuli 
presented below the awareness threshold result in cortical 
evoked potentials (e.g., Begleiter, Gross, & Kissin, 1969; 
Libet, Alberts, Wright, & Feinstein, 1967; Shevrin & Rennick, 
1967). Shevrin and Fritzler (1968) demonstrated that the 
primary wave amplitude in response to 1 msec tachistoscopic 
stimulus exposures was greater for meaningful than for 
eaningless stimuli. Hartley (1969) used the stereoscopic 
visual stimulation paradigm to demonstrate that cortical 
evoked responses associated with stimulation of the dominant 
eye are reduced in magnitude when emotive stimuli, relative 
to neutral stimuli, are presented to the suppressed eye. 
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Kemp-Wheeler and Hill (1987) recently demonstrated that 
subjects exposed to subliminal presentation of 
affectively-laden words, relative to a group of subjects 
exposed to neutral words, showed significant increases in 
several physiological measures of anxiety, including sweating, 
shaking, and muscular tension. 
Although most of the work in subliminal perception has 
focused on the visual system, subliminal effects are not 
limited to this modality. In studies of visceroception, Adam 
1978) has demonstrated that internal stimulation of which the 
subject reports no awareness, such as the inflation of an 
intestinal balloon and mild electric shocks to the cervix 
uteri, result in specific EEG responses. Effects of subliminal 
auditory stimulation have already been discussed. Libet and 
his associates (Libet, 1973; Libet et al., 1967) have shown 
that electrical stimulation of the skin results almost 
immediately in a cortical evoked response, but that the 
subject remains unaware of the stimulus until it has been 
presented for approximately 500 msec. Similarly, direct 
electrical stimulation of the brain only results in 
perceptable sensation after continuous stimulation for half 
a second. Finally, subliminal olfactory stimulation, such as 
weak concentrations of androstenol or aliphatic acid (which 
is found in vaginal secretions of primates) have been shown 
o influence affective judgments of photographs and written 
descriptions of other people (Cowley, Johnson, & Brooksbanck, 
1977; Kirk-Smith, Booth, Carroll, & Davies, 1978). 
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Appendix D 
Ethical Considerations 
The finding in numerous previous studies that 
subliminally presented stimuli can affect behavior and mood 
obviously raises important ethical concerns. Silverman (1977) 
was well aware of these concerns, and has written an extensive 
report on ethical considerations and guidelines in the use of 
subliminal stimulation. The unanimous conclusion of experts 
in the field is that, except under conditions of repeated 
exposure over several sessions, the effects of subliminal 
stimulation are "slight, without subjective discomfort, and 
very fleeting" (Silverman, 1977, p. 3). Recent reviews of the 
attempted use of subliminal stimulation for advertising 
purposes (e.g., Moore, 1982) revealed no evidence for their 
effectiveness in modifying consumer behavior. This is 
undoubtedly due to the weak and short-lived nature of 
subliminally-produced effects under most conditions. In fact, 
the only studies that have reliably yielded lasting effects 
of subliminal stimulation are the therapy and educational 
adjunct studies employing Silverman's (1983, 1984) 
methodology, in which a therapeutic stimulus is repeatedly 
presented over many sessions. Silverman (1977) presented the 
following observations that argue against the possibility that 
subliminal stimulation in a single laboratory session might 
produce large or lasting effects: 
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"1) Clinically sophisticated experimenters report that 
even when they make concerted efforts to judge from Ss' 
reactions whether an experimental or control stimulus 
had been exposed, they do not see large enough 
differences to confidently make such judgments. 2) In 
the debriefing at the end of each experiment, subjects 
typically react with disbelief that stimuli had been 
subliminally exposed and sometinmes explicitly comment 
that there was no change they subjectively experienced 
during the experiment" (p. 3). 
In addition to these observations, Silverman (1977) 
reported two kinds of objective data that reveal the fleeting 
nature of subliminal effects. First, subjects who received 
the experimental stimulus in an initial phase and the control 
stimulus in a second phase (usually one to three days later) 
have been compared to those who received the opposite order 
of conditions. Comparisons of the baseline levels of 
pathology just prior to the second phase have been made in 
several studies, and reveal "no differences that even 
approached significance" (p. 4). The second piece of 
objective data supporting the short-lived nature of subliminal 
effects comes from a study by Silverman, Pettit, and Dunne 
(1971, cited in Silverman, 1977). In this study, two 
assessments of subjects' pathology were made following 
presentation of experimental and control stimuli. The first 
was made immediately following stimulus presentation, whereas 
the second was made 15 to 3 0 minutes later. The first 
assessment revealed an increase in pathology immediately 
following the experimental stimulus, as predicted. By the 
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second assessment, however, the level of pathology had 
completely returned to its baseline level. Finally, in a 
recent study of mildly depressed women, Dauber (1984) found 
statistically significant effects of subliminal stimulation 
on the same dependent measure that was employed in the present 
study (i.e., a modified version of the Depressive Adjective 
Checklist). It should be noted, however, that the actual 
magnitude of these effects was quite small, and an extremely 
sensitive measure was required to reveal any change in mood. 
Although the possibility of risk to any participant in the 
present study was very unlikely, several precautions were 
taken in accordance with the guidelines proposed by Silverman 
(1977). Briefly, these included the following: 
1) Each participant received detailed information about the 
experiment prior to his or her participation. No deception 
was employed, and the absence of deception was explicitly made 
clear to the subjects. Informed consent was obtained. 
2) Subjects were encouraged to ask questions and voice 
concerns about the experiment. They were reminded that they 
could choose to discontinue their participation at any time 
without any penalty whatsoever. 
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3) An extensive oral and written debriefing took place in 
which the subliminal stimuli were revealed, as well as the 
rationale for their use. 
4) Each participant was invited to contact the experimenter 
following the experimental session in order to discuss any 
lingering negative impact he or she thinks the stimuli may 
have had. 
In addition to these precautions recommended by Silverman 
(1977), the following preventative measures were also taken: 
1) All subjects who participate in the study were screened 
for suicidal potential using a standard measure (the SAD 
PERSONS scale), and were free of significant suicidal risk. 
2) All participants not receiving psychiatric or psychological 
services at the time of their participation (i.e., possibly 
some of the depressed subjects, and all of the remitted and 
never-depressed subjects) were provided a list of community 
mental health professionals upon completion of the initial 
screening interview. They were explicitly told that the 
experimenter's giving them this list in no way reflected a 
judgment that psychotherapeutic services were needed or 
recommended, but was simply part of the experimental protocol. 
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3) In the unlikely event that a subject were to have become 
visibly upset or disturbed during any phase of the 
experimental session, the experiment would have been stopped 
immediately. The experimenter would have then discussed any 
potential concerns the subject might have had, and would have 
made appropriate referrals as needed. 
It should be noted that no subject reported being 
disturbed or upset in any way by the tachistoscopic 
experimental procedure. All 3 0 subjects who began the 
procedure completed it without incident. 
Appendix E 
Consent for Screening 
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I agree to undergo a brief interview and to complete a 
brief questionnaire to be used in selecting participants for 
a psychological study on the effects of verbal stimuli on 
mood. I have been informed that my participation in this 
interview is completely voluntary, and that I can decide to 
stop the interview at any time if I wish. I also understand 
that all information collected from me will be held completely 
confidential. 
If I am currently receiving psychological or psychiatric 
treatment, or if I have received such treatment in the past, 
I give my permission for the experimenter to contact my 
therapist to obtain a brief description of his or her view of 
my main problems. My therapist's name is/was: 
I understand that if I am selected for participation in 
this study, the experimental procedure will be explained to 
me later. At that time, I will be given another opportunity 
to decide whether or not I want to continue to participate. 
Signature 
Date 
Witness 
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Appendix F 
Sample Items from the Schedule for Affective Disorders 
And Schizophrenia — Life-time Version 
1. I would like to hear about any problems or difficulties 
you are having in your life now. 
2. When would you say you first noticed that something was 
wrong (this time)? 
3. Are you feeling better now or is it at its worst now? 
4. How long has it been since you were (description of 
full-blown condition)? 
5. Did you ever go to a doctor for your nerves? 
6. Were you ever a patient in a psychiatric hospital or ward 
(before)? 
7. Were there any (other) times when you or someone else 
felt you needed help because of your feelings, your 
nerves, or the way you were acting? 
8. Did you ever have a period that lasted at least 1 week 
when you were bothered by feeling depressed, sad, blue, 
hopeless, down in the dumps, that you didn't care 
anymore, or didn't enjoy anything? 
9. What about feeling irritable or easily annoyed? 
10. During that time did you seek help from anyone, like a 
doctor, or minister or even a friend, or did anyone 
suggest that you seek help? Did you take any medication? 
Did you act differently with people, your family, at 
work, or at school? 
11. How many episodes like this have you had? 
12. When you were (depressed, down) , did you have any beliefs 
or ideas which you later found out were not true — like 
people being out to get you, or talking about you behind 
your back, or that your thoughts or movements were 
controlled? 
13. Did you hear voices or other sounds that other people 
couldn't hear?...have visions or see things that were 
not visible to other people?.. .What about strange smells, 
or strange feelings in your body? 
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14. Did people have trouble understanding what you were 
talking about? 
15. Were you unusually cheerful and energetic at any time, 
just before, during, or right after you were depressed? 
16. Have there been any times other than when you were 
(depressed, manic), that you were (sick, emotionally 
upset, in the hospital, heard voices, had strange 
experiences, felt people were against you...?) 
17. What have your drinking habits been like? 
18. Was there ever a period in your life when you drank too 
much? 
19. Since you have been an adult have you been the kind of 
person who often has a few days when you feel down or 
depressed and then at other times has a few days when 
you feel even better than normal or high? (Does your 
mood swing from high to low?) (Are you clearly more 
active during the high periods? Do you have a lot of 
energy?) 
20. Did you ever have a period that lasted at least 1 week 
when you were bothered by feeling depressed, sad, blue, 
hopeless, down in the dumps, or that you just didn't care 
anymore? 
21. Have you ever had panic attacks or anxiety attacks when 
you suddenly felt very frightened and had physical 
symptoms like...? (When does this happen?) 
22. Have you had periods of at least 2 weeks when you felt 
anxious or tense (jittery, nervous, restless, "uptight") 
most of the time? 
23. How about being bothered by thoughts that kept coming 
back to you, that didn't make sense, that you couldn't 
get rid of or put out of your mind? 
24. Have you ever tried to kill yourself or done anything 
that could have killed you? 
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Appendix H 
SAPS PERSONS Scale 
For Assessing the Risk of Suicide 
Name Subject # 
Age Date Score 
Male 
< 19 or > 
Depression Yes 
Previous attempt Yes 
Ethanol abuse Yes 
Rational thinking loss No Yes 
Social supports lacking Yes 
Organized plan Yes 
No spouse Yes 
Sickness Yes 
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Appendix I 
Therapist Consent Form 
This statement acknowledges my permission for the 
participation of a 
client/patient under my care, as a participant in a 
psychological research project concerning the effects of 
subliminal stimulation on mood. The purpose, nature, and 
procedures of this proje'ct have been fully explained to me. 
I have been informed that subjects may experience a mild 
increase or decrease in dysphoric mood as a result of the 
experimental stimulation, and that past research with this 
methodology suggests that any such effects are likely to be 
very mild and fleeting. I understand that any identifying 
information obtained will be kept strictly confidential, and 
will be available only to James Herbert, M.A., Pricipal 
Investigator, Rosemery 0. Nelson, Ph.D., Professor of 
Psychology at UNCG, and their research associates. 
I understand that my client/patient has consented to the 
experimenter's contacting me regarding his or her case. The 
client's/patient's current diagnosis is (per DSM-III or 
DSM-III-R; please specify): 
Axis I: 
Axis II: 
Axis III: 
I understand that informed consent will be obtained from 
my client/patient prior to his or her participation in the 
study proper, and that the voluntary nature of the study has 
been emphasized to him/her. 
Therapist's signature 
Date 
Witness 
Appendix J 
Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive Data by Subject 
s A M D B M S 
S G A I D M A 
# E R A I P D 
I G I P 
T N D E 
A 0 R 
L S S 
• I O 
• s N 
01 29 
• 
2 
• 
12 7 24 
• 
1 
03 43 1 12 2 21 0 
28 51 1 12 1 21 1 
02 45 1 12 5 21 0 
23 37 1 12 3 22 1 
17 34 2 12 10 25 1 
27 34 2 12 8 19 1 
21 32 1 12 0 16 0 
29 32 1 12 1 14 0 
30 39 1 12 5 22 0 
06 33 2 7 6 33 1 
09 38 1 7 3 21 1 
25 39 2 11 2 23 1 
07 42 1 7 9 27 2 
16 20 2 7 4 30 1 
19 47 1 7 10 30 2 
24 31 1 7 9 24 1 
18 46 1 7 3 21 1 
22 41 1 7 4 19 0 
26 43 1 7 4 22 0 
04 26 1 5 24 47 1 
08 40 2 5 34 40 2 
20 39 1 1 28 43 1 
05 25 1 1 29 36 1 
15 30 2 1 45 30 2 
11 37 1 5 38 41 3 
13 34 2 1 36 37 2 
10 45 1 2 40 35 2 
12 33 2 5 28 35 3 
14 53 1 2 22 35 2 
Kev to Variables 
DIAGNOSIS: 1 = Major Depression 7 = 
2 = Dysthymia 8 = 
5 = Double Depression 11 = 
1-Remitted 
2-Remitted 
5-Remitted 
MARITAL STATUS: 1 = Married 2 = Single 
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Table 2 
One-Way Analysis of Variance and TuJcey Post Hoc 
Comparisons on Beck Depression Inventory 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Group 5085.60 2 102.41 0.0001 
Error 670.40 27 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter 
significantly different 
are not 
at p < .05) 
Normal 4.20 A 
Remitted 5.40 A 
Depressed 32.40 B 
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Table 3 
One-Way Analysis of Variance and Tukey Post Hoc 
Comparisons on MMPI-Depression Scale 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Group 1631.40 2 42.57 0.0001 
Error 517.40 27 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter 
significantly different 
are not 
at p < .05) 
Normal 20.50 A 
Remitted 25.00 A 
Depressed 37.90 B 
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Table 4 
One-Way Analysis of Variance and Tukey Post Hoc 
Comparisons on SADPERSONS 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 10.32 2 12.07 0.0002 
Error 11.12 26 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter are not 
significantly different at p < .05) 
Normal 
Remitted 
Depressed 
0.44 
1.00 
1.90 
A 
A 
B 
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Table 5 
One-Way Analysis of Variance on Subjects' Age 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group " 31.76 2 0.24 0.7860 
Error 1633.86 25 
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Table 6 
Method I: Outline of Procedure 
1. Visual acuity test 
2. Baseline DACL 
3. First critical stimulus set (5 stimuli, 4 4-msec exposures 
each in subliminal condition, or 1 4-sec exposure of each 
in supraliminal condition), followed by agreement ratings 
after each series of four exposures (subliminal) or one 
exposure (supraliminal) 
4. First critical DACL 
5. 5-minute break 
6. Second critical stimulus set and agreement ratings 
7. Second critical DACL 
8. 5-minute break 
9. Third critical stimulus set and agreement ratings 
10. Third critical DACL 
11. 5-minute break 
12. Fourth critical stimulus set and agreement ratings 
13. Fourth critical DACL 
14. Discrimination Task 
15. Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
16. Debriefing (written and oral) 
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Table 7 
One-Way Analyses of Variance 
On Discrimination Task Data 
I. Number of.Correct Discriminations 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 12.87 2 1.52 0.2367 
Error 114.10 27 
II. Number of "Same" Responses 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 2.60 2 0.53 0.5963 
Error 66.60 27 
III. Number of "Different" Responses 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. 
Group 
Error 
2.60 2 0.53 0.5963 
66.60 27 
239 
Table 8 
One-Way Analysis of Variance and Tukey 
Post Hoc Comparisons on Baseline DACL 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 43152536.27 2 148.07 0.0001 
Error 17048786.40 117 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter are not 
significantly different at p < .05) 
Normal 
Remitted 
Depressed 
-547.70 
•339.10 
815.80 
A 
B 
C 
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Table 9 
Four-Way Analysis of Variance on DACL Gain Scores 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. 
Group 
Order 
Group X Order 
1088744.92 
850140.37 
1544232.76 
Ss(Group X Order) 5183595.63 
Modality 59096.57 
Valence 5831.11 
Group X Modality 2163 00.27 
Group X Valence 60744.41 
Modality X Valence 47710.17 
Order X Modality 48534.40 
Order X Valence 60505.98 
Grp X Ord X Mod 265710.59 
Grp X Ord X Val 164121.11 
Ord X Mod X Val 89701.37 
Grp X Mod X Val 23230.80 
Ord X Grp X Mod X Val 
208427.59 
Error 2299279.21 
2 
3 
6 
18 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
6 
6 
3 
2 
6 
54 
1.89 
0.98 
0.89 
1.39 
0.14 
2.54 
0.71 
1.12 
3.51 
0.47 
1.04 
0.64 
0.70 
0.27 
0.82 
0.1798 
0.4224 
0.5201 
0.2439 
0.7128 
0.0883 
0.4946 
0.2945 
0.0212 
0.7019 
0.4099 
0.6958 
0.5548 
0.7623 
0.5624 
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Table 10 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Order by Modality 
Interaction for DACL Gain Scores 
SUBLIMINAL Order 3 Order 1 Order 2 Order 4 
(-112.92) (17.28) (148.92) (201.72) 
Order 3 (-112.92) - n.s. * * 
Order 1 (17.28) - n.s. n.s. 
Order 2 (148.92) - n.s. 
Order 4 (201.72) 
SUPRALIMINAL Order 3 Order 2 Order 4 Order 1 
(-88.58) (-45.67) (76.27) (131.78) 
Order 3 (-88.58) - n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Order 2 (-45.67) - n.s. n.s. 
Order 4 (76.27) - n.s. 
Order 1 (131.78) 
*p < .05 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Order by Modality 
Interaction for DACL Gain Scores 
ORDER 1 Subliminal 
(17.28) 
Supraliminal 
(131.78) 
Subliminal (17.28) 
Supraliminal (131.78) 
n.s. 
ORDER 2 Supraliminal 
(-45.67) 
Subliminal 
(148.92) 
Supraliminal (-45.67) 
Subliminal (148.92) 
ORDER 3 Subliminal 
(-112.92) 
Supraliminal 
(-88.58) 
Subliminal (-112.92) 
Supraliminal (-88.58) 
n.s. 
ORDER 4 Supraliminal 
(76.28) 
Subliminal 
(201.72) 
Supraliminal (76.28) 
Subliminal (201.72) 
n.s. 
*p < .05 
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Table 11 
Four-Way Analysis of Variance on Unadjusted DACL Scores 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F p 
Group 53856421.80 2 63. 64 0. 0001 
Order 3066641.15 3 2. 42 0. 1000 
Group X Order 1945651.18 6 0. 77 0. 6059 
Ss(Group X Order) 7616763.63 18 
Modality 59096.57 1 1. 39 0. 2439 
Valence 5831.11 1 0. 14 0. 7128 
Group X Modality 216300.27 2 2. 54 0. 0883 
Group X Valence 60744.41 2 0. 71 0. 4946 
Modality X Valence 47710.17 1 1. 12 0. 2945 
Order X Modality 448534.40 3 3. 51 0. 0212 
Order X Valence 60505.98 3 0. 47 0. 7019 
Grp X Ord X Mod 265710.59 6 1. 04 0. 4099 
Grp X Ord X Val 164121.11 6 0. 64 0. 6958 
Ord X Mod X Val 89701.37 3 0. 70 0. 5548 
Grp X Mod X Val 23230.80 2 0. 27 0. 7623 
Ord X Grp X Mod X Val 
208427.59 
Error 2299279.21 
6 
54 
0.82 0.5624 
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Table 12 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Group Main Effect 
For Unadjusted DACL Scores 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter are not 
significantly different at p < .05) 
Normal -585.63 
Remitted -517.97 
Depressed 869.90 
A 
A 
B 
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Table 13 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Order by Modality 
Interaction for Unadjusted DACL Scores 
SUBLIMINAL Order 2 Order 4 Order 1 Order 3 
(-361.42) (-275.94) (98.39) (144.92) 
Order 2 (-361.42) * * 
Order 4 (-275.94) * * 
Order 1 (98.39) 
Order 3 (144.92) 
SUPRALIMINAL Order 2 Order 4 Order 1 Order 3 
(-166.83) (-150.50) (-16.11) (120.58) 
Order 2 (-166.83) - n.s. n.s. * 
Order 4 (-150.50) - n.s. * 
Order 1 (-16.11) - n.s. 
Order 3 (120.58) 
*p < .05 
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Table 13 (Continued) 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Order by Modality 
Interaction for Unadjusted DACL Scores 
ORDER 1 Supraliminal 
(-16.11) 
Subliminal 
(98.38) 
Supraliminal (-16.11) 
Subliminal (98.38) 
n.s. 
ORDER 2 Subliminal 
(-361.42) 
Supraliminal 
(-166.83) 
Subliminal (-3 61.42) 
Supraliminal (-166.83) 
ORDER 3 Supraliminal 
(120.58) 
Subliminal 
(144.92) 
Supraliminal (12 0.58) 
Subliminal (144.92) 
n.s, 
ORDER 4 Subliminal 
(-275.94) 
Supraliminal 
(-150.50) 
Subliminal (-275.94) 
Supraliminal (-150.50) 
n.s. 
*p < .05 
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Table 14 
Post Hoc Tests on Order by Modality Interaction For Unadjusted 
DACL Scores Using Method Described bv Boik f!979^ 
Unlike standard Tukey post hoc comparisons, in which each 
level of one treatment (A) is tested against every other level 
of that treatment at a single level of treatment B, the 
procedure described by Boik allows grouping of the treatment 
A means. This allows specific hypotheses to be tested, rather 
than the standard null hypothesis that all levels are the 
same. The procedure involves computing an F-test, using the 
following formula to calculate the sums of squares: 
n q A2 
where n = nubmer of subjects per cell, q = number of levels 
of factor X collapsed across, and A = E cM, where M = the 
means being compared, and c = the vector coefficients (which 
must always sum to zero). The vector coefficients are used 
to determine which means are compared. The vector 
coefficients for the present analyses are listed in the table 
below: 
ORDER 
1 
2 
3 
4 
First Condition 
Of Each Order 
Sub 
Supra 
MODALITY 
Sub Suora 
Irrational +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Rational +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 
Irrational -1 +1 -1 -1 +1 -1 
Rational -1 -1 + 1 -1 -1 +1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
COMPARISON NUMBER 
Comparison 1: F (1,54) = 1.65 (n.s.) 
Comparison 2: F (1,54) = 67.53 (P < .01) 
Comparison 3: F (1,54) = 0.10 (n.s.) 
Comparison 4: F (1,54) = 2.06 (n.s.) 
Comparison 5: F (1,54) = 15.67 (P < .01) 
Comparison 6: F (1,54) = 1.28 (n.s.) 
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Table 14 (Continued) 
Post Hoc Tests on Order by Modality Interaction For Unadjusted 
DACL Scores Using Method Described bv Boik (1979) 
Thus, only Comparisons 2 and 5 were significant. Both of 
these involved comparing orders in which the rational 
statements were presented first vs. orders in which the 
irrational statements were presented first, regardless of 
modality of presentation. 
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Table 15 
Sequence of Orders and Means Broken Down By 
Order X Modality for Unadjusted DACL Scores 
ORDER SEQUENCE 
1 Sub-Irrat / Sub-Rat / Supra-Irrat / Supra-Rat 
2 Sub-Rat / Sub-Irrat / Supra-Rat / Supra-Irrat 
3 Supra-Irrat / Supra-Rat / Sub-Irrat / Sub-Rat 
4 Supra-Rat / Supra-Irrat / Sub-Rat / Sub-Irrat 
(Note that Sub = subliminal, Supra = supraliminal, 
Rat = rational, and Irrat = irrational) 
ORDER MODALITY 
Sub Suora 
1 93.39 -16.11 
2 -361.42 -166.83 
3 144.92 120.58 
4 -275.94 -150.50 
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Table 16 
Pearson's Correlations of Agreement Ratings 
For Individual Stimuli 
Stimulus Number 
Sum 
0.75678 0.82759 0.71133 0.72874 0.90057 
p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 
0.74730 0.72358 0.74984 0.89766 
p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 
0.77877 0.73846 0.91613 
p < .0001 p < .0001 p < .0001 
0.67760 0.86805 
p < . 0001 p < . 0001 
0.87578 
p < .0001 
Sum 
Definition of Stimuli 
Rational 
1. I don't have to be perfect. 
2. I don't have to be loved by everyone. 
3. Making mistakes is OK. 
4. It's OK to disagree. 
5. I don't always have to be successful. 
Irrational 
1. I have to be perfect. 
2. I have to be loved by everyone. 
3. Making mistakes is terrible. 
4. I must agree with everyone. 
5. I have to be sucessful at everything. 
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Table 17 
Four-Way Analysis of Variance on Sum of Agreement Ratings 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 2127. 64 2 0. 21 0. 8089 
Order 13358. 91 3 0. 90 0. 4613 
Group X Order 16729. 84 6 0. 56 0. 7546 
Ss(Group X Order) 89249. 63 18 
Modality 1442. 17 1 0. 28 0. 6012 
Valence 421128. 57 1 • 
o
 
CO 
72 0. 0001 
Group X Modality 7913. 29 2 0. 76 0. 4733 
Group X Valence 120076. 45 2 11. 51 0. 0001 
Modality X Valence 393822. 11 1 75. 49 0. 0001 
Order X Modality 35069. 31 3 2. 24 0. 0940 
Order X Valence 31581. 94 3 2. 02 0. 1223 
Grp X Ord X Mod 24559. 71 6 0. 78 0. 5858 
Grp X Ord X Val 33131. 37 6 1. 06 0. 3988 
Ord X Mod X Val 5382. 86 3 0. 34 0. 7936 
Grp X Mod X Val 131569. 72 2 12. 61 0. 0001 
Ord X Grp X Mod X Val 
27644.73 6 0.88 0.5136 
Error 281709.21 54 
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Table 18 
Five-Way Analysis of Variance on Individual Agreement Ratings 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 424. 11 2 0. 21 0. 8095 
Order 2671. 78 3 0. 90 0. 4613 
Group X Order 3345. 97 6 0. 56 0. 7546 
Ss(Group Order) 17849. 93 18 
Modality 288. 43 1 0. 92 0. 3376 
Valence 84225. 71 1 269. 30 0. 0001 
Stimulus 1382. 24 4 1. 10 0. 3541 
Group X Modality 1582. 66 2 2. 53 0. 0811 
Group X Valence 24015. 29 2 38. 39 0. 0001 
Group X Stimulus 498. 65 8 0. 20 0. 9908 
Modality X Valence 78764. 42 1 251. 84 0. 0001 
Modality X Stimulus 593. 27 4 0. 47 0. 7547 
Order X Group 3345. 97 6 1. 78 0. 1017 
Order X Modality 7013. 86 3 7. 48 0. 0001 
Order X Valence 6316. 39 3 6. 73 0. 0002 
Order X Stimulus 2892. 66 12 0. 77 0. 6807 
Valence X Stimulus 4501. 18 4 3. 60 0. 0069 
Grp X Ord X Mod 4911. 94 6 2. 62 0. 0171 
Grp X Ord X Stm 3730. 34 24 0, 50 0. 9788 
Grp X Ord X Val 6626. 27 6 3. 53 0. 0021 
Ord X Mod X Val 1076. 57 3 1. 15 0. 3300 
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Table 18 (Continued) 
Five-Way Analysis of Variance on Individual Agreement Ratings 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f, 
Ord X Mod 
Ord X Val 
Grp X Mod 
Mod X Val 
Grp X Mod 
Grp X Val 
Ord X Grp 
Ord X Grp 
Ord X Grp 
Grp X Mod 
Ord X Mod 
Grp X Ord 
Error 
X Stm 
X Stm 
X Val 
X Stm 
X Stm 
X Stm 
X Mod 
X Mod 
X Val 
X Val 
X Val 
X Mod 
2916.44 
2288.08 
26313.94 
4141.98 
1401.62 
798.95 
X Val 5528.95 
X Stm 4046.00 
X Stm 2757.60 
X Stm 3628.39 
X Stm 2298.15 
X Val X Stm 
2941.52 
106963.24 
12 
12 
2 
4 
8 
8 
6 
24 
24 
8 
12 
24 
342 
0.78 
0.61 
42.07 
3.31 
0.56 
0.32 
2.95 
0.54 
0.37 
1.45 
0.61 
0.39 
0.6742 
0.8341 
0.0001 
0.0111 
0.8103 
0.9585 
0.0081 
0.9644 
0.9976 
0.1745 
0.8318 
0.9961 
Table 19 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Group X Valence Interaction 
For Sum of Agreement Ratings 
IRRATIONAL Remitted 
(151.90) 
Normal 
(170.70) 
Depressed 
(213.20) 
Remitted (151.90) 
Normal (170.70) 
Depressed (213.20) 
n. s. n.s. 
n. s. 
RATIONAL Depressed 
(261.05) 
Normal 
(310.25) 
Remitted 
(344.75) 
Depressed (261.05) 
Normal (310.25) 
Remitted (344.75) 
n.s, * 
n.s. 
NORMAL Irrational 
(170.70) 
Rational 
(310.25) 
Irrational 
Rational 
(170.70) 
(310.25) 
REMITTED Irrational 
(151.90) 
Rational 
(344.75) 
Irrational 
Rational 
(151.90) 
(344.75) 
DEPRESSED Irrational 
(213.20) 
Rational 
(261.05) 
Irrational (213.20) 
Rational (261.05) 
n.s. 
*p < .05 
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Table 20 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Modality X Valence Interaction 
For Sum of Agreement Ratings 
IRRATIONAL Supraliminal Subliminal 
(123.87) (233.33) 
Supraliminal (123.87) 
Subliminal (233.33) 
RATIONAL Subliminal Supraliminal 
(241.30) (369.40) 
Subliminal (241.30) 
Supraliminal (3 69.40) 
SUBLIMINAL Irrational 
(233.33) 
Rational 
(241.30) 
Irrational 
Rational 
(233.33) 
(241.30) 
n. s. 
SUPRALIMINAL Irrational 
(123.87) 
Rational 
(369.40) 
Irrational 
Rational 
(123.87) 
(369.40) 
*p < .05 
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Table 21 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Group X Modality X Valence 
Interaction for Sum of Agreement Ratings 
SUBLIMINAL-IRRATIONAL Depressed Normal Remitted 
(223.40) (232.50) (244.10) 
Depressed 
Normal 
Remitted 
(223.40) 
(232.50) 
(244.10) 
n.s. n.s. 
n.s. 
SUBLIMINAL-RATIONAL Normal 
(216.90) 
Depressed 
(242.80) 
Remitted 
(264.20) 
Normal 
Depressed 
Remitted 
(216.90) 
(242.80) 
(264.20) 
n.s. n.s. 
n.s. 
SUPRALIMINAL-IRRATIONAL Remitted Normal Depressed 
(59.70) (108.90) (203.00) 
Remitted 
Normal 
Depressed 
(59.70) 
(108.90) 
(203.00) 
n.s. * 
* 
SUPRALIMINAL-RATIONAL Depressed 
(279.30) 
Normal 
(403.60) 
Remitted 
(425.30) 
Depressed 
Normal 
Remitted 
(279.30) 
(403.60) 
(425.30) 
n.s. 
*p < .05 
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Table 21 (Continued) 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Group X Modality X Valence 
Interaction for Sum of Agreement Ratings 
NORMAL-SUBLIMINAL Rational 
(216.90) 
Irrational 
(232.50) 
Rational 
Irrational 
(216.90) 
(232.50) 
n.s. 
NORMAL-SUPRALIMINAL Irrational 
(108.90) 
Rational 
(403.60) 
Irrational 
Rational 
(108.90) 
(403.60) 
REMITTED-SUBLIMINAL Irrational 
(244.10) 
Rational 
(264.20) 
Irrational (244.10) 
Rational (264.20) 
n.s. 
REMITTED-SUPRALIMINAL Irrational 
(59.70) 
Rational 
(425.30) 
Irrational (59.70) 
Rational (425.30) 
DEPRESSED-SUBLIMINAL Irrational 
(223.40) 
Rational 
(242.80) 
Irrational (223.40) - n.s. 
Rational (242.80) 
DEPRESSED-SUPRALIMINAL Irrational Rational 
(203.00) (279.30) 
Irrational (203.00) 
Rational (279.30) 
*p < .05 
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Table 21 (Continued) 
Tukey Post Hoc Tests on Group X Modality X Valence 
Interaction for Sum of Agreement Ratings 
NORMAL-IRRATIONAL Supraliminal 
(108.90) 
Subliminal 
(232.50) 
Supraliminal (108.90) 
Subliminal (232.50) 
NORMAL-RATIONAL Subliminal 
(216.90) 
Supraliminal 
(403.60) 
Subliminal (216.90) 
Supraliminal (403.60) 
REMITTED-IRRATIONAL Supraliminal 
(59.70) 
Subliminal 
(244.10) 
Supraliminal (59.70) 
Subliminal (244.10) 
REMITTED-RATIONAL Subliminal 
(264.20) 
Supraliminal 
(425.30) 
Subliminal (264.20) 
Supraliminal (425.30) 
DEPRESSED-IRRATIONAL Supraliminal 
(203.00) 
Subliminal 
(223.40) 
Supraliminal (203.00) 
Subliminal (223.40) 
n. s. 
DEPRESSED-RATIONAL Subliminal 
(242.80) 
Supraliminal 
(279.30) 
Subliminal (242.80) 
Supraliminal (279.30) 
n.s. 
*p < .05 
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Table 22 
One-Way Analyses of Variance on TAT 
Latency and Response Time Data 
I. Card l; Latency to First Response 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 126.67 2 1.23 0.3077 
Error 1388.30 27 
II. Card 1: Total Response Time 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. 
Group 
Error 
630.46 2 0.21 0.8122 
40604.90 27 
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Table 22 (Continued) 
One-Way Analyses of Variance on TAT 
Latency and Response Time Data 
I. Card 3BM: Latency to First Response 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 136.87 2 0.90 0.4179 
Error 2049.80 27 
II. Card 3BM: Total Response Time 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f, 
Group 
Error 
1128.20 2 0.26 0.7735 
58742.60 27 
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Table 22 (Continued) 
One-Way Analyses of Variance on TAT 
Latency and Response Time Data 
I. Card 10: Latency to First Response 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d. f. F P 
Group 330.20 2 1. 03 0.3705 
Error 4326.50 27 
II. Card 10: Total Response Time 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f. F P 
Group 
Error 
651.86 2 0.20 0.8174 
40096.00 25 
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Table 22 (Continued) 
One-Way Analyses of Variance on TAT 
Latency and Response Time Data 
I. Card 14: Latency to First Response 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 355.45 2 2.63 0.0913 
Error 1758.00 26 
II. Card 14: Total Response Time 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. 
Group 
Error 
1246.61 2 0.32 0.7279 
50407.26 26 
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Table 23 
One-Way Analyses of Variance on Sum of TAT 
Latency and Response Time Measures 
I. Latency to First Response 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 1915.49 2 1.03 0.3699 
Error 24095.96 26 
II. Total Response Time 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. 
Group 
Error 
9597.05 2 0.20 0.8187 
594917.37 25 
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Table 24 
One-Way Analysis of Variance and Tukey Post Hoc Comparisons 
On Number of Depression Diagnoses Assigned to Each Group 
Source 
Sums of 
Squares d.f F p 
Group 85.40 2 5.16 p < . 05 
Error 223.40 27 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter are 
significantly different at p 
not 
<. 05) 
Normal 3.5 A B 
Remitted 1.9 A 
Depressed 6.0 B 
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Table 25 
Mean Number of Depression Diagnoses in Relation to Actual 
Diagnostic Status for Depressed and Normal Subjects 
Psychologists• Judgment 
Depressed Not Depressed 
A D x = 6 X = 4 
c i Dep SD = 1.70 SD = 1.70 
t a 
u q X = 3.5 X = 6.5 
a n Not Dep SD = 2.07 SD = 2. 07 
1 o 
s 
i 
s 
Remitted Ss -
-Judgment of depressed: x = 
-Judgment of not depressed: x = 
1.9, SD = 
8.1, SD = 
1.20 
1.20 
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Table 2 6 
One-Way Analysis of Variance on Modified DAS 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. 
Group 
Error 
266.58 2 0.10 0.9045 
34398.59 26 
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Table 27 
One-Way Analysis of Variance and Tukey 
Post Hoc Comparisons on Standard DAS 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. F p 
Group 12683.57 2 6.96 0.0038 
Error 23675.26 26 
Group Mean Grouping 
(Means with same letter are not 
significantly different at p < .05) 
Normal 
Remitted 
Depressed 
108.78 
107.70 
152.20 
A 
A 
B 
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Table 28 
One-Way Analysis of Variance on- Difference 
Between Standard and Modified DAS 
Sums of 
Source Squares d.f. 
Group 
Error 
9591.17 2 2.10 0.1431 
59464.69 26 
s 
u 
B 
J 
E 
C 
T 
# 
01 
01 
01 
01 
03 
03 
03 
03 
28 
28 
28 
28 
02 
02 
02 
02 
23 
23 
23 
23 
17 
17 
17 
17 
27 
27 
27 
27 
21 
21 
21 
21 
29 
29 
29 
29 
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S 
U 
M 
A 
G 
R 
E 
E 
249 
270 
226 
357 
84 
77 
123 
363 
248 
251 
22 
454 
339 
235 
15 
409 
287 
314 
131 
426 
233 
226 
82 
468 
246 
238 
224 
330 
228 
227 
104 
360 
223 
93 
12 
470 
Table 29 
Raw Data CKev to Variables at End of Table) 
G M V 0 D B M S B C D 
R 0 A R I D M A D R A 
0 D L D A I P D A D S 
U A E E G I P C A 1 
P L N R N D E L C 
I C 0 R L 
T E S S . 
Y • I 0 • 
• • 
• 
s N • 
• 
1 1 1 1 12 07 24 1 -708 -706 121 
1 1 2 1 -652 
1 2 1 1 -593 
1 2 2 1 -746 
1 1 1 1 12 02 21 0 403 -309 111 
1 1 2 1 112 
1 2 1 1 -300 
1 2 2 1 -413 
1 1 1 1 12 01 21 1 -820 -704 138 
1 1 2 1 -340 
1 2 1 1 -430 
1 2 2 1 -455 
1 1 1 2 12 05 21 0 -921 -1120 135 
1 1 2 2 -1070 
1 2 1 2 -1186 
1 2 2 2 -977 
1 1 1 2 12 03 22 1 -1029 -1259 139 
1 1 2 2 -989 
1 2 1 2 -1127 
1 2 2 2 -1071 
1 1 1 3 12 10 25 1 -740 -572 109 
1 1 2 3 -410 
1 2 1 3 -745 
1 2 2 3 -687 
1 1 1 3 12 8 19 1 -24 136 • 
1 1 2 3 163 
1 2 1 3 75 
1 2 2 3 -10 
1 1 1 4 12 0 16 0 -302 -600 177 
1 1 2 4 -564 
1 2 1 4 -443 
1 2 2 4 -525 
1 1 1 4 12 1 14 0 -752 -764 172 
1 1 2 4 -942 
1 2 1 4 -572 
1 2 2 4 -744 
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Table 29 (Continued) 
Raw Data 
S 
U 
B 
J 
E 
C 
T 
# 
G 
R 
0 
U 
P 
M 
0 
D 
A 
L 
1 
T 
Y 
V 
A 
L 
E 
N 
C 
E 
0 
R 
D 
E 
R 
D 
I 
A 
G 
N 
0 
S 
1 
s 
B 
D 
I 
M 
M 
P 
I 
D 
S 
A 
D 
P 
E 
R 
S 
O 
N 
B 
D 
A 
C 
L 
C 
R 
D 
A 
C 
L 
D 
A 
S 
1 
D 
A 
S 
S 
U 
M 
A 
G 
R 
E 
E 
30 1 1 1 4 12 5 22 0 -584 -406 157 123 
30 1 1 2 4 -384 
30 1 2 1 4 -508 
30 1 2 2 4 -588 
06 2 1 1 1 7 6 33 1 395 232 186 133 
06 2 1 2 1 -493 
06 2 2 1 1 -553 
06 2 2 2 1 -149 
09 2 1 1 1 7 3 21 1 -402 -696 93 109 
09 2 1 2 1 -618 
09 2 2 1 1 -488 
09 2 2 2 1 -491 
25 2 1 1 1 11 2 23 1 -224 -262 118 102 
25 2 1 2 1 -288 
25 2 2 1 1 -546 
25 2 2 2 1 -677 
07 2 1 1 2 7 9 27 2 -456 -622 182 108 
07 2 1 2 2 -517 
07 2 2 1 2 -371 
07 2 2 2 2 -483 
16 2 1 1 2 7 4 30 1 -487 -677 189 146 
16 2 1 2 2 -704 
16 2 2 1 2 -723 
16 2 2 2 2 -667 
19 2 1 1 3 7 10 30 2 32 -242 59 77 
19 2 1 2 3 -136 
19 2 2 1 3 -45 
19 2 2 2 3 -151 
24 2 1 1 3 7 9 24 1 -681 -532 193 127 
24 2 1 2 3 -692 
24 2 2 1 3 -437 
24 2 2 2 3 -821 
18 2 1 1 4 7 3 21 1 -256 -334 156 81 
18 2 1 2 4 -121 
18 2 2 1 4 -375 
18 2 2 2 4 -388 
188 
238 
150 
399 
316 
307 
41 
461 
223 
228 
13 
460 
214 
296 
152 
462 
384 
460 
26 
353 
182 
251 
52 
346 
236 
254 
93 
456 
240 
66 
53 
458 
178 
294 
54 
444 
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Table 29 (Continued) 
Raw Data 
s G M V 0 D B M S B C D D S 
u R 0 A R I D M A D R A A U 
B 0 D L D A I P D A D S S M 
J U A E E G I P C A 1 2 A 
E P L N R N D E L C G 
C I C • 0 R L R 
T T E • s S • E 
# Y • I 0 • E 
• 
* 
• • • s N • • 
• 
22 2 1 1 4 7 4 19 0 -388 -960 153 100 206 
22 2 1 2 4 -878 222 
22 2 2 1 4 -682 73 
22 2 2 2 4 -675 365 
26 2 1 1 4 7 4 22 0 -924 -824 99 94 262 
26 2 1 2 4 -1036 264 
26 2 2 1 4 -753 40 
26 2 2 2 4 -844 448 
04 3 1 1 1 5 24 47 1 550 1178 114 167 145 
04 3 1 2 1 1097 205 
04 3 2 1 1 757 253 
04 3 2 2 1 541 244 
08 3 1 1 1 5 34 40 2 754 831 164 94 236 
08 3 1 2 1 838 287 
08 3 2 1 1 839 207 
08 3 2 2 1 977 366 
20 3 1 1 1 1 28 43 1 1093 1384 198 133 179 
20 3 1 2 1 1167 411 
20 3 2 1 1 944 51 
20 3 2 2 1 1493 470 
05 3 1 1 2 1 29 36 1 389 408 150 207 222 
05 3 1 2 2 -42 196 
05 3 2 1 2 621 296 
05 3 2 2 2 492 181 
15 3 1 1 2 1 45 30 2 1229 1008 119 140 236 
15 3 1 2 2 1247 254 
15 3 2 1 2 1819 227 
15 3 2 2 2 1671 250 
11 3 1 1 3 5 38 41 3 445 953 98 195 217 
11 3 1 2 3 910 224 
11 3 2 1 3 447 228 
11 3 2 2 3 680 302 
13 3 1 1 3 1 36 37 2 1160 755 153 34 282 
13 3 1 2 3 1406 195 
13 3 2 1 3 1792 335 
13 3 2 2 3 1349 177 
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Table 29 (Continued) 
Raw Data 
S 
U 
B 
J 
E 
C 
T 
# 
G 
R 
0 
U 
P 
M 
0 
D 
A 
L 
I 
T 
Y 
V 
A 
L 
E 
N 
C 
E 
O 
R 
D 
E 
R 
D 
I 
A 
G 
N 
0 
S 
I 
s 
B 
D 
I 
M 
M 
P 
I 
D 
S 
A 
D 
P 
E 
R 
S 
O 
N 
B 
D 
A 
C 
L 
C 
R 
D 
A 
C 
L 
D 
A 
S 
1 
D 
A 
S 
2 
S 
U 
M 
A 
G 
R 
E 
E 
10 3 1 1 4 2 40 35 2 1358 566 138 189 
10 3 1 2 4 550 
10 3 2 1 4 917 
10 3 2 2 4 532 
12 3 1 1 4 5 28 35 3 834 961 154 172 
12 3 1 2 4 823 
12 3 2 1 4 1460 
12 3 2 2 4 677 
14 3 1 1 4 2 22 35 2 346 36 72 53 
14 3 1 2 4 -90 
14 3 2 1 4 219 
14 3 2 2 4 583 
250 
279 
208 
243 
238 
107 
221 
199 
168 
47 
374 
Kev to Variables 
GROUP: 1 = Normal 
2 = Remitted 
3 = Depressed 
MODALITY: 1 = Subliminal 
2 = Supraliminal 
VALENCE: 1 = Irrational 
2 = Rational 
ORDER: See Table 9 
DIAGNOSIS: 1 = Major Depression 7 = 1-Remitted 12 = No 
2 = Dysthymia 8 = 2-Remitted dx 
5 = Double Depression 11 = 5-Remitted 
CRDACL: Unadjusted DACL scores 
SUMAGREE: Sum of agreement ratings 
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Appendix K 
Some Mental Health Professionals in the Greensboro Area 
AGENCIES WITH A SLIDING FEE SCHEDULE: 
Guilford County Mental Health Center 373-3630 
UNCG Psychology Clinic 334-5662 
PSYCHOLOGISTS 
Dr. Isis Badawi 275-9889 
Dr. Floyd Heiney 275-9889 
Dr. Jane Perrin 378-0398 
Dr. Richard Cook (Kernersville) 993-8281 
PSYCHIATRISTS 
Dr. Raouf Badawi 854-2391 
Dr. Gary Henschen 299-0108 
Dr. Victor Morcos 854-2391 
Dr. Edward Rhoads 299-0511 
Please note that we are giving this list of names to 
everyone who participates in the study who is not already 
seeing a therapist. Your receiving this list is simply 
routine, and does not in anv wav imply that vou need to see 
a therapist. 
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Appendix L 
Information About Study of Subliminal Stimulation on Mood 
There are many things that reduce and intensify sad or 
depressed feelings. One important group of factors, we 
believe, are faint or indistinct experiences people have. By 
experimentally studying these factors in different groups of 
people we hope to understand better what causes clinical 
depression. 
If you decide to participate in this study you will be 
asked at different points in time to indicate the degree to 
which you are experiencing different feelings, and how much 
you agree with certain statements. You will also be asked to 
look at flashes of light that will be statements very quickly 
exposed. Some of the statements may make you feel slightly 
more sad, some may have no effect at all on your mood, and 
some of the statements may make you feel slightly less sad. 
From past research with this procedure we know that the 
effects of these statements are typically very fleeting, and 
as soon as the study is over I will tell you exactly what the 
statements were. Moreover, no deception is used in this 
study. In other words, we are not trying to trick you in any 
way. From this study we hope to learn something about 
depression, which will hopefully be useful in treating and 
perhaps preventing this disturbing experience. 
You do not have to participate in this study, and if you 
do agree to participate you can still change your mind at.any 
time and withdraw from it. All identifying information 
collected from you will remain strictly confidential. 
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Appendix M 
Consent Form 
I agree to participate in this psychological study 
investigating the effects of subliminal stimulation on mood. 
The nature of the study has been fully explained to me. I 
understand that I will be looking at flashes of light that 
will be statements exposed very quickly, and that these 
statements may temporarily slightly reduce or intensify 
certain feelings, particularly sad or depressed feelings. 
I understand that as soon as the experiment is over I 
will be told what the statements are, and the purpose of the 
study will be explained more fully. I understand that I am 
free to ask the experimenter any questions about the study at 
any time. 
I have been informed that this study is not meant to be 
psychological treatment of any kind. I further understand 
that my participation is completely voluntary, and that I can 
withdraw from the study at any time. Finally, I understand 
that any identifying information collected from me will remain 
strictly confidential. 
Signature 
Date 
Witness 
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Appendix N 
Post-Experimental Questionnaire 
Name S# 
Date 
Please answer the following questions: 
1. Did you notice any change in your mood during the course 
of the experiment? 
Yes 
No 
If yes, how much of a change did you notice? 
A small negative change 
A moderate negative change 
A large negative change 
A small positive change 
A moderate positive change 
A large positive change 
2. Please briefly describe any mood changes you noticed 
during the study. 
3. How difficult was it for you to rate how much you agreed 
with the statements when they were exposed very quickly? 
Impossible 
Very difficult 
Moderately difficult 
Moderately easy 
Very easy 
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During the last part of the experiment in which the 
different stimuli were flashed, were you able to tell them 
apart? 
Could you actually read the statements during this last 
phase? 
Did you find the study in any way unpleasant? If so, 
please describe. 
Any further comments? 
Appendix O 
Agreement Ratings 
278 
Name S# 
Date 
Please put a mark along the line to indicate how much you 
agree or disagree with each statement. Sometimes the 
statements will be flashed so quickly that it will be very 
difficult or even impossible to see them. In this case, 
please mark your guess as to how much you'd agree with the 
statement if you could see it. 
Disagree completely Agree completely 
1. I i 
Disagree completely Agree completely 
2 .  I  I  
Disagree completely Agree completely 
3. I : I 
Disagree completely Agree completely 
4. I I 
Disagree completely Agree completely 
5. I I 
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Appendix P 
MOOD SCALE A 
A number of research studies have found that if you pay close 
attention to your emotions, you can sometimes detect changes 
in emotional states not only from one day to another, but also 
from hour to hour and even minute to minute. We would like 
you to try this experiment on yourself. Observe your feelings 
throughout this experiment and see if you can detect any 
changes in feelings. 
You will be given different versions of this mood scale 
several times during the experiment. Your job is simply to 
mark the line at the point along each scale that best 
represents the extent to which you are experiencing that 
particular mood or feeling at that time. Although only a few 
points along the scale are labeled, feel free to place your 
line at any point along the scale. Work as rapidly as 
possible. 
HOW MUCH OF THIS FEELING DO YOU HAVE RIGHT NOW? DO YOU FEEL: 
Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Wilted I I I I I I 
Safe 
Mirserable 
Gloomy 
Dull 
Gay 
Low-spirited 
Unwanted 
Fine 
Broken­
hearted 
Down-cast 
Enthusiastic 
Failure 
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Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Afflicted | | I I I I 
Active I I I I I I 
Strong 
Tortured 
Listless 
Sunny 
Wretched 
Broken 
Light-
hearted 
Criticized 
Grieved 
Dreamy 
Hopeless 
Oppressed 
Joyous 
Weary 
Droopy 
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MOOD SCALE B 
A number of research studies have found that if you pay close 
attention to your emotions, you can sometimes detect changes 
in emotional states not only from one day to another, but also 
from hour to hour and even minute to minute. We would like 
you to try this experiment on yourself. Observe your feelings 
throughout this experiment and see if you can detect any 
changes in feelings. 
You will be given different versions of this mood scale 
several times during the experiment. Your job is simply to 
mark the line at the point along each scale that best 
represents the extent to which you are experiencing that 
particular mood or feeling at that time. Although only a few 
points along the scale are labeled, feel free to place your 
line at any point along the scale. Work as rapidly as 
possible. 
HOW MUCH OF THIS FEELING DO YOU HAVE RIGHT NOW? DO YOU FEEL: 
Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Downhearted I I I I I I 
Lively 
Unfeeling 
Alone 
Unhappy 
Alive 
Terrible 
Poor 
Forlorn 
Alert 
Heartsick 
Bright 
Glum 
Desolate 
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Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Composed | | | | | | 
Clean | | | | | | 
Dispirited | | | | | | 
Moody | | | | | | 
Pleased | | | | | | 
Dead | | | | | | 
Sorrowful | | | | | | 
Bleak | | | | | | 
Morbid | | | | I; | 
Heavy-
hearted | | | | | | 
Easy-going | | | | | | 
Gray | | | | | | 
Melancholy | | | | | | 
Hopeful | | | | |_ | 
Mashed | I I | | | 
Unlucky | | | | | | 
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MOOD SCALE C 
A number of research studies have found that if you pay close 
attention to your emotions, you can sometimes detect changes 
in emotional states not only from one day to another, but also 
from hour to hour and even minute to minute. We would like 
you to try this experiment on yourself. Observe your feelings 
throughout this experiment and see if you can detect any 
changes in feelings. 
You will be given different versions of this mood scale 
several times during the experiment. Your job is simply to 
mark the line at the point along each scale that best 
represents the extent to which you are experiencing that 
particular mood or feeling at that time. Although only a few 
points along the scale are labeled, feel free to place your 
line at any point along the scale. Work as rapidly as 
possible. 
HOW MUCH OF THIS FEELING DO YOU HAVE RIGHT NOW? DO YOU FEEL: 
Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat 
Cheerless 
Animated 
Blue 
Lost 
Dejected 
Healthy 
Discouraged 
Bad 
Despondent 
Free 
Despairing 
Uneasy 
Peaceful 
Grim 
Moderately Very Much Extremely 
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Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Distressed | | | | | | 
Whole | | | | | | 
Buoyant | | | | | | 
Tormented | | | | | | 
Weak | | | | | | 
Optimistic | | | | | | 
Low | | | | | | 
Deserted j | | | | | 
Burdened j | | | | | 
Wonderful | | I 1 | | 
Crushed | | | | ) | 
Somber | | | | | | 
Interested J | | | | | 
Joyless | | | | | | 
Crestfallen | I | | j | 
Lucky | | | | | | 
Chained | j | | | I 
Pessimistic I I I I I I 
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MOOD SCALE D 
A number of research studies have found that if you pay close 
attention to your emotions, you can sometimes detect changes 
in emotional states not only from one day to another, but also 
from hour to hour and even minute to minute. We would like 
you to try this experiment on yourself. Observe your feelings 
throughout this experiment and see if you can detect any 
changes in feelings. 
You will be given different versions of this mood scale 
several times during the experiment. Your job is simply to 
mark the line at the point along each scale that best 
represents the extent to which you are experiencing that 
particular mood or feeling at that time. Although only a few 
points along the scale are labeled, feel free to place your 
line at any point along the scale. Work as rapidly as 
possible. 
HOW MUCH OF THIS FEELING DO YOU HAVE RIGHT NOW? DO YOU FEEL: 
Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Depressed | | | | | | 
Elated I I I I I I 
Awful 
Lifeless 
Grief-
stricken 
Inspired 
Woeful 
Lonely 
Suffering 
Mellow 
Drooping 
Rej ected 
Fortunate 
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Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Dreary | | | | | | 
Lousy | j | | | | 
Good | | | | | | 
Fit | | | | | | 
Lonesome | | | | | | 
Unloved | | j | | J 
Glad | | ! | | | 
Grave | | | | | | 
Sunk | j ! | | | 
Shot | | | | | | 
Merry I I I I I I 
Wasted | | | | | | 
Washed Out | j | | | | 
Clear | | | |_ | | 
Gruesome | | | | | | 
Tired | | | | | | 
High | | | | | | 
Worse | |_ | | | | 
Drained I I I I I I 
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MOOD SCALE E 
A number of research studies have found that if you pay close 
attention to your emotions, you can sometimes detect changes 
in emotional states not only from one day to another, but also 
from hour to hour and even minute to minute. We would like 
you to try this experiment on yourself. Observe your feelings 
throughout this experiment and see if you can detect any 
changes in feelings. 
You will be given different versions of this mood scale 
several times during the experiment. Your job is simply to 
mark the line at the point along each scale that best 
represents the extent to which you are experiencing that 
particular mood or feeling at that time. Although only a few 
points along the scale are labeled, feel free to place your 
line at any point along the scale. Work as rapidly as 
possible. 
HOW MUCH OF THIS FEELING DO YOU HAVE RIGHT NOW? DO YOU FEEL: 
Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Sorrowful I I | I I I 
Lively 
Uneasy 
Tormented 
Low-spirited 
Clean 
Discouraged 
Suffering 
Broken­
hearted 
Easy-going 
Downhearted 
Washed Out 
Playful 
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Not-at-all Slightly Somewhat Moderately Very Much Extremely 
Joyless | _| | | | | 
Despairing | | | | | | 
Gay | | | | | | 
Friendly | | | | | | 
Successful | | | | | | 
Rejected | | | I | | 
Crestfallen | | | j | | 
Jolly I I I I I I 
Deserted | | | 1 | | 
Grieved | | | | | | 
Low | | | | | | 
Steady | | | | | _| 
Wretched | | | | | | 
Terrible | | | | _| | 
Inspired | | | | j_ | 
Woeful | | | | | | 
Unworthy | | | | | | 
Joyous | | | | | | 
Destroyed | | | |_ | | 
Somber | | | | _ | | 
Unconcerned I I I I I I 
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Appendix R 
TAT Study: Psychologists' Debriefing Form 
The TAT stories you read were obtained from thirty-
subjects who participated in a series of studies on unipolar 
depression. The purpose of these studies is to examine 
hypotheses derived from Aaron Beck's cognitive theory of 
depression. As you know, Beck proposes that depression-prone 
individuals develop depressogenic cognitive schemas, largely 
as the result of childhood experiences. These schemas remain 
latent until activated by a stressor. Once activated, the 
schemas influence a wide range of perceptual and cognitive 
phenomena, eventually leading to depression. Beck's is a 
classic diathesis-stress model, with the underlying schemas 
constituting a psychological diathesis for depression, and the 
stressor that activates them being the stress component of the 
model. 
Beck groups depressogenic cognitions into several levels, 
with underlying schemas — statements that reflect general 
themes or contingencies in one's life — being the deepest, 
most stable. Other cognitions such as "automatic thoughts" 
are more transient and closer to awareness. 
There is a great deal of research supporting certain 
aspects of Beck's theory. Several studies, for example, 
suggest that both depressogenic schemas and automatic thoughts 
are present in most persons who are currently depressed. 
Moreover, most of the studies that examine these cognitions 
longitudinally have found that they appear to covary with the 
clinical course of depression, so that once the depressive 
episode resolves, the cognitions seem to normalize. These 
results call into question the etiological significance of 
abnormal cognitions. The "depressogenic" cognitions might 
simply be concomitants of depression, rather than causes of 
depression. 
Recall that the underlying schemas postulated by Beck 
constitute a diathesis condition for depression. They are 
held to be temporally stable, in that during inter-episode 
intervals they once again become dormant. Thus, the failure 
of standard self-report measures to identify these schemas in 
the depression-prone person who is currently between episodes 
is not surprising. If Beck's theory is to hold, however, 
these schemas must somehow be shown to be present, despite 
their latent status, in the currently asymptomatic depression-
prone individual. 
The present series of studies employs a variety of 
methods in an effort to assess the presence of depressogenic 
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schemas in the depression-prone person. In the present study, 
ten of the thirty subjects were in fact currently clinically 
depressed. Ten others were remitted depressives, who had 
previously experienced at least one episode of unipolar 
depression, and the remaining ten had no history of 
depression. Since one of the primary uses of the TAT is to 
identify important underlying themes that guide or reflect 
one's behavior, we reasoned that the test might be sensitive 
to the schemas discussed by Beck. If Beck's theory is 
correct, we are hypothesizing that most of the ten actively 
depressed subjects, as well as most of the ten currently 
remitted depressed subjects, will be classified as depressed, 
whereas the normal control subjects will be classified as not 
depressed. 
There are, of course, many limitations to the present 
methodology, including the fact that only four cards were 
administered, and you, the clinical judge, were not able to 
have direct contact with the subjects yourself. Nevertheless, 
in combination with the other studies in this series, we hope 
that the results of the present study will shed some light on 
this intriguing theoretical issue. 
If you have any further questions, or if you would like 
to discuss further the purpose or results of this study, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at 212-420-2800 (work), 
or 718-435-5108 (home). Thank you once again for your help. 
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Appendix S 
Debriefing Statement 
As was explained to you when this study was introduced, 
we are interested in how certain motivating factors that 
people may not be fully aware of may be involved in the 
development of clinical depression. A major theory of 
depression proposes that persons at risk for depression may 
hold certain unrealistically negative attitudes or beliefs 
about themselves, the world, and the future. An example of 
such a belief might be something like "I must be successful 
at everything I do or else I'm no good as a person." Past 
research suggests that some people at risk for depression 
readily acknowledge having these beliefs. Other people, 
however, such as many of those who have been depressed in the 
past but who are not currently depressed, usually don't report 
having these beliefs. 
In order to investigate the possibility that different 
groups of people might hold such negative beliefs, we 
presented stimuli, consisting of short sentences, on the 
tachistoscope (or "t-scope" for short). Sometimes the stimuli 
were exposed very quickly (or "subliminally"), and sometimes 
they were exposed for a longer time (or "supraliminally") . 
Past research shows that people sometimes react differently 
to stimuli when they are presented subliminally compared to 
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when they are presented supraliminally. We presented two 
types of stimuli in this manner. One group consisted of 
statements reflecting the negative beliefs that some people 
may hold, and included the following: 
"I have to be perfect" 
"I have to be loved by everyone" 
"Making mistakes is terrible" 
"I must agree with everyone" 
"I have to be successful at everything." 
The other group of stimuli were more positive 
alternatives to each of these statements, and included: 
"I don't have to be perfect" 
"I don't have to be loved by everyone" 
"Making mistakes is OK" 
"It's OK to disagree" 
"I don't always have to be successful." 
Three different groups of people are being compared in 
this study: 1) people who are currently depressed; 2) people 
who have been depressed in the past but are not currently 
depressed; and 3) people who have never been depressed. We 
think that people who have had some experience with depression 
either currently or in the past may respond more to the 
stimuli, especially when they are presented subliminally, than 
people who have never been depressed. For example, people who 
have been depressed may feel slightly more sad when they see 
the negative statements and slightly more happy when they see 
the positive statements, whereas people who haven't been 
depressed may not be affected one way or the other. By 
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comparing how these three groups of people respond to the 
different stimuli described above, we hope to be able to see 
what role (if any) negative beliefs play in causing 
depression. We hope that the results of this study will lead 
toward a better understanding of the causes of depression, and 
will hold implications for improved treatments and 
preventative measures for the condition. 
Past studies using similar procedures to those used here 
have found that any effects the stimuli may have had on your 
mood are very small and very fleeting. That is, if you 
noticed any change at all in your feelings, it was probably 
very slight, and won't last more than a few minutes. If, 
however, you feel that the stimuli may have had any other 
effects, or if you have any questions at all about the study, 
please don't hesitate to call the Principal Investigator, Mr. 
James Herbert, at 334-5662 or 334-5013, or the project 
supervisor, Dr. Rosemery O. Nelson, at 334-5013. You can also 
drop by Mr. Herbert's office in the Eberhart building at UNCG 
(Rm. 382 or Rm. 377). 
Your participation in this project has been greatly 
appreciated. Let me ask you one last favor: Please don't 
discuss any details about the study with anyone you know who 
might also be a participant in the study in the future, as 
this could possibly contaminate our results. 
